U.S. Dept. of Energy v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
| Decision Date | 13 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | AFL-CI,Nos. 95-2949,95-3113,I,s. 95-2949 |
| Citation | 106 F.3d 1158 |
| Parties | 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2481, 65 USLW 2565 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Morgantown Energy Technology Center, Morgantown, West Virginia, Petitioners, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1995,ntervenor. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Morgantown Energy Technology Center, Morgantown, West Virginia, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: William Kanter, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. David Michael Smith, Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Kevin Michael Grile, Assistant General Counsel, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Chicago, IL, for Intervenor. ON BRIEF: Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, John F. Daly, Ellen D. Katz, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. James F. Blandford, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Mark D. Roth, General Counsel, Charles A. Hobbie, Deputy General Counsel, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor.
Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Enforcement denied by published opinion. Judge WILKINS wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS joined. Judge LUTTIG wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.
The United States Department of Energy (the Department) petitions for review of a decision and order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (the Authority) that concluded that the Department violated the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act (FSLMRA), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-7135 (West 1996). The Authority held that the violation occurred when the Department disapproved of a clause in a collective bargaining agreement that would have required midterm bargaining regarding union-initiated proposals not included in or covered by the collective bargaining agreement. The Authority cross-petitions for enforcement of its decision and order. 1 We hold that the Department is not required to bargain with respect to the provision and therefore deny enforcement of the decision and order of the Authority.
The FSLMRA establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing collective bargaining between federal-sector employers and employees. See U.S. Department of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 844 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc) [hereinafter HHS ]. Like their counterparts in the private sector, federal agencies and unions have a duty to "meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement." 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(a)(4). This duty to bargain generally includes all "condition[s] of employment" except those explicitly exempted by the FSLMRA. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(b)(2); Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n v. FLRA, 895 F.2d 152, 154 (4th Cir.1990) [hereinafter NRC ]. 2 However, the duty to negotiate "exists only 'to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation.' " NRC, 895 F.2d at 154 (quoting 5 U.S.C.A. § 7117(a)(1)). 3 Failure to negotiate in good faith is an unfair labor practice. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(a)(5), (b)(5).
In addition, the duty to negotiate "does more than simply require an agency to negotiate; it subjects the agency to the possibility that the proposal will become binding." HHS, 844 F.2d at 1089. If good faith negotiations fail, the FSLMRA provides for the resolution of the impasse by the Federal Services Impasses Panel (the Impasses Panel), which is vested with the authority to impose negotiable proposals on the parties. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7119(c)(5)(B), (C); Department of Defense, Office of Dependents Sch. v FLRA, 879 F.2d 1220, 1222 (4th Cir.1989). But, the Impasses Panel does not possess the authority to impose terms that are inconsistent with the FSLMRA or any other federal law. See id. Accordingly, the head of an agency may disapprove of a term imposed upon the agency by the Impasses Panel pursuant to 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(c)(1) on the basis that the term is not consistent with applicable law, i.e., is nonnegotiable. See id.; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 778 F.2d 850, 856-57 (D.C.Cir.1985). 4 If the agency disapproves of a provision included in a collective bargaining agreement by order of the Impasses Panel, the union, in response, may either seek a negotiability determination by the Authority under 5 U.S.C.A. § 7117(c)(1) or may file an unfair labor practices charge against the agency pursuant to 5 U.S.C.A. § 7118. 5 See Department of Defense Dependents Sch., Alexandria, Va. v. FLRA, 852 F.2d 779, 784 (4th Cir.1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 778 F.2d at 855-56. In either case, the Authority must determine whether the provision in question is consistent with the FSLMRA or other applicable law.
The material facts are not in dispute. The Department employs approximately 200 union workers at the Morgantown Energy Technology Center (METC) in Morgantown, West Virginia. The American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1995, AFL-CIO (the Union) is the certified exclusive representative of METC employees for collective bargaining purposes. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(a)(1).
METC and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement. During negotiations for a successor agreement, the Union proposed the following "reopener" clause:
The Employer will be obligated to bargain in good faith on any Union-proposed changes in conditions of employment during the term of this agreement as long as the subject of any specific proposal is not controlled by this agreement and as long as the Union has not clearly and unmistakably waived bargaining over all proposals.
