U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D12-1956 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, a/s/o M A Federal, Inc., Appellant, v. ADT SECURITY SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; William P. Levens,
Judge.
Carol M. Rooney, Hobart M. Hind, Jr., and
Anthony J. Livingston of Butler Pappas
Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, for
Appellant.
Kristopher J. Verra of Shook Hardy & Bacon
L.L.P., Tampa, and Charles C. Eblen of
Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Kansas City,
Missouri, for Appellee.
United States Fire Insurance Company (USFI) appeals a judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of ADT Security Services, Inc., which had the end result of adismissal of USFI's complaint with prejudice. This negligence action arose after a facility owned by M.A. Federal, USFI's insured, was broken into and equipment was stolen. ADT provided security for the building. After USFI paid M.A. Federal's insurance claim, USFI became subrogated to M.A. Federal's rights and sued ADT on the theories that ADT was negligent by failing to advise M.A. Federal that the analog-based security system that was installed would become obsolete once the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) transitioned from an analog-based system to a digital system, by failing to replace the analog-based system with a digital system after the transition, and by failing to advise M.A. Federal that the system stopped transmitting signals once the transition occurred. The trial court granted ADT's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on provisions in the contract between ADT and M.A. Federal purporting to limit ADT's liability. We conclude that this was error because USFI alleged a legally sufficient cause of action that was independent of any breach of contract.
M.A. Federal contracted with ADT in 2006 to install a security system which included a wireless backup that would activate if the "hard wire" was disabled. At the time of the installation, ADT was aware that analog service would cease in 2008,1 thereby resulting in a loss of signal between analog-based security systems and ADT's alarm monitoring service.
The wireless backup for M.A. Federal's security system ceased working in 2008 at the time of the transition from analog to digital service. However, ADT did notnotify M.A. Federal that the backup system was no longer transmitting signals to ADT's monitoring service. In March 2010, M.A. Federal's warehouse was broken into and millions of dollars of equipment was stolen. During the burglary, the "hard wire" was disabled, and because the wireless system was not transmitting a signal, the burglary went undetected.
After USFI became subrogated to M.A.'s Federal's rights, it brought its negligence suit. Within ADT's answer and affirmative defenses, it admitted that it knew about the transition date. However, ADT denied any liability for M.A. Federal's losses and denied that it had any duties to M.A. Federal other than "duties recognized by law." ADT alleged thirteen affirmative defenses, including the defense that the cause of action was barred by contractual provisions between the parties.
Thereafter, ADT filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings based entirely on the affirmative defense of contractual liability. ADT argued that USFI had failed to allege a tort duty independent of the parties' contract that could support the negligence claim. ADT further contended that a waiver of subrogation provision2 barredUSFI's action and that another provision limited ADT's liability to $1000.3 ADT relied on language on the back of the contract addressing circumstances where a customer could, for an additional expense, opt for a rider that would expand ADT's liability.4 It is undisputed that M.A. Federal did not purchase the additional protection. ADT arguedthat it simply had no duty outside the contract to monitor or protect M.A. Federal's facility.
Ultimately, the trial court granted ADT's motion finding that USFI's action was essentially premised upon negligent performance of the contract, and therefore, it was barred by the provisions in the contract.
We review an order granting judgment on the pleadings de novo. Syvrud v. Today Real Estate, Inc., 858 So. 2d 1125, 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Williams v. Howard, 329 So. 2d 277, 280-81 (Fla. 1976)).
"The purpose of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is to test the legal sufficiency of a cause of action or defense where there is no dispute as to the facts." Barentine v. Clements, 328 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (citing Bradham v. Hayes Enters., 306 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)). A party can only obtain judgment on the pleadings if it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings and attachments thereto. Hammond v. Decorator's Servs., Inc., 522 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Thompson v. Napotnik, 923 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Tres-AAA-Exxon v. City First Mortg., Inc., 870 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). The trial court must take all well-pleaded facts as true, Barentine, 328 So. 2d at 879 (citing Wilkins v. Tebbetts, 216 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)), and "the court's sole inquiry is whether the complaint states a cause of action," Hammond, 522 So. 2d at 522 (citing Appel v. Scott, 479 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)).5 If a partyrefers to a document within the complaint, a trial court may rely on that document to determine the nature of the claim being alleged. See Veal v. Voyager Prop. & Cas. Ins., 51 So. 3d 1246, 1249-50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Here, USFI alleged that ADT failed to disclose to M.A. Federal that the FCC was transitioning from analog signals to digital signals, failed to replace the analog-based system when it became obsolete after the transition, and failed to notify M.A. Federal when the analog-based system ceased transmitting signals to ADT's monitoring service. USFI alleged that M.A. Federal would not have contracted with ADT if it had known that the backup system would be rendered useless after the transition. These allegations—which must be accepted as true—address a material component of the contract between the parties, and they amount to allegations of an independent tort. Floyd v. Video Barn, Inc., 538 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ().
While the contract called for the installation of a functioning wireless backup system, the "other conduct" here is ADT's alleged failure to warn of the transition from analog to digital signals and failure to notify M.A. Federal when the analog-based system ceased transmitting signals to ADT's monitoring service. The first of these allegations goes to the formation of the contract. USFI alleged that M.A. Federal contracted with ADT to provide a functioning security system, but M.A. Federal did so without full knowledge that the security system it purchased would be rendered obsolete after the transition from analog to digital service. Thus, although USFI'sallegation was inartfully worded,6 it appears to be one alleging negligent...
To continue reading
Request your trial