Tyson v. Stoutamire

• Decision Date: 21 March 1932
• Citation: 104 Fla. 505,140 So. 454
• Parties: TYSON v. STOUTAMIRE, Sheriff.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

140 So. 454

104 Fla. 505

TYSON v. STOUTAMIRE, Sheriff.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

March 21, 1932

Original habeas corpus proceeding instituted on petition of James Edward Tyson against Frank Stoutamire, Sheriff of Leon County.

Petitioner remanded.

ELLIS J., and BUFORD, C.J., dissenting.

COUNSEL

B. K. Roberts, of Tallahassee, and De Hoff & De Hoff, of Jacksonville, for petitioner.

B. A Meginniss, of Tallahassee, Cary D. Landis, Atty. Gen., and H E. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

W. J. Oven, of Tallahassee, Edgar W. Waybright and Stanton Walker, both of Jacksonville, as amici curiae.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Paragraph 4 of section 1011, Rev. Gen. St., section 1285, Comp. Gen. Laws, as amended by section 3 of Chapter 15625, Acts of 1931, Ex. Sess., approved June 26, 1931, reads as follows:

'(4) No motor vehicle shall be operated on a public highway outside of any municipal corporation in this State carrying a load of more than sixteen thousand pounds, including the weight of such vehicle.' (Emphasis ours.)

This proceeding in habeas corpus was instituted to determine directly the constitutionality of the above-quoted section, in view of its relation to chapter 14764, Acts of 1931, which in section 11 thereof provides:

'No truck or trailer shall be authorized under any Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity in common carriage to carry a load in excess of 12,000 pounds, and the Commission shall by the terms of all certificates issued by it limit the load weight of every truck or trailer to not more than 12,000 pounds. * * *'

The argument of petitioner for his discharge from custody is that, since the first law above named applies to so-called 'private' trucks and motor vehicles, while the last mentioned statute applies solely to 'certificated' vehicles holding permits from the Railroad Commission, there is an unlawful and unconstitutional discrimination created between the first class and the latter class of vehicles, with resultant denial of the equal protection of the laws, because, under the first class, so-called private vehicles must conform to a maximum weight limit of 16,000 pounds (which includes the weight of the vehicle), while, under the last classification, 'certificated' vehicles operating under authority of the Railroad Commission are permitted to carry as much as 12,000 pounds of load, regardless of the weight of the vehicle, which may make the combined weight of both vehicles and load run much over 16,000 pounds in the case of a 'certificated' vehicle.

In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the fact that in the briefs of the petitioner it is stated that, for a 'certificated' vehicle to carry a 12,000 pound load, a six-ton type of truck would have to be used, making the combined weight of truck and load amount to approximately 20,500 pounds; the truck weighing, so it is said, about 8,500 pounds.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we may take judicial notice of the divers weights of motor vehicles as determined by the state motor vehicle commissioner, we may regard it as established for the purposes of this record that, under chapter 15625, supra, a private use truck or bus would be limited to a maximum weight limit of 16,000 pounds for both load and vehicle combined, while a so-called 'certificated' truck or bus, falling under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission, as provided by chapter 14764, supra, would, under the latter act, by authority of a permit from the commission, be permitted to be operated with a combined weight of vehicle and load of as much as 20,500 pounds.

A majority of the court have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that no denial of the equal protection of the laws is brought about by providing one maximum weight for a public service or 'certificated' vehicle while a different and less maximum weight is fixed for a private use vehicle. Nor is such classification otherwise invalid, unreasonable, arbitrary, or unenforceable. Miami Transit Co. v. McLin (Fla.) 133 So. 99; Hiers v. Mitchell, 95 Fla. 345, 116 So. 81.

The weight limit provisions of chapter 14764, supra, have not been repealed by the terms of paragraph 4 of section 3 of chapter 15625, supra, merely because the letter chapter was enacted subsequent to chapter 14764. Both were passed at what may be regarded as one continuous session of the Legislature, although the latter act became a law at a special session which immediately followed the regular session of 1931. The rule is well established that acts passed at one and the same session of the Legislature, or at what is equivalent thereto, which acts deal with the same general subject, must be considered as being in pari materia. Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 65, 126 So. 308, 331.

