U.S. John Stapp, Inc., Civil Action No. H-05-0678.

Decision Date28 July 2006
Docket NumberCivil Action No. H-05-0678.
Citation448 F.Supp.2d 819
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. JOHN STAPP, INC., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Peter Glenn Myer, U.S. Dept of Justice, Washington, DC, Daniel David Hu, U.S. Attorneys Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Arthur Thomas Kajander, Kajander & Greene, Houston, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ATLAS, District Judge.

Pending before the Court in this admiralty case is Plaintiff United States of America's ("Plaintiff's") Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 32] and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 33] ("Motion"). Defendants John Stapp, Inc. ("John Stapp"), Stapp Towing Co., Inc. ("Stapp Towing"), and tug CAPTAIN STAPP in rem ("CAPTAIN STAPP') (collectively, "Defendants")1 have filed a Response [Doc. # 34] and a Sur-Response [Do; # 36]. Plaintiff has filed a Reply [Doc. # 35]. Having considered the parties' submissions, all matters of record, and applicable legal authorities, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Motion should be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The SS EQUALITY STATE ("EQUALITY STATE") is a vessel owned by Plaintiff. On December 13, 2003, the EQUALITY STATE was moored in the Houston Ship Channel at City Docks 13 and 14. The weather was fair with good visibility and little wind. CAPTAIN STAPP, with tug STARFISH and four unidentified barges in tow, struck the EQUALITY STATE. This allision2 occurred at approximately 11:39 a.m. The allision caused a sharp indention in the EQUALITY STATE'S starboard hull and other damages that were visible immediately after the allision. However, the vessel's hull was not breached.

The CAPTAIN STAPP controlled the tug. Neither the STARFISH nor any of the barges in tow contributed to the allision. The parties agree that the CAPTAIN STAPP is entirely at fault in causing the allision. John Stapp owns the CAPTAIN STAPP. Stapp Towing employed the master and crew of the CAPTAIN STAPP and was responsible for its operation. Stapp Towing is currently in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On November 8, 2005, the bankruptcy court entered an agreed order modifying the automatic stay arising under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code to permit Plaintiff to pursue insurance proceeds from Stapp Towing's insurance carrier.3

Pacific Gulf Marine ("Pacific Gulf), the ship manager of the EQUALITY STATE, engaged Sabine Surveyors, Ltd. ("Sabine") as an independent surveyor to assess the damage caused by the allision. Sabine surveyed the EQUALITY STATE on December 22, 2003.4 On December 30, 2003, Sabine issued its survey with the following findings and recommendations:

Found

1. Starboard side shell plating set in sharply 0"-6" over a 12' × 10' area centered between frame numbers 90 & 95 and 18' below main deck. Recommended

1. To be cropped and renewed as original:

• One section side shell plating 12' × 10' × 1" flat plate

Internal framing.

• Four sections vertical side shell frame 12' 9" × 4" × 5/8" angle.

• One section cargo hold upper fidley deck 10' × 1'6" × 1/2" flat plate.

• One section fuel oil tank top plating 12' × 1'6" × 1/2" flat plate.

• Two sections transverse web frame 12' × 2' × 1/2" flat plate.

• Four sections upper fidley transverse deck chords 6' × 9' × 4' × 1/2" angle.

• Four upper bracket deck chord brackets 24' × 18' × 18' × 1/2" flat plate.5

Sabine also noted that the damages it found "could reasonably be attributed to the contact [the allision with the CAPTAIN STAPP] as reported."6

After consulting with the vessel's engineers, Pacific Gulf, and the American Bureau of Shipping, Plaintiff determined that the damages to the EQUALITY STATE from the allision did not affect the vessel's seaworthiness. Plaintiff therefore decided to defer repairs until sometime in 2007 when the EQUALITY STATE is scheduled for drydocking.7 On January 9, 2004, Pacific Gulf issued specifications detailing the work that will be required to repair the damages from the allision.8 Plaintiff then solicited fixed-price bids for the work described in the specifications. The winning bid was a fixed price quote of $108,6209 Plaintiff plans to have the repairs performed when the vessel undergoes a pre-scheduled drydock in 2007.

Plaintiffs Motion is fully briefed and ripe for determination.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment is authorized if the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law entitles it to judgment. FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits filed in support of the motion, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir.2003). The movant bears the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ... [the record], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d at 375.

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir.2001) (internal citation omitted). "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party" DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted).

In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been created, the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir.2003). However, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the non-movant "only when there is an actual controversy—that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1999). The non-movant's burden is not met by mere reliance on the allegations or denials in the non-movant's pleadings. See Diamond Offshore Co. v. A & B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531, 545 n. 13 (5th Cir.2002) (noting that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence (quoting Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir.1994))). Likewise, "unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions that a fact issue exists" do not meet this burden. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.1998). Instead, the nonmoving party must present specific facts which show "the existence of a `genuine' issue concerning every essential component of its case." Id. In the absence of any proof, the court will not assume that the non-movant could or would prove the necessary facts. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks a judgment jointly and severally against Defendants for $108,620, the amount of the fixed-price bid for repairs of the damage caused by Defendants to the EQUALITY STATE by the December 2003 allision.10 Defendants admit to fault in causing the allision and thus liability is undisputed. The issue that separates the parties is the question of the amount of damages. The Court concludes that Defendants have not raised a genuine question of material fact and will grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

A. Liability

"When a moving vessel collides with a stationary object, the moving vessel is presumed to be at fault." Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir.1994) (citing The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 192-93, 15 S.Ct. 804, 39 L.Ed. 943 (1895); Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Express, Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1471 (5th Cir.1991); Am. Petrofina Pipeline Co. v. M/V Shoko Maru, 837 F.2d 1324, 1326 (5th Cir.1988)). Thus, when a moving vessel allides with a moored or anchored vessel, the moving vessel is presumed to be at fault. See Skidmore v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir.1975) (stating general maritime rule that "where a moving vessel collides with a vessel at anchor the moving vessel is presumed to be at fault"); Brown & Root Marine Operators, Inc. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 377 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.1967) (same). This presumption may be rebutted if the moving vessel shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it acted with reasonable care, the stationary object caused the allision, or the allision was an unavoidable accident. Am. Petrofina Pipeline, 837 F.2d at 1326.

Under maritime law, a vessel's operator and a vessel's owner are liable in personam for a vessel's negligent pilotage. See In re Mid-South Towing Co., 418 F.3d 526, 528-29 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming in personam judgment against vessel owner and operator for vessel's allision with a wharf); Galveston County Nay. Dist. No. 1 v. Hopson Towing, 877 F.Supp. 363, 369-70 (S.D.Tex.1995) (holding vessel owner and vessel operator were both liable, in personam, for vessel's negligent allision with fixed object), reed in part on other grounds, 92 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.1996). Furthermore, "a vessel is liable in rem for the negligence of its pilot." Kingfisher Shipping Co., Ltd. v. M/V Klarendon, 651 F.Supp. 204, 207 (S.D.Tex.1986) (citing The...

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