Tyrrell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington
Decision Date | 09 March 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 67862-6.,67862-6. |
Citation | 140 Wash.2d 129,994 P.2d 833 |
Parties | Michael D. TYRRELL, Respondent, v. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF WASHINGTON, Petitioner. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Diehl Rettig, Cheryl Adamson, Kennewick, for Petitioner.
Timothy B. Fennessy, Spokane, for Respondent.
Michael Tyrrell, respondent, brought an action in Spokane County Superior Court against Farmers Insurance Company of Washington (Farmers), petitioner, requesting a declaratory judgment that Tyrrell's tripping while exiting a camper attached to his pickup truck, with alleged injuries resulting, was a "motor vehicle accident" covered under the personal injury provisions (PIP) of his automobile insurance policy. The trial court granted Tyrrell's motion for partial summary judgment on this question. Farmers appealed, arguing in relevant part that the legal conclusion that Tyrrell's injuries were the product of a "motor vehicle accident" was clearly erroneous. Division Three of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Farmers petitioned for this Court's review. We granted review, and now reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for an entry of summary judgment in Farmers' favor.
The following facts are undisputed. In 1992, Tyrrell, a chiropractor, parked a 1986 Toyota one-ton pickup, to which a detachable camper was affixed, in a Spokane park for overnight camping. The vehicle was insured by Farmers. The camper's purchase, occurring three or four years after that of the truck, had included a single, unattached wooden object used as a step to make entering and exiting easier. Upon exiting the camper, Tyrrell stepped down from the truck's tailgate onto the unattached wooden step that had been placed on the ground. The step somehow gave way, causing Tyrrell to fall. In falling, his arm caught on the edge of the tailgate, cutting it. He then landed on a rock, further injuring himself. In addition to minor wounds, Tyrrell suffered two compression fractures in his back. Tyrrell first notified Farmers of the incident a few months later. Two and a half years later he filed a claim with Farmers under his policy's PIP provisions seeking payment for medical expenses, wage loss, and the purchase of a Nordic Track and medical equipment. Farmers denied the claim.
Tyrrell filed an action in Spokane County Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the accident was covered under the PIP provisions of his Farmers policy. Farmers answered with two affirmative defenses: (1) The injuries were not caused by a "motor vehicle accident" and, thus, were not covered by the Farmers policy; and (2) Tyrrell breached conditions in his Farmers policy precedent to invoking its coverage by failing to cooperate with Farmers and timely submit his claim form. Farmers moved for summary judgment on the question of whether Tyrrell's injury claim was the result of a "motor vehicle accident" within the insurance policy's coverage, arguing it was not. Tyrrell cross-claimed for a partial summary judgment finding that there was coverage. The trial judge granted partial summary judgment on this question to Tyrrell and denied Farmers' motion. Farmers then moved for summary judgment on its second affirmative defense: breach of the policy's cooperation clause. This motion was also denied,1 thus reserving this fact question for trial. Farmers appealed to Division Three of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. See Tyrrell v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 94 Wash.App. 320, 971 P.2d 960 (1999)
. Farmers then petitioned for this Court's review, and review was granted.
Was Tyrrell's injury claim the result of a "motor vehicle accident" covered by his automobile insurance policy?
The central issue in this case is whether Tyrrell's injury claim could have been covered by his automobile insurance policy inasmuch as the policy limits coverage to claims for "bodily injury to each insured person caused by a motor vehicle accident." Clerk's Papers at 92 (emphasis added).
801 P.2d 207 (citing E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wash.2d 901, 907, 726 P.2d 439 (1986)).
Where policy language is "clear and unambiguous," and not fairly susceptible to two different reasonable interpretations, courts may not create an ambiguity. Kitsap County, 136 Wash.2d at 576, 964 P.2d 1173 (citing American Star, 121 Wash.2d at 874, 854 P.2d 622). Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the language of the insurance policy at issue here to be unambiguous, and neither party argues here that the term "motor vehicle accident" is ambiguous—although they do disagree over its meaning. The term arises in the following context:
We will provide the benefits described below for bodily injury to each insured person caused by a motor vehicle accident.
. . . .
Motor vehicle means a land motor vehicle or a trailer, but does not mean a vehicle:
. . . .
3. Located for use as a residence or premises.
Clerk's Papers at 92. There is no dispute over the fact that Tyrrell's injuries resulted from an "accident," which the policy defines as "a sudden event, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions, resulting in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended by the insured person." Clerk's Papers at 90. Thus, while "motor vehicle" and "accident" are defined, the term "motor vehicle accident" is not.