J.A. 6. METC and the Union failed to agree on the inclusion of this language in the successor agreement; consequently, the Union requested assistance from the Impasses Panel. Rejecting METC's contention that the proposal was nonnegotiable, the Impasses Panel concluded that the Union had a statutory right under the FSLMRA to initiate midterm bargaining and that the failure to include a midterm bargaining provision in the collective bargaining agreement could be construed as a waiver by the Union of its statutory right. 6 Accordingly, the Impasses Panel directed the parties to adopt a modified version of the Union's proposed language:
The Employer will be obligated to bargain in good faith on any negotiable Union-initiated proposals concerning matters that are not contained in or covered by the collective-bargaining agreement, unless the Union has waived its right to bargain about the subject matter involved.
J.A. 8. 7
Subsequently, the Director of Personnel for the Department disapproved the collective bargaining agreement, see 5 U.S.C.A. § 7114(c), on the basis that midterm bargaining would create a system of rolling bargaining and result in endless negotiation in contravention of the express aim of the FSLMRA to foster effective and efficient government, see 5 U.S.C.A. § 7101(a)(1)(B), (2).
In response, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Authority, contending that the Department, by disapproving of the language included in the collective bargaining agreement by order of the Impasses Panel, impermissibly interfered with the collective bargaining relationship in violation of 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(a)(1), (5). The Union also asserted that the Department failed to cooperate in impasse procedures in violation of 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(a)(1), (6). Relying on Social Security Administration v. FLRA, 956 F.2d 1280, 1281 (4th Cir.1992) [hereinafter SSA ], the Department argued that its disapproval of the reopener clause was justified because the language imposed by the Impasses Panel was not consistent with applicable law and would frustrate the purpose of the FSLMRA to foster "effective and efficient" government and would create unstable labor relations. The Authority rejected the Department's argument, determining that SSA addressed only the issue of whether an agency has a statutory duty to engage in midterm bargaining over union-initiated proposals, leaving open the question of whether such provisions are negotiable. See Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 51 F.L.R.A. 124, 127 (1995). 8 The Authority then determined that the reopener clause was not inconsistent with the FSLMRA or any other law and thus was negotiable. See id. at 128-29.
Having concluded the provision was negotiable, the Authority determined that the Department had failed to cooperate with the decision of the Impasses Panel in violation of 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(a)(1), (6). See id. at 130. Additionally, the Authority ruled that the Department unlawfully interfered with the collective bargaining process between METC and the Union in violation of 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(a)(1), (5). See id. The Authority ordered the Department to rescind its disapproval of the provision imposed by the Impasses Panel and to direct METC to incorporate the reopener clause into the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 130-31.
We will set aside a decision of the Authority if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (West 1996); see Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444 n. 7, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983). Although "the Authority is entitled to considerable deference when it exercises its special function of applying the general provisions of the [FSLMRA] to the complexities of federal labor relations," reviewing courts "must not rubber-stamp ... administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chair King, Inc. v. Gte Mobilnet of Houston
...... for the Sourthern District of Texas (the "Federal Suit"). Although the Recipients named several ... unambiguous meaning regarding the issue before us. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, ...and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 54-57 ...Rather than undermining the authority of federal law, this interpretation recognizes it ......
-
Italia Foods Inc v. As The Representative Of A Class Of Similarly Situated Persons
...enforcement exclusively in state courts; and it recognized state power to reject Congress' authorization.” International Science, 106 F.3d at 1158. By this court's count, seven states' courts appear to have concluded that the “opt-out” approach is the correct framework. See Edwards v. Direc......
-
Italia Foods Inc. v. And As the Representative
...enforcement exclusively in state courts; and it recognized state power to reject Congress' authorization." International Science, 106 F.3d at 1158. By this court's count, seven states' courts appear to have concluded that the "opt-out" approach is the correct framework. See Edwards v. Direc......
-
Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc.
...... for the Sourthern District of Texas (the "Federal Suit"). Although the Recipients named several ... unambiguous meaning regarding the issue before us. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, ...and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 54-57 ...Rather than undermining the authority of federal law, this interpretation recognizes it ......