Furthermore, section 8 of chapter 15625 contains a provision which reads as follows: 'But nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal any part of Senate Bill 411 passed at the regular session of the 1931 Legislature.' That Senate Bill No. 411 is what now appears in the books as chapter 14764 is admitted.

It is the duty of the court, in view of the foregoing proviso found in chapter 15625, supra, considered in connection with the general rule for construing acts in pari materia, to so construe the apparently conflicting provisions of chapter 14765 and chapter 15625 as to give each of them a reasonable field of operation. This is especially true when it appears that both acts were passed at what was practically one and the same session of the Legislature, and each of them dealt with a distinct phase of motor vehicle traffic. And, in addition to the foregoing, the Legislature has specifically said in the statute which was last passed (chapter 14625) that in passing chapter 15625 it did not intend to repeal 'any part of' chapter 14764 (Senate Bill 411).

So a majority of the court think that it is clear that the Legislature has the constitutional authority to separately deal with common carrier, private carrier, and special contract carrier vehicles, as a separate class from all others, and to impose upon that class such greater or less burdens and restrictions of operation as legislative wisdom may dictate. Accordingly, when the Legislature does pass two separate laws undertaking to deal with these classes separately, and says in the last law passed that, in making a special classification out of all motor vehicles except 'certificated' vehicles, it did not intend to repeal 'any part of' the law relating to certificated motor vehicles, we are compelled to give such legislative declaration its proper effect by holding that the weight limit of 16,000 pounds (combined load and vehicle), specified in chapter 15625, has no application to those separately classified vehicles which were separately dealt with by the Legislature and regulated by chapter 14764, supra.

Paragraph 4 of section 3 of chapter 15625, supra, provides that 'no' motor vehicle (which means passenger or freight carrying motor vehicles) shall be operated on a public highway carrying a load of more than 16,000 pounds,including the weight of such motor vehicle. That section is not in such hopeless conflict with chapter 14764 that it cannot be reconciled therewith, and we are not authorized to hold that, by reason of an apparent conflict, chapter 15625 must be deemed to have superseded and repealed the provisions of chapter 14764. To hold that the weight limit paragraph contained in chapter 15265, which applies as well to passenger busses as to freight carrying vehicles, supersedes the weight limits of chapter 14764, we must thereby hold that the Legislature intended to bring about a result in the enactment of chapter 15625 which would in effect probably outlaw a majority of the passenger carrying busses licensed by the Railroad Commission under chapter 14764, as well as a large unmber of freight carrying vehicles operating under the commission.

Nothing could be clearer than that the Legislature did not intend any such result, and that it evidenced its intent that no such result should ensue by expressly providing in chapter 15625 that such chapter should not repeal 'any part of' chapter 14764.

The history, purpose, and intent of chapter 15625 in the 1931 session of the Legislature is so well known that we are probably authorized to take judicial knowledge of the fact that chapter 15625 was principally enacted to provide an increase in automobile license tag fees, to give effect to the constitutional amendment exempting automobiles from ad valorem taxes, and to provide additional revenues for the common school by revising and re-enacting a portion of the existing statute. Likewise, the history, intent, and purpose of chapter 14764 is also so clear and well known that we are probably authorized to judicially notice the fact that its enactment was directly brought about because of the supposed offect of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264, which was supposed to have, to a large extent, rendered invalid the 1929 law on the subject of certificated vehicles.

The provisions of chapter 15625, Acts of 1931, Ex. Sess., prescribing a more restricted weight limit for so-called 'private' trucks and other vehicles than is authorized with respect to 'certificated' vehicles, being valid, the petitioner should be remanded, ant it is so ordered.

Petitioner remanded.

WHITFIELD, TERRELL, BROWN, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

BUFORD C.J., and ELLIS, J., dissent.

CONCURRING

BROWN, J. (concurring).

In addition to what is said in the majority opinion, I am inclined to think there is a reasonable basis for the classification made by the Legislature which limits private...