Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey

• Decision Date: 03 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-35424.,04-35424.
• Citation: 452 F.3d 1055
• Parties: TUTOR-SALIBA CORPORATION, a California Corporation; Ronald N. Tutor, an Individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF HAILEY, a Municipal Corporation; Board of Trustees of the Friedman Memorial Airport Authority; Friedman Memorial Airport Authority, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

452 F.3d 1055

TUTOR-SALIBA CORPORATION, a California Corporation; Ronald N. Tutor, an Individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF HAILEY, a Municipal Corporation; Board of Trustees of the Friedman Memorial Airport Authority; Friedman Memorial Airport Authority, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-35424.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 10, 2006.

Filed July 3, 2006.

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Patrick E. Bailey, Bailey & Partners, Santa Monica, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

W. Eric Pilsk, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, Washington, DC, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho; B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV 02-0475 BLW.

Before: BRUNETTI, TASHIMA, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Ronald N. Tutor ("Tutor") filed this action after defendants denied him permission to land his Boeing Business Jet at Friedman Memorial Airport in Hailey, Idaho. Tutor brought several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims, and defendants subsequently filed a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.¹ The district court found that all but two of the bases of Tutor's § 1983 claim were frivolous; it therefore granted defendants' motion in part for fees and costs incurred in defending against Tutor's frivolous claims, while denying the motion with respect to fees and costs incurred in defending against Tutor's non-frivolous claims.

Tutor then moved to vacate the fee order, arguing that: (1) the district court applied an improper legal standard when evaluating the § 1988 motion for attorney's fees and costs; (2) because the district court found that two bases of the § 1983 claim were not frivolous, the entire § 1983 cause of action was necessarily not frivolous; and (3) the district court's fee allocation, including costs, was unreasonable and not supported by the record. The district court denied Tutor's motion to vacate and Tutor now raises the same arguments on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over this post-judgment order. We affirm the district court's conclusion that defendants were entitled to partial attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against Tutor's frivolous claims. However, because the district court failed to explain adequately how it arrived at the amount of its attorney's fee and cost award, we vacate the award and remand so that the district court may further elucidate its reasoning.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendants operate Friedman Memorial Airport, which is a single-runway airport serving the resort areas of Hailey, Ketchum, and Sun Valley, Idaho. Tutor owns a vacation home in Ketchum and requested permission to land his personal Boeing Business Jet² at the airport in order to access his vacation home.

The airport maintains a runway weight restriction that prohibits operations by dual-wheel aircraft with a maximum gross take-off weight of 95,000 pounds or more. Tutor's Boeing Jet has a maximum gross take-off weight of 171,000 pounds. Defendants applied this weight restriction and denied Tutor's request to operate his Boeing jet at the airport. Although Tutor was denied permission to operate his Boeing jet at the airport, he was able to access his vacation home by using an alternative private jet that met the airport's weight requirements.

Tutor's complaint challenged defendants' restriction as violating substantive due process, procedural due process, equal protection, and right to travel and his rights under the Commerce Clause, the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. §§ 47101-47131 (2004) ("AAIA"), the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990, 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521-47533 (2004) ("ANCA"), and state law. Tutor sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Following discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Tutor's motion for summary judgment and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that a number of Tutor's claims were frivolous. Defendants subsequently moved for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court granted defendants' motion in part, concluding that all of Tutor's constitutional claims, i.e., his substantive due process, procedural due process, equal protection, Commerce Clause, and right to travel claims, were frivolous. It also found, however, that Tutor's AAIA and ANCA claims were issues of first impression, and therefore were not frivolous. After reviewing the record, briefs, and legal bills, the district court determined that 20 percent of defendants' legal fees were attributable to defending against the frivolous constitutional claims. It then found that the hourly rate charged by defendants' counsel was reasonable for the skill and experience of the lawyers and awarded $88,094.05 in legal fees, representing 20 percent of the total fees requested, plus $70,944.39 in costs, mostly for travel and depositions. The district court denied defendants' request for expert fees and costs. It also denied Tutor's motion to vacate the fee award. Tutor appeals the fee award.³

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's decision to award attorney's fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Richard S. v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 317 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir.2003). "Elements of legal analysis and statutory interpretation that figure into the district court's attorney's fees decision are reviewed de novo." Id. at 1086 (citation omitted). Factual findings supporting the decision are reviewed for clear error. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Tutor's constitutional claims were frivolous.

In addition to relief available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1988 provides, in relevant part, that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Supreme Court has instructed that a prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to an attorney's fees award under § 1988 only when the plaintiff's action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)). In determining whether this standard has been met, a district court must assess the claim at the time the complaint was filed, and must avoid "post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. 694.

A. The district court applied the proper legal standard.

Tutor first argues that the district court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard when it evaluated whether his constitutional claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Tutor contends that the district court improperly relied on evidence offered by the parties in support of their motions for summary judgment and its review of the record and its own assessment of Tutor's claims, rather than on the nature of the claims at the outset of the litigation.

The only support Tutor offers for his argument is a string of partial quotes from the district court's opinions. Tutor contends that the quotes prove that the district court applied "post-hoc reasoning" and "hindsight logic" because they are in the past tense. A review of the district court's rulings, however, belies Tutor's argument. In its summary judgment ruling, the district court cited to Christiansburg, indicating that it was aware of the proper legal standard. The district court also carefully evaluated each of Tutor's claims and focused on whether there was any colorable legal or factual basis for each claim.

Moreover, in response to Tutor's motion to vacate, the district court expressly stated that its decision was based on the fact that Tutor "could not, even at the outset of the litigation, establish that [he] had a Constitutionally protected right to operate [his] preferred aircraft at [his] preferred airport." See Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 356 (11th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (reversing the denial of attorney's fees after summary judgment because "the assertion of a constitutional claim based knowingly on a nonexistent property interest was legally groundless"); Flowers v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 49 F.3d 391, 392-93 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (affirming fee award where district court "specifically considered the Supreme Court's admonition in Christiansburg to refrain from post hoc reasoning and to view the reasonableness of the matter from the plaintiff's perspective at the time"). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court applied the proper legal standard when it determined that Tutor's constitutional claims were frivolous.

B. Tutor's constitutional claims were frivolous.

We next examine whether the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that Tutor's constitutional claims were frivolous at the outset of the litigation. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. 694; Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 650 (9th Cir.2005). Tutor argues that his constitutional claims were not frivolous because they were supported by existing case law. Although Tutor cites various cases which he contends demonstrate that his claims were not frivolous, as we explain below, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Tutor lacked a factual and legal basis for his constitutional claims at the outset of the litigation.

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