In defining "motor vehicle accident," Farmers heavily relies upon a Division Two decision, Farmers Ins. Co. v. Grelis, 43 Wash.App. 475, 718 P.2d 812 (1986). When Grelis, the owner of an insured van, was sitting inside his van, he invited someone to enter the vehicle. That person proceeded to pull a knife on Grelis with the intention of robbing him. The robber tripped on part of the front seat, accidentally lunged forward, and stabbed Grelis. See id. at 476-77, 718 P.2d 812. Grelis made a claim of benefits under his insurance policy for medical expenses and lost income due to the stabbing, under the terms of a PIP provision that provided benefits "`for injury to each insured person caused by an automobile accident.'" Id. at 477, 718 P.2d 812 (emphasis omitted). Farmers denied coverage, finding that the stabbing injury was not the product of such an automobile accident. Farmers sought, and received, a summary judgment finding that no coverage existed for Grelis's injury. Id. On appeal, Grelis argued that the term "automobile accident" was ambiguous and should be construed against Farmers. Grelis's policy defined "accident" in a manner identical to the definition of "accident" in Tyrrell's Farmers policy. Id. The court wrote that "[t]he issue ... is whether the word `accident' is ambiguous when modified by the word `automobile.'" Id. at 478, 718 P.2d 812. Applying the rules of insurance contract interpretation, the court found that Id. It noted that the average person would not consider the stabbing incident to be an "automobile accident," even though it involved an automobile. Id. Significantly, Division Two found support in another court's construction of "the similar term `motor vehicle accident'":
Id. (quoting Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth. v. Gholson, 98 Misc.2d 657, 658-59, 414 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490, aff'd, 71 A.D.2d 1004, 420 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1979)). Accordingly, Division Two found that the injuries to Grelis were caused by the robbery, and the incidental involvement of van seats did not convert the incident into an "automobile accident." See id.
Grelis is factually distinguishable, which Tyrrell argues makes it legally distinguishable as well. However, Farmers argues that the discussion in Grelis of the meaning of the similar term "automobile accident," and approvingly quoted definition from Gholson of the term "motor vehicle accident," is consistent with the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of the latter term within the context of the insurance policy at issue here....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Sharbono v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.
...If possible, we interpret a policy to harmonize the policy's provisions and avoid creating ambiguities. Tyrrell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 140 Wash.2d 129, 133, 994 P.2d 833 (2000); see Dobosh v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co., 43 Wash.App. 467, 471, 717 P.2d 793 (1986) (citations II. IN......
-
Matthews v. Penn-America Ins. Co.
...418, 38 S.Ct. 158, 62 L.Ed. 372 (1918)); U.S. Life Credit Life Ins., 129 Wash.2d at 569, 919 P.2d 594. 28. Tyrrell v. Farmers Ins. Co., 140 Wash.2d 129, 133, 994 P.2d 833 (2000) ("In reviewing the policy, it is considered as a whole so as to give effect to every clause in it."); Kitsap Coun......
-
State v. Bisson
...are questions of law reviewed de novo. State v. Harrison, 148 Wash.2d 550, 556, 61 P.3d 1104 (2003); Tyrrell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 140 Wash.2d 129, 133, 994 P.2d 833 (2000). ¶ 18 Available Remedies for Involuntary Plea Agreement. For a defendant's guilty plea to be deemed voluntary ......
-
Polygon v. American Nat. Fire Ins. Co.
...however, we must examine the entire policy as a whole and give effect to every clause contained therein. Tyrrell v. Farmers Ins. Co., 140 Wash.2d 129, 133, 994 P.2d 833 (2000). In determining the meaning of a particular term, we must view the "`contract as a whole, the subject matter and ob......
-
Table of Cases
...17.16(1) Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wn.App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970): 17.16(1) Tyrrell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 140 Wn.2d 129, 994 P.2d 833 (2000): 17.4 U_____________________________________________________________________ Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 97 Wn.App. 417, 983 P.2d 1155 (1......
-
§17.4 - Principles of Insurance Contract Interpretation and Construction
...Terms that are not defined are given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, Tyrrell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 140 Wn.2d 129, 133, 994 P.2d 833 (2000), and courts sometimes consult a standard English dictionary as a part of this analysis. Id. If the court is to give a word a technic......