Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1979
• Citation: 407 A.2d 1
• Parties: Marcia TYSON et al. v. WHITAKER & SON, INC.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1

407 A.2d 1

Marcia TYSON et al. v. WHITAKER & SON, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 19, 1979.

Bennett, Kelly & Zimmerman, P. A., by Graydon G. Stevens (orally), Portland, for plaintiffs.

Hewes, Culley, Feehan & Beals by Martica F. Sawin (orally), Peter W. Culley, Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, GODFREY, NICHOLS and GLASSMAN, JJ.

McKUSICK, Chief Justice.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether a non-resident automobile dealer can be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Maine courts for the sale of a defectively manufactured or serviced vehicle that causes an accident in Maine. ¹ Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Superior Court (Cumberland County) dismissing this action for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant. The Superior Court ruled that assertion of jurisdiction over this nonresident dealer would violate due process. We disagree and therefore sustain the appeal. We do, however, remand the case to the Superior Court for further factfinding necessary to the ultimate determination of the jurisdictional issue.

On September 5, 1972, the father of plaintiffs Marcia and Tania Tyson purchased a 1972 Chevrolet truck from defendant, Whitaker & Son, Inc., an automobile dealer in Sidney, New York. ² At the time of the sale, the Tysons were New York residents. On July 26, 1973, while passengers in the truck traveling toward New Brunswick, Canada, plaintiffs were injured in a one-vehicle accident on the Maine Turnpike in New Gloucester. Subsequently plaintiffs moved to Florida. Thereafter, alleging that their truck's steering mechanism had failed, plaintiffs brought two actions in the Maine Superior Court, one against the truck's manufacturer, General Motors Corporation, and the other against the defendant automobile retailer. ³ In their action against defendant, now on appeal, plaintiffs alleged both breach of the warranties of merchantability and fitness and negligent "fail(ure) to properly inspect, service and maintain" the truck.

Defendant Whitaker & Son, Inc., after being served in New York State, moved to dismiss on the ground, Inter alia, of lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant supported its motion by its president's affidavit that it owned no property in Maine, had never solicited or transacted business in Maine, and had never shipped goods into Maine pursuant to a contract of sale. On February 1, 1979, the Superior Court dismissed the action against Whitaker & Son, Inc., holding that there were insufficient "minimum contacts" between Maine and defendant to support this state's assertion of jurisdiction over the New York dealership.

Our analysis begins with Maine's "long arm" statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (Supp.1978). We center our attention on subsection 2(I), by which Maine asserts adjudicatory jurisdiction in the broadest constitutional terms. ⁴ That section 704-A(2)(I) provides:

2. Causes of action. Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts:

I. Maintain any other Relation to the State or to persons or property Which affords a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this State consistent with the Constitution of the United States. (Emphasis added)

Subsection 2(I) should be read in the light of the preamble, subsection 1:

1. Declaration of purpose. It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest demands that the State provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this State, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this State and persons of other states. This section, to insure maximum protection to citizens of this State, shall be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants To the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, 14th amendment. (Emphasis added)

The preamble affirms the legislature's intention that section 704-A be liberally construed "to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause." ⁵ See Labbe v. Nissen Corp., Me., 404 A.2d 564, 569 (1979). Other jurisdictions have similarly interpreted the reach of their " long arm" statutes to be limited only by the constitutional requirements of due process. E. q., Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268, 277 A.2d 207, 209 (1971); Darby v. Superior Supply Co., 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970); Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971).

With the broad thrust of the preamble in mind, we next turn to the statutory provision that we here elect to apply, subsection 2(I). The question facing us is whether, in the terms of that subsection, defendant did "(m)aintain any . . . relation" to Maine "which affords a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this State consistent with the Constitution of the United States." In light of the preamble's mandate that courts of Maine should assert jurisdiction "to the fullest extent permitted" by due process, we interpret the term "relation" in subsection 2(I) to be consonant with the traditional due process requirement of "minimum contacts." In other words, to determine whether our "long arm" statute provides for assertion of jurisdiction over defendant, we must decide whether such an assertion of jurisdiction would pass constitutional muster. The question of statutory construction whether the Maine legislature has provided for Maine courts to have jurisdiction over this defendant in this case becomes identical to the question whether Maine courts may constitutionally assert such jurisdiction.

Subsection 2(I)'s requirement of a "relation" between defendant and Maine grows out of the seminal decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). There the Supreme Court set forth the fundamental standard:

(D)ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment In personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

Id. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). The Supreme Court went on in International Shoe to require that the defendant have some "contacts, ties or Relations," Id., 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154 (emphasis added), with the forum. As the Court recently rephrased it, "(A)n essential criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality and nature' of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that State." Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978). The Court in Kulko cautioned that the standards of "fairness" and "reasonableness" are "not susceptible of mechanical application . . . (and that) the facts of each case must be weighed," with the recognition that "few answers will be written 'in black and white'." Id.

Our analysis of the facts of this case will proceed in three steps. See Woods, "Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction after Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson," 20 Ariz.L.Rev. 861, 881-82 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Woods ). We will first determine whether Maine has a legitimate governmental interest in the subject matter of this action; if Maine does, then it has the basic power to adjudicate this dispute. As the second step in our analysis we will determine whether defendant's business is such that defendant should reasonably anticipate, or not be unfairly surprised by, litigation arising in Maine from that business. Only if we have found both a legitimate governmental interest and such reasonable anticipation do we reach the third step: determination whether the exercise of jurisdiction over defendant would comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." In the case at bar, we are convinced that the first and second steps are satisfied. However, the third and ultimate determination, that of "fair play and substantial justice," requires further factfinding, and for that we must remand to the Superior Court.

Returning to the first stage of analysis, we find that Maine has "a minimal legitimate governmental interest in the litigation and the consequent power to decide if it is fair to assert it." Woods, supra at 883. The "relationship" between defendant and this state arises, in the first place, from the vehicular accident that occurred here. The likely presence of witnesses in regard to the accident and subsequent hospitalization, and other evidence in Maine, along with the potential medical creditors here, provides the required connection between "the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). Maine not only has an obvious interest in providing a forum for persons injured within its borders, but it also has an interest in the safety of all motor vehicles operated on its highways, including those, such as the Tysons', that are only transiently present in the state. Thus, in the terminology used by Professor Woods, Maine has "preliminary jurisdiction," Woods, supra at 908-09, justifying our proceeding to the next inquiry of whether defendant could reasonably...