U.S. v. Brummels, 93-2158
| Decision Date | 04 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-2158,93-2158 |
| Citation | 15 F.3d 769 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Kent J. BRUMMELS, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was David A. Domina of Omaha, NE.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Willis A. Buell, Asst. U.S. Atty., of Sioux City, IA.
Before FAGG, Circuit Judge, ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Kent Brummels pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. Sec. 610(a) (1988), which prohibits the adulteration of meat capable for use as human food. Brummels appeals the district court's 1 determination that the conduct to which he pleaded guilty qualified as a felony under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 676(a) (1988). Because we hold that the district court's factual determination that Brummels had substantive quality-control duties in his role as quality control supervisor is not clearly erroneous and because we interpret "distribution" to include acts of meat adulteration by a supervisor in charge of quality control, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Kent Brummels pleaded guilty to acts that the parties agree amount to adulteration of meat in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 610(a). 2 Specifically, Brummels admitted that, while he was the quality control supervisor in the Siouxland Quality Meat plant (Siouxland), he took meat out of barrels marked "inedible" and put it into "edible" product containers or onto the conveyor belt for further processing. 3 Brummels also admitted that he "scooped up and picked up" meat from the plant floor and put it onto the conveyor belt or into containers marked "edible."
The plea agreement left to the district court's determination whether the acts committed by Brummels involved any "distribution or attempted distribution" of an adulterated article under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 676(a). If Brummels' acts involved any "distribution or attempted distribution" of an adulterated article, then he would be guilty of a felony; if not, Brummels would be guilty of a misdemeanor. 4 The district court elicited evidence regarding Brummels' responsibilities as quality control supervisor at both the plea hearing (Plea Hearing) and at a special hearing (Motion Hearing) to determine whether Brummels' conduct constituted a felony.
At the Motion Hearing, the district court resolved a factual dispute regarding the contours of Brummels' responsibilities as quality control supervisor at Siouxland. Brummels claimed that he was a glorified meat-cutter who received extra pay, but had no substantive duties with respect to the quality of the meat that left the plant. Brummels claimed that his title was, just that, a title and nothing more. The government argued that Brummels did have quality control responsibilities and that he occupied and abused a position of public trust. The district court resolved this factual dispute in the government's favor. 5 In light of Brummels' position as quality control supervisor and the trust relationship between Brummels and the consuming public, the district court interpreted "distribution or attempted distribution" of adulterated meat under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 676(a) to encompass Brummels' acts and concluded that Brummels was guilty of a felony. Brummels timely appealed.
On appeal, Brummels contends that the acts to which he pleaded guilty constitute the misdemeanor of "preparation" of adulterated meat and not the felony of "distribution or attempted distribution" of adulterated meat. Brummels disputes the district court's factual determination regarding his responsibilities at Siouxland and also argues that the term "distribution" in Sec. 676(a) is ambiguous and therefore should be interpreted, consistent with the rule of lenity, in his favor.
Brummels argues that the standard of review in this case is de novo; the government argues that the standard of review is clearly erroneous. Both parties are correct, in part. As to factual findings, the proper standard of review is clearly erroneous. United States v. Claymore, 978 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir.1992). As to application of facts to the legal interpretation of Sec. 676(a), the standard of review is de novo. See United States v. Schenk, 983 F.2d 876, 879 (8th Cir.1993); Claymore, 978 F.2d at 423.
The only factual dispute involves the extent of Brummels' responsibilities as quality control supervisor at Siouxland. The district court adopted the factual findings of the presentence investigation report (PSI). 6 The PSI stated that Brummels supervised the quality control personnel and that the objective of quality control was to insure the quality of the meat at Siouxland. The PSI stated Brummels occupied a managerial position at Siouxland. Finally, the PSI stated that the victims of Brummels' acts included consumers of the adulterated meat.
Brummels' testimony at the Motion Hearing supports the district court's factual findings. Brummels testified that his job responsibilities included supervision and what amounts to training of the quality control personnel. 7 Finally, Brummels testified that one of his specific responsibilities was to insure that the meat met the specifications required for the customers. 8 In light of these admissions by Brummels, we cannot say that the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. See Claymore, 978 F.2d at 423.
Section 676(a) of Title 21 governs the penalties for violations of the meat inspection statutes. Brummels argues that the fact that his acts involved the "preparation and processing of meat clearly place[ ] him in the production, rather than the distribution phase of meat production." Appellant's Br. at 11. Brummels also argues that Sec. 676(a) is ambiguous, and therefore, consistent with the rule of lenity, this court should interpret it narrowly to exclude his conduct. See United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir.1991).
As with any case involving statutory construction, we first look to the language of the statute. The language of Sec. 676(a) defeats Brummels' first argument that he was not involved in "distribution" of adulterated meat simply because his acts constitute "preparation" of adulterated meat. 9 Section 676(a) provides that
[a]ny person ... who violates any provision of this chapter for which no other criminal penalty is provided by this chapter shall upon conviction be subject to imprisonment for not more that one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both such imprisonment and fine; but if such violation involves intent to defraud, or any distribution or attempted distribution of an article that is adulterated ... such person ... shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
21 U.S.C. Sec. 676(a) (emphasis added). Section 676(a) sets the default penalty for violations of the meat inspection provisions at the misdemeanor level and provides an additional condition that, if satisfied, transforms a misdemeanor into a felony. In order for a violation to constitute a felony under Sec. 676(a), an act must (1) violate a separate meat inspection provision, and (2) "such violation" must "involve[ ] intent to defraud, or any distribution or attempted distribution of an article that is adulterated." Id. Thus, the language of Sec. 676(a) requires an enhanced penalty for an act that squarely violates another provision within the meat inspection chapter, and involves "distribution or attempted distribution" of adulterated meat. See id.
Implicit in Brummels' argument, however, is the proposition that acts constituting "preparation" of adulterated meat cannot also, simultaneously, involve any "distribution" of adulterated meat. But the language of the statute compels the conclusion that an act that constitutes "preparation" can constitute a felony if it also involves "distribution or attempted distribution" of adulterated meat. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 676(a). We hold, therefore, that the language and structure of Sec. 676(a) support a conclusion that acts of "preparation" can, in some instances, also constitute "distribution." Thus, we reject Brummels' argument that because his acts squarely constitute "preparation" of adulterated meat, they cannot also involve "distribution" of adulterated meat. We now turn to whether Brummels' acts involve "distribution" under Sec. 676(a).
Brummels next argues that the rule of lenity requires that this court define the ambiguous term "distribution" in Sec. 676(a) narrowly to constitute " 'the process of getting goods from the manufacturer to the consumer, including marketing, handling of orders, and transport of goods.' " Appellant's Br. at 8 (). Brummels supports his definition with case law interpreting Sec. 676(a), the legislative history of Sec. 676(a), and case law interpreting the term "distribute" in statutes outside meat inspection context. Applying his definition, Brummels concludes that his conduct did not involve "distribution" under Sec. 676(a). We disagree.
The rule of lenity requires that a court adopt the less punitive alternative if faced with two reasonable interpretations of a criminal statute and ambiguous congressional intent. Freisinger, 937 F.2d at 391. The rule of lenity serves as a rule of statutory construction for criminal statutes that applies only in "those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to 'the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies' of the statute." Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 465, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v....
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