Vincent v. City of New Haven
Decision Date | 11 March 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 17661.,17661. |
Citation | 285 Conn. 778,941 A.2d 932 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Martha VINCENT v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. |
Jason M. Dodge, Glastonbury, for the appellants (defendants).
Thomas A. Weaver, Meriden, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Nathan Julian Shafner filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.*
The sole issue raised by this workers' compensation appeal is whether the surviving dependent of an employee who, prior to the employee's death, was entitled to health insurance coverage, also is entitled to health insurance coverage following the employee's death. The named defendant, the city of New Haven (city),1 denied the plaintiff, Martha Vincent, health insurance coverage after her husband, Edwin Vincent (decedent), died of a work-related injury to his heart. The plaintiff contested the city's denial of coverage, claiming that, because she had been entitled to and was receiving health insurance coverage at the city's expense prior to the decedent's death pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1989). § 31-284b,2 she also was entitled to such coverage after the decedent's death. The workers' compensation commissioner for the third district (commissioner) agreed with the plaintiff that, under General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) §§ 7-433c3 and 31-306,4 the city was required to provide her with the same health insurance coverage to which she had been entitled prior to the decedent's death.5 The compensation review board (board) affirmed the commissioner's decision, and the city appealed.6 We conclude that the plaintiff is not entitled to health insurance benefits under § 31-306, and, therefore, we reverse the decision of the board.
The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed. The decedent was employed by the city as a police officer. On October 10, 1990, the decedent suffered an injury to his heart7 and filed a claim for benefits under § 7-433c. The city accepted the claim and, in accordance with the requirements of § 31-284b, provided the decedent and the plaintiff with group health insurance coverage.
On September 3, 1991, the decedent died as a result of his heart injury. The plaintiff, the decedent's sole dependent, entered into an agreement with the city pursuant to which the city accepted the plaintiffs claim for survivor's benefits under § 31-306. The city, however, contested liability for continuing health insurance coverage, claiming that, under the plain language of § 31-306, an employer is not required to provide health insurance coverage to the surviving dependent of a deceased employee. Concluding that he was bound by prior precedent of the board; see Weymouth v. Police Dept., No. 4550, CRB-1-02-7 (April 3, 2003) ( ); Sansone v. Enfield, No. 3885, CRB-01-98-9 (November 18, 1999) (same); the commissioner ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The city appealed from the decision of the commissioner to the board, which affirmed the commissioner's ruling.
On appeal from the decision of the board, the city maintains that its obligation under § 31-284b to provide the plaintiff with health insurance coverage terminated upon the decedent's death because § 31-306 plainly and unambiguously limits a surviving dependent's benefits to burial expenses and weekly compensation calculated as a percentage of the deceased employee's earnings. We agree with the city.
We note preliminarily that the issue raised in this appeal, namely, whether the plaintiff is entitled to continued health insurance coverage under § 31-306 following the death of the decedent, "is one of statutory construction ... Because the relevant aspects of this statute have been subjected neither to previous judicial scrutiny nor to a time-tested interpretation by the board we afford no special deference to the conclusion of the board.8 ... Instead, we exercise the plenary review [that] we otherwise apply to such questions of law....
,"(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pizzuto v. Commissioner of Mental Retardation, 283 Conn. 257, 264-65, 927 A.2d 811 (2007). With these principles in mind, we turn to the relevant statutory language.
Under General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31-306(b), "[c]ompensation shall be paid [to dependents] on account of death resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment or from an occupational disease as follows: (1) ... four thousand dollars for burial expenses ... [and] (2) [t]o those wholly dependent upon the deceased employee at the time of his injury, a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly earnings of the deceased at the time of injury...." (Emphasis added.) These two payments—a payment for burial expenses and a weekly payment based on a percentage of the deceased employee's average weekly earnings —represent the only compensation to which a surviving dependent is entitled under the express language of § 31-306. The statute makes no mention of an entitlement to any other benefits, including health insurance coverage.
The plaintiff nevertheless claims that § 31-306 is ambiguous and that the ambiguity must be resolved in her favor in light of the beneficent purposes of the act. The plaintiff relies on two separate but related arguments to support her claim of ambiguity. First, the plaintiff refers to General Statutes § 31-275(4),10 which defines "`[c]ompensation'" for purposes of the act as "benefits or payments mandated by the provisions of [the act], including, but not limited to payments made under the provisions of section 31-284b..." The plaintiff contends that, because "payments made under the provisions of [§ ] 31-284b" include health insurance benefits for dependents; see Tufaro v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 24 Conn.App. 234, 239, 587 A.2d 1044 (1991) ( ); the legislature's use of the word "compensation" in § 31-306 reasonably may be interpreted as signifying an intent to include health insurance benefits within the purview of that statutory provision. Second, the plaintiff relies on General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31-284b (a), which provides that an employer who provides health insurance coverage to its employees must continue to provide such coverage to injured employees "[i]n order to maintain, as nearly as possible, the income of employees who suffer employment-related injuries...."11 In essence, the plaintiff maintains that it is reasonable to read the remedial purpose of § 31-284b, which refers only to employees, into § 31-306, which refers only to surviving dependents of employees, and that doing so imports ambiguity into § 31-306. As the plaintiff notes, since the board's decision in Sansone,12 the board has relied on this rationale in concluding that "the ambiguous interplay" of these statutory provisions "should be construed to allow the [surviving dependent' to receive ... health insurance coverage as part of her survivor's benefits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven, No. 4919, CRB-3-05-1 (January 13, 2006), quoting Sansone v. Enfield, supra, at No. 3885. We conclude that neither § 31-275 nor § 31-284b supports the plaintiff's claim that § 31-306 reasonably may be construed to require an employer to provide health insurance coverage to a surviving dependent of a deceased employee.
First, we reject the plaintiff's contention that § 31-275(4), which defines "compensation" to include health insurance coverage, affords a basis for concluding that § 31-306 requires the city to continue to provide the plaintiff with such coverage following the death of the decedent. General Statutes § 31-275 expressly provides that its definition of compensation shall apply throughout the act "unless the context otherwise provides...." "By adding the phrase `unless the context otherwise provides,' the legislature recognized that in some cases the circumstances under which the statute is being applied control the meaning of the term `compensation.'" Weinberg v. ARA...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Blondeau v. Baltierra
...to accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven , 285 Conn. 778, 792, 941 A.2d 932 (2008). Nothing in § 52-420 requires a movant to articulate the factual basis for a motion to vacate, modify or correct an a......
-
Tomick v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.
...governing the same general subject matter . . . ." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven, 285 Conn. 778, 784-85, 941 A.2d 932 (2008). "An axiomatic rule of statutory construction is that statutes should be construed so that no part of a legislative enact......
-
Dipietro v. Farmington Sports Arena Llc., No. 29175.
...Because the statute is remedial in nature, it should be construed broadly to accomplish its remedial purpose. See Vincent v. New Haven, 285 Conn. 778, 792, 941 A.2d 932 (2008). In addition, “any ambiguities should be resolved in a manner that furthers, rather than thwarts, the [statute's] r......
-
State v. Singleton
...particular result. That is a function of the legislature." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven, 285 Conn. 778, 792, 941 A.2d 932 (2008). It is thus for the legislature, not for this court, to decide whether a second exception should be added to § 53a-1......