U.S. v. Brown, 95-2671
Decision Date | 26 June 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 95-2671,95-2671 |
Citation | 117 F.3d 353 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sherard Dale BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Frances C. Hulin, Timothy A. Bass (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Jerry B. Kurz (argued), Kathryn Hall, Hall & Kurz, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before COFFEY, FLAUM and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
This appeal presents a single question: whether a gun from which the firing pin has been removed is a "firearm" for purposes of sections 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) and 1B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) and the commentary thereto. Because we conclude that it is, we affirm the appellant's sentence.
When Sherard Dale Brown walked into Bank One in Springfield, Illinois intending to rob it, he carried in his waistband an unloaded gun. The gun had been given him by his putative getaway driver, in reality an undercover state police officer. Unbeknownst to Brown, the officer had removed the gun's firing pin. In any event, Brown didn't get very far: FBI agents arrested him as soon as he entered the bank.
Brown pleaded guilty to attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and the district court sentenced him to 64 months in prison. In computing Brown's sentence, the district court increased his offense level by five levels based on the court's determination that Brown possessed a "firearm" within the meaning of section 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) of the Sentencing Guidelines. After Brown's appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we instructed counsel to address the propriety of this five-level increase.
Subparagraph (C) of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2) prescribes a five-level increase in the defendant's base offense level "if a firearm was ... possessed" during a robbery offense, while subparagraph (E) of that section provides for a three-level increase "if a dangerous weapon was ... possessed." Three being less than five, Brown contends that, although the gun he possessed was indeed a dangerous weapon, it was not a firearm under the Guidelines. Brown did not raise this argument below, and consequently we will vacate his sentence on this basis only if we determine that the district court committed plain error. See Fed.R.Crim. P. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-50, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-80, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). For the sake of our analysis, we will assume that it would constitute plain error had the district court increased Brown's offense level five levels, as opposed to three levels, as the result of an erroneous interpretation of the Guidelines. See United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1994). Because the parties dispute neither Brown's possession of the gun nor its lack of a firing pin, the question we decide is a legal one.
For the applicable definition of firearm, we look to the application notes found in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, comment. (n.1). As defined in the commentary to section 1B1.1, firearm means
(i) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (ii) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (iii) any firearm muffler or silencer; or (iv) any destructive device. A weapon, commonly known as a "BB" or pellet gun, that uses air or carbon dioxide pressure to expel a projectile is a dangerous weapon but not a firearm.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(e)). Brown argues that this definition does not encompass a gun that has been rendered inoperable by the removal of its firing pin.
Our research has uncovered no authority directly addressing this argument in the context of the Sentencing Guidelines. The same argument has, however, been considered by federal courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), a statutory firearm definition that is identical, in all relevant respects, to the definition at issue here. 1 See U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 388 ( ). Noting that section 921(a)(3) does not require operability, a number of courts have held that damage to or removal of a firing pin does not bring a weapon outside the statute's broad definition of firearm. See United States v. Hunter, 101 F.3d 82, 83-86 (9th Cir.1996) (, )cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1285, 137 L.Ed.2d 360 (1997) and --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1347, 137 L.Ed.2d 505 (1997); United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir.1994) (); United States v. Ruiz, 986 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir.1993) (); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir.1987) ( ); see also United States v. Reed, 114 F.3d 1053 (10th Cir.1997) ( ); cf. United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir.1990) ( )(quoting United States v. Polk, 808 F.2d 33, 34 (8th Cir.1986)).
Brown argues that these precedents should not be applied to his case. Although he acknowledges that the gun in question was "originally manufactured ... for the purpose of expelling a projectile," he reasons that, because its "firing pin was intentionally removed by" the undercover officer (Brown's emphasis), it was no longer, at the time of the robbery, "designed to" expel a projectile. The logical flaw in a case such as Ruiz, he asserts, is that it would insert the word "originally" before the definitional "designed to" clause. "[T]he major issue," Brown insists, "is ... intent." We understand this contention not as an argument for a mens rea requirement, for such a claim would be misplaced under the sentencing provisions at issue here, and, in any case, Brown concedes that he did not know the gun had been modified. Rather, we take Brown's argument to be that the point at which a gun becomes so altered that one cannot speak meaningfully of its original design must be determined with reference to the purpose behind the alteration.
Assuming (without deciding) that a weapon originally "designed to ... expel a projectile" may reach a point at which it is no longer designed to do so, we do not agree with Brown that the line is crossed with the removal of a gun's firing pin. To hang the inquiry entirely upon the "designed to" prong may indeed lead in some cases to unedifying circularities. See, e.g., Ruiz, 986 F.2d at 910 ( ). The problem with Brown's approach, however, is that it focuses only on a portion of the relevant definition, which covers weapons that are "designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(e)(i)) (emphasis added). In our view, this language must be read as a whole, and an alteration that renders a weapon inoperable cannot by itself remove the weapon from the Guidelines' firearm definition if the alteration does not preclude the weapon's being readily converted to operability.
Based on this understanding, the removal of a gun's firing...
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