U.S. Brewers Ass'n, Inc. v. Director of the New Mexico Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control

• Decision Date: 21 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 13053,13053
• Citation: 100 N.M. 216,1983 NMSC 59,668 P.2d 1093
• Parties: , 1983-2 Trade Cases P 65,750 UNITED STATES BREWERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Adolph Coors Company, Stroh Brewery Company, F & M Schaefer Brewing Company, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Miller Brewing Company, Olympia Brewing Company, G. Heileman Brewing Company and Pabst Brewing Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and The Guinnes-Harp Corporation, Plaintiff-in-Intervention-Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF THE NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 1093

668 P.2d 1093

100 N.M. 216, 1983-2 Trade Cases P 65,750

UNITED STATES BREWERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Adolph Coors Company, Stroh Brewery Company, F & M Schaefer Brewing Company, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Miller Brewing Company Olympia Brewing Company, G. Heileman Brewing Company and Pabst Brewing Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants and The Guinnes-Harp Corporation Plaintiff-in-Intervention-Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF THE NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13053.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 21, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1983.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, William S. Dixon, Freedman, Boyd & Daniels, Charles W. Daniels, Albuquerque, for plaintiffs-appellants

Paul Bardacke, Atty. Gen., Arthur J. Waskey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Lawrence A. Barela, Special Counsel to the Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

RIORDAN, Justice.

United States Brewers Association, Inc., Adolph Coors Company, Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Miller Brewing Company, Olympia Brewing Company, G. Heileman Brewing Company and Pabst Brewing Company (Brewers) filed a declaratory action against the Director of the New Mexico Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Director), in which Guinness-Harp Corporation intervened, challenging the constitutionality of the 1979 amendment to the Discrimination in Selling Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 60-12-1 through 60-12-10 (Act). ¹ Upon motion, the trial court granted Brewers a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act on the condition that they execute bonds, binding themselves to pay the difference between the prices at which the products were sold during the pendency of the injunction and the prices at which the Act would have required them to be sold under the Act. Director filed a motion for summary judgment which was opposed by Brewers, who filed counter-affidavits to the motion. Director's motion for summary judgment was granted. Brewers appeal. We affirm and remand.

The issues on appeal are:

I. Whether the 1979 amendment to the Act was unconstitutional for failure to properly contain the subject of the 1979 amendment in the title of the Act.

II. Whether the Act imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce.

III. Whether the Act requires price-fixing that is unlawful under federal antitrust laws.

IV. Whether the Act is in violation of the police powers of New Mexico.

FACTS

The Act was originally passed in 1967 and applied to the sale of "alcoholic liquor" as defined in the Liquor Control Act, which excluded brewed products. The prohibition under the Act was that no brand of "alcoholic liquor" could be sold by manufacturers to New Mexico liquor wholesalers (Wholesalers) at any price higher than the price sold to any other liquor wholesaler anywhere in the United States or District of Columbia.

During the 1979 legislative session, House Bill 278 was enacted as 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 83, and specifically read:

AN ACT RELATING TO ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS; AMENDING THE DISCRIMINATION IN SELLING ACT.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO:

Section 1. Section 60-12-2 NMSA 1978 (being Laws 1967, Chapter 269, Section 2) is amended to read:

"60-12-2. FILING OF SCHEDULES REQUIRED.--No brand of alcoholic liquor shall be sold to or purchased by a wholesaler, irrespective of the place of sale or delivery, unless a schedule is filed with the director of the department of alcoholic beverage control and is then in effect. For the purposes of the Discrimination in Selling Act, "alcoholic liquor" means alcoholic liquor as defined in Section 60-3-1 NMSA 1978."

The effect of this amendment was to extend the price affirmation law to brewed products which had previously been excluded under the definition of "alcoholic liquor."

I. SUBJECT OF THE AMENDMENT

Brewers claim that the purpose and effect of the amendatory language of House Bill 278 were concealed from the Legislature, the administration and those affected by the law. Therefore, Brewers argue that House Bill 278 failed to comply with the mandatory notice requirements of N.M. Const. art. 4, Sections 16 and 18. We disagree.

