U.S. v. Chamberlain

• Decision Date: 09 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-1324,98-1324
• Citation: 159 F.3d 656
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Richard W. CHAMBERLAIN, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 656

159 F.3d 656

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Richard W. CHAMBERLAIN, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 98-1324.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Sept. 9, 1998.

Decided Nov. 3, 1998.

Jeffrey M. Silverstein, with whom Billings & Silverstein was on brief for appellant.

Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and James L. McCarthy, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

Richard Chamberlain appeals from his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Maine on one count of possession of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which makes it unlawful for any person who has been "committed to a mental institution" to possess any firearm in interstate commerce. Under Maine law, Chamberlain had earlier been involuntarily admitted for five days, on an emergency basis, to a Maine mental hospital. Chamberlain moved to dismiss the federal information, contending that his involuntary emergency admission was not, as a matter of law, a "commitment" to a mental institution as required for conviction under § 922(g)(4). The district court denied the motion. Chamberlain entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge on appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. He was sentenced to five years probation and ordered to pay a $100 assessment. This appeal followed. We affirm.

I.

On June 25, 1996, Chamberlain was involuntarily admitted, on an emergency basis, to the Acadia Hospital in Bangor, Maine pursuant to an application filed under a Maine statute, 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(1)-(3). ¹ In the application seeking Chamberlain's involuntary admission, a clinician at Acadia stated that "Chamberlain has a mental illness and, due to mental illness, poses a likelihood of serious harm, on the basis that he put a loaded gun to his head and threatened his wife." The application further stated that "suitable resources for care and treatment are unavailable in the community." Chamberlain was examined on June 25, 1996, by a licensed physician, who certified pursuant to section 3863 that Chamberlain posed a danger of serious harm due to mental illness because he "held a gun to his head tonight" and constituted a "[d]anger to [him]self and others." A judge of the Maine district court reviewed and endorsed the application and certification as being prepared in accordance with law, and ordered that Chamberlain be transported and admitted to Acadia for no more than five days, the maximum length of an emergency detention under section 3863.

After Chamberlain had been admitted to Acadia, a second physician examined him and completed a "24-Hour Certification Form." On the form, the physician certified that he had "examined [Chamberlain] and in my opinion the patient is mentally ill, and, due to his [ ] mental illness, poses a likelihood of serious harm to himself [ ] or others if discharged at this time." As grounds for the certification, the physician stated that Chamberlain had "put a gun to his head last evening with suicidal ideation" and "remains distraught today and constitutes a danger to [him]self."

A patient who has been detained for five days pursuant to section 3863 may thereafter remain at the mental hospital if (1) the patient voluntarily admits himself, see 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3831 , OR (2)² the chief administrative officer of the mental hospital obtains from the state district court an "involuntary commitment order," see 34-B M.R.S.A. §§ 3863(5)(B), 3864. ³ After his initial five-day emergency detention, Chamberlain voluntarily admitted himself to Acadia on or about June 30, 1996, remaining there until his release on July 8, 1996. The chief administrative officer made no application in his case for an "involuntary commitment order."

On May 19, 1997, a police officer received a suicide/attempt to locate report from Chamberlain's brother. Chamberlain's brother told the officer that Chamberlain was upset over the breakup of his marriage, had stated that he had nothing to live for, and was suicidal. The officer located Chamberlain's pickup truck in an airport parking lot. Inside the truck were a loaded Remington .270 caliber rifle, a box of .270 caliber ammunition, and a Savage 30-30 caliber rifle. These items, which were manufactured outside the state of Maine, were seized and Chamberlain was arrested and charged in the federal district court with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).

Chamberlain filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that he had not, as a matter of law, been "committed to a mental institution" within the meaning of § 922(g)(4). The federal district court denied the motion, and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Chamberlain entered a conditional plea of guilty under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, reserving his right to appeal from the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The court sentenced Chamberlain to five years' probation and a mandatory $100 assessment.

II.

This appeal raises a single legal issue: Whether Chamberlain's involuntary admission pursuant to 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863 constituted a "commitment" for purposes of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). The federal district court held that Chamberlain's five-day involuntary admission, which was followed by his continued admission on a voluntary basis, constituted a "commitment" for purposes of the federal firearms ban. Chamberlain contends that his five-day emergency detention under Maine law fell short of amounting to a "commitment," and that only detention under an involuntary commitment order obtained pursuant to section 3864, note 3, supra, would have constituted a "commitment" allowing conviction under the federal firearms statute. We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the term "commitment." See United States v. Ortiz, 146 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.1998).

We begin with the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), part of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968. Section 922(g)(4) states that it shall be unlawful for anyone

(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution;

...

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

The Gun Control Act does not define the phrase "committed to a mental institution." See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922; see also United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 867, 115 S.Ct. 185, 130 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994).

Determination of whether Chamberlain was so "committed" is a question of federal law. See Waters, 23 F.3d at 31; United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1335 (5th Cir.1988). Cf. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111-12, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) ("Whether one has been 'convicted' within the language of the gun control statutes is ... a question of federal ... law, despite the fact that the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of the State.") (citation omitted). While we are determining a question of federal law, we "may seek guidance from state law," Giardina, 861 F.2d at 1335, since "commitment" occurs pursuant to procedures required by state law. See United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (8th Cir.1973). After taking into account whatever guidance state law may offer, our interpretation must in any case be consistent with federal policy. See Waters, 23 F.3d at 31; Giardina, 861 F.2d at 1335. Accordingly, we examine both Maine's statutory involuntary hospitalization procedures and the federal gun control policy embodied in § 922(g)(4).

A. Maine's Involuntary Hospitalization Law

Under Maine law, a person may be "admitted to a mental hospital, on an emergency basis," upon written application stating the applicant's belief that the person is mentally ill and, because of his illness, "poses a likelihood of serious harm." 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(1). The Maine statute elsewhere describes such an emergency admission as an "involuntary admission" and it is clear that a person so admitted cannot leave the institution and is under its control. ⁴ The application must be accompanied by a certificate signed by a health care professional who has examined the patient not more than three days before the date of admission and determined that the patient "poses a likelihood of serious harm." Id., § 3863(2).

The application and the accompanying certificate must be reviewed by a Justice of the Superior Court, Judge of the District Court, Judge of Probate or a justice of the peace. See id., § 3863(3). If the judicial officer determines that the application and certificate are "regular and in accordance with the law," id., the statute requires that he or she endorse them. A patient admitted on an emergency basis may not be detained for more than five days. See id., § 3863(5)(B)(2).

Once a patient is involuntarily admitted, section 3863 requires that the patient be examined "as soon as practicable." See id., § 3863(7). If this post-admission examination is not held within twenty-four hours after the time of admission, or if a health care provider fails or refuses after the examination to certify that the patient is mentally ill and, due to his mental illness, "poses a likelihood of serious harm," the patient must be immediately discharged. See id., § 3863(7)(C).

After the initial five-day involuntary hospitalization, a patient may elect to be "informally admitted" for a longer period, provided the chief administrative officer of the hospital determines that admission of the patient on an informal basis is appropriate. See id., § 3863(5)(A). This informal,...