Tyson v. District Court for Fourth Judicial Dist., El Paso County, State of Colo.

Decision Date06 March 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94SA351,94SA351
Citation891 P.2d 984
PartiesRobert Long TYSON and Barbara Germaine Whitehorn Tyson, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT FOR the FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, EL PASO COUNTY, STATE OF COLORADO, and the Honorable Gilbert A. Martinez, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Melat, Pressman, Ezell & Higbie, Bernard R. Baker, Colorado Springs, for petitioners.

John W. Suthers, Dist. Atty., Robert D. Jones, Deputy Dist. Atty., Fourth Judicial Dist., Colorado Springs, for respondents.

Justice VOLLACK delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The petitioners-defendants, Robert Long Tyson and Barbara Germaine Whitehorn Tyson, have filed this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21, challenging an order of the El Paso County District Court. We issued a rule directing the respondent, the El Paso County District Court, to show cause why the defendants should be prohibited from having their retained counsel represent both their interests. Because we hold that the district court's order deprived the defendants of the right to counsel of their choice, we now make the rule absolute and direct the district court to vacate its August 22, 1994 order.

I.

By indictment, the defendants, Robert Tyson and Barbara Germaine Whitehorn Tyson, husband and wife, were charged with felony menacing, § 18-3-206, 8B C.R.S. (1986); prohibited use of a weapon, § 18-12-106, 8B C.R.S. (1986); criminal mischief, § 18-4-501, 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.); reckless endangerment, § 18-3-208, 8B C.R.S. (1986); reckless driving, § 42-4-1203, 17 C.R.S. (1993); possession of marihuana, § 18-18-106, 8B C.R.S. (1986); second-degree assault, § 18-3-203, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.); and illegal discharge of a firearm, § 18-12-107.5, 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), in connection with a drive-by shooting on the interstate highway.

The defendants retained the same attorney to represent them in defending against these charges. At the preliminary hearing in July 1994, the El Paso County District Court determined that no conflict of interest existed by both defendants' being represented by the same attorney, based on all the attendant facts and circumstances. During the course of this hearing, the following colloquy ensued between the district court and the defendants:

THE COURT: Mr. Tyson and Ms. Whitehorn, you have one attorney representing you.... That raises a conflict of interest. It's not a potential conflict, it is a conflict. Do you understand that?

....

THE COURT: And ... the reason why there is a conflict, is two reasons:

One, if you each had an attorney that was not the same, that attorney may be able to get a better plea bargain for you by saying, "It's not my fault, it's Mr. Tyson's fault", or it's the other way around, "It's not my fault", Mr. Tyson, "it's Ms. Whitehorn's fault". In other words, your attorneys would be able to perhaps shed some blame on the other party. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT BARBARA WHITEHORN: Yes.

DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: Yes, sir.

....

THE COURT: That is going to affect a potential defense at trial. [Your attorney] will not be able to tell a jury trial--or jurors, that you are not at fault, that the co-Defendant's at fault. Do you understand that?

....

THE COURT: That also obviously affects any kind of plea bargain, because he can't go to the District Attorney and say, "Dismiss the charges against my client because the other Defendant's more at fault", or "Give my client a misdemeanor because the other Defendant's more at fault". Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT BARBARA WHITEHORN: Yes, sir.

DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: Yes, sir.

....

THE COURT: And do you have any questions or problems with [your attorney] representing both of you?

....

THE COURT: Why don't you have any problems? Mr. Tyson?

DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: Well, for one thing, we don't intend to make any plea bargains, Your Honor.

....

DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: And we're both very satisfied with [the attorney]; at least I am.

THE COURT: ... And Ms. Whitehorn?

DEFENDANT BARBARA WHITEHORN: I have no intention to making a plea bargain, as to place the blame on Robert would depend on me lying. I would have to lie to say that he's guilty of something, and that would be absurd.

THE COURT: Do you understand that I have had many people stand in front of me and say, "We're going to trial, we're not going to have a plea bargain", but lo and behold, the closer you get to trial, they do reach a plea bargain? For example, the District Attorney could offer you a misdemeanor offense, with no jail, with probation, and no fine, and let you on out of here with nothing basically, with the exception of a misdemeanor, and you are precluding yourself from doing that?

DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: He's already made that offer, Your Honor, and we've rejected it.

DEFENDANT BARBARA WHITEHORN: He did make me an offer of Class Five Felony, no jail time, and I refused that.

THE COURT: Also, the District Attorney might be able to say, Ms. Tyson, or Mr. Tyson, "I'm going to dismiss the charges against you if you testify against Ms. Whitehorn", or he might be able to tell Ms. Whitehorn, "I'm going to dismiss charges against you if you testify against Mr. Tyson", and when you have one attorney representing both of you, that can't happen? Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: Yes. We discussed that with [our attorney], Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And is it your intention to have [your attorney] represent both of you?

DEFENDANT BARBARA WHITEHORN: Yes.

DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that by waiving any conflict today, you can't come back at a later time and say, "Judge, there was a conflict"; you can't come back at a later time on appeal and say, "Judge, there was a conflict", because, more than likely, the [c]ourt of appeals is going to say you waived the conflict? Do you understand that?

....

THE COURT: All right. I just want you both to understand that another attorney might be more effective representing you than [your attorney] is, because of the conflict. Do you understand that?

....

THE COURT: And why is [it that you have a preference for your attorney to represent you]?

DEFENDANT BARBARA WHITEHORN: I think he's a very capable attorney, and very experienced.

DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: I'm satisfied with his abilities, Your Honor.

District Judge Martinez additionally appointed advisory counsel for each defendant in order for the court to further assess the representation issue. Each court-appointed attorney interviewed his respective party separately for the limited purpose of ascertaining the existence of a conflict. Following the completed interviews, the district court gleaned what had transpired between the advisory counsel and each defendant. The advisory counsel expressed to the court that both of the defendants remained intent on having their attorney represent them:

[ADVISORY COUNSEL FOR BARBARA WHITEHORN]: ... [H]ere are some issues that were discussed, either in depth, or touched upon, depending on how much I thought they were involved in this case.

The diversity of liability for the two persons potentially being an issue; sentencing exposure; mitigating factors; aggravating factors; ... the general concept of who would have been, if convicted--if either of them would have been convicted, who would be considered more blameworthy, so to speak. We had some discussion of the severance of the two Defendants as a trial tactic.... Plea bargaining was certainly discussed. The fact that either both or neither parties might choose to testify at trial, which I thought was a big issue here, along with the plea bargaining, along with the sentencing issues.... Jury selection, we spent a significant amount of time on that, which I thought was an issue here.

....

And I believe [Ms. Whitehorn] listened to those, and was able to intelligently discuss those matters with me, and it's my clear belief that she desires to have [her attorney], ... she wants [the retained attorney] to represent her.

....

[ADVISORY COUNSEL FOR ROBERT TYSON]: ... I met with my client.... We talked at length ... [about] the same topics as [the other advisory counsel] discussed with his client; differences in culpability, differences in the appropriateness of a plea, the differences between husband and wife concerning the appropriateness of a plea agreement, differences concerning who should testify and not testify, and how a jury might perceive the difference between joint representation and representation by separate attorneys.

... [Mr. Tyson] understands the charge against him.... He also understands the potential conflicts as well, and he desires to waive those conflicts.

....

I don't think the public would perceive a flaw in the judicial system if husband and wife, with a great unity of interest, decide to conduct a joint defense, and in fact, Your Honor, based upon [a] ... review of the facts of this case, I think a joint defense is in these Defendants' best interests.

So, therefore, I would urge the Court to accept the Defendant's waiver of the conflict, and allow [the retained attorney] to represent the parties as they desire.

The court thereafter received signed affidavits from both defendants waiving any conflict of interest and engaged in the following exchange:

THE COURT: What if [the District Attorney's Office] offer[s] one of your clients a misdemeanor, and one gets one day probation, no fine, no jail, if that client would testify against the other client, ... an attorney might certainly say that deal is so good, it's too good to pass up, and would tell their client to take that deal. You, representing both clients, have conflicting interests. If you told one client to take the deal, you would not be representing your other client.

[DEFENDANTS' RETAINED ATTORNEY]: We've discussed that very potentiality; that--any possible plea offers that might be forthcoming, and each of them...

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