Section 16 provides in pertinent part:

The subject of every bill shall be clearly expressed in its title * * * but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in its title, only so much of the act as is not so expressed shall be void * * * *

Section 18 provides in pertinent part:

No law shall be revised or amended, or the provisions thereof extended by reference to its title only; but each section thereof as revised, amended or extended shall be set out in full * * * *

(a) Legislative intent

In an attempt to show legislative intent, Brewers introduced affidavits at trial from chairmen of legislative committees claiming that they did not know the effect of House Bill 278, and that if they would have known the effect of House Bill 278, then they would have held hearings. The propriety of admitting a legislator's testimony to determine legislative intent was addressed in State v. Turley, 96 N.M. 592, 633 P.2d 700 (Ct.App.1980), rev'd, 96 N.M. 579, 633 P.2d 687 (1981). The Court of Appeals' opinion held that "a legislator's testimony, either as committee member or legislative member, generally is not competent evidence as to the intent of the legislative body enacting a measure." Id. 96 N.M. at 597, 633 P.2d 705 (citations omitted). However, we then overruled the Court of Appeals' opinion and found that "there [was] insufficient evidence in the record upon which the Court of Appeals could predicate a general principle of law that a legislator's testimony is not competent evidence as to the intent of the legislative body enacting a measure. * * * * " Id. at 581, 633 P.2d at 689.

We now agree with the statement by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Haynes v. Caporal, 571 P.2d 430, 434 (Okl.1977) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), referred to by the Court of Appeals in Turley, that:

At trial, legislative intent * * * was sought to be established through the testimony of an individual senator and house member at the time of [the bill's] passage. This court is not bound, and need not consider such evidence. Testimony of individual legislators or others as to happenings in the Legislature is incompetent, since that body speaks solely through its concerted action as shown by its vote.

Similarly, as addressed in Annot., 70 A.L.R. 5 (1931), in determining legislative intent it is proper to look to the legislative history of an act or contemporaneous statements of legislators while the legislation was in the process of enactment. Statements of legislators after the passage of the legislation, however, are generally not considered competent evidence to determine the intent of the legislative body enacting a measure. See, e.g., County of Washington, Oregon v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 176 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 2251 n. 16, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n. 39, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1864 n. 39, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); see also Annot. 56 L.Ed.2d 918 (1979).

In New Mexico, legislative intent must be determined primarily by the legislation itself. State v. McHorse, 85 N.M. 753, 517 P.2d 75 (Ct.App.1973); Santa Fe Downs, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 85 N.M. 115, 509 P.2d 882 (Ct.App.1973). Therefore, we adopt the Court of Appeals' reasoning and holding in Turley. To the extent that our opinion in Turley may be construed as inconsistent with this holding, our opinion is expressly overruled.

(b) Constitutionality

We have long held that the test of a statute's constitutional validity under Section 16 is whether the title fairly gives such reasonable notice of the subject matter of the statute itself as to prevent the mischief intended to be guarded against. State v. Ingalls, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177 (1913). The mischief, which is to be guarded against, is "hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation, surprise or fraud on the legislature, or not fairly apprising the people of the subjects of legislation so that they would have no opportunity to be heard on the subject." Martinez v. Jaramillo, 86 N.M. 506, 508, 525 P.2d 866, 868 (1974) (citations omitted). When applying this test on appeal, we will indulge every presumption in favor of the legislation's validity. Id. Furthermore, each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. State v. Gomez, 34 N.M. 250, 280 P. 251 (1929).

As a result of previous rulings by this Court, the Legislature has made it a policy to insure that the title of an act is stated in broad terms. See, e.g. Bureau of Revenue v. Dale J. Bellamah Corp., 82 N.M. 13, 474 P.2d 499 (1970); First Thrift and Loan Association v. State, 62 N.M. 61, 304 P.2d 582 (1956). The title, however, need not set forth details of an enactment. City of Albuquerque v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 776, 508 P.2d 585 (1973). If the subject matter of the bill is reasonably germane to the title of the act, it is sufficient to be valid under Section 16. In re Investigation No. 2 of the Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission, 91 N.M. 516, 577 P.2d 414 (1978); see also State ex rel. Salazar v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 55 N.M. 395, 234 P.2d 339 (1951). Likewise, we have held that the fact that an act may amend certain provisions of other statutes by implication, does not in and of itself violate Section 18. State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabal, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928 (1928).

In the present case, House Bill 278 was very simple. It consisted of two paragraphs on one page and made two changes to the Act. The first change was to substitute the name of the person with whom reports must be filed from the "chief of the liquor division" to the "director of the department of alcoholic beverage control." The second change was to alter the definition of "alcoholic liquor" from "Spirituous Liquor" to "alcoholic liquor" as defined in ...