U.S. v. Dufur
Decision Date | 17 September 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-1723,79-1723 |
Citation | 648 F.2d 512 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Artie Ray DUFUR, aka Artie Ray Baker, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
John W. Lundin, Seattle, Wash., for defendant-appellant.
J. Ronald Sim, Asst. U. S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.
Before TRASK, GOODWIN and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Artie Ray Dufur, aka Artie Ray Baker, appeals his conviction, under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, for first degree murder of a customs officer. We affirm.
Dufur entered the United States by automobile at a customs check point on the Canadian border near Lynden, Washington. He was sent to the customshouse for a secondary inspection where he shot and killed Customs Inspector Gerry Ward. Dufur fled by automobile and then on foot, being apprehended after a night-long search.
Dufur was transported to Whatcom County jail in a mobile booking van. While en route, he was advised of his Miranda rights. Dufur explained to the interrogating agents that he had killed Ward because he feared being apprehended and returned to prison from which he had escaped while serving a sentence for a prior murder conviction.
Dufur contends that the district court committed reversible error by (1) failing to adequately protect against the prejudicial effects of publicity both during and prior to trial; (2) admitting into evidence certain allegedly involuntary admissions; (3) failing to dismiss the indictment's murder count for lack of specificity; (4) declining to appoint a second defense attorney; and (5) denying his motion for a mistrial because of certain comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument.
The district court denied Dufur's motions for a change of venue, dismissal or sequestration of the jury, exclusion of the press from pretrial proceedings, and interviews with the jurors after rendition of the verdict. Dufur argues that the "cumulative effect" of these actions denied him a fair trial. We disagree.
Dufur argues that certain jurors, because of exposure to pretrial publicity, remembered "a number of significant details regarding the defendant and the circumstances of the crime." He has not specified, however, any prejudicial information known by any juror. Where publicity about a case is massive, a presumption of prejudice arises. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). The publicity here did not warrant such a presumption.
The district court conducted extensive voir dire before impaneling the jury, interviewing individually in chambers any prospective juror who had been exposed to pretrial publicity. Once the jury was impaneled, the court admonished it repeatedly to avoid exposure to publicity about the case. Whether to sequester a jury or how often to inquire about its exposure to publicity are questions committed to the district court's discretion. Frame v. United States, 444 F.2d 71, 72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942, 92 S.Ct. 291, 30 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971).
Dufur has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying any of his motions or that the "cumulative effect" of the district court's denials precluded him from obtaining a fair trial.
Dufur maintains that he did not knowingly waive his right to remain silent and to have an attorney present. He also contends that the circumstances surrounding his apprehension and arrest were so coercive that any statements he made at the time were involuntary regardless of whether he was properly given his Miranda warnings. A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing the voluntariness of a statement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The district court heard conflicting evidence on the issues of waiver and voluntariness and found that Dufur had been properly advised of his rights, understood and waived them, and made a voluntary confession. These findings, which depend on the district court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, are supported by the record. They are not "clearly erroneous." United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971, 97 S.Ct. 1659, 52 L.Ed.2d 365 (1977).
In Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 11 S.Ct. 761, 35 L.Ed. 377 (1891), the Court reversed a murder conviction because the indictment failed to allege the place of death with sufficient specificity. The requirement is that "(a)ll the essential ingredients of the offence charged must be stated in the indictment, embracing with reasonable certainty the particulars of time and place." Id. at 136, 11 S.Ct. at 767.
The murder count states: "That on or about May 24, 1979, at Lynden, within the Western District of Washington, ARTIE RAY BAKER a/k/a MICHAEL JOSEPH ARRINGTON with premeditation and by means of shooting, murdered Kenneth Ward " This form of indictment, Form 1 from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, states the time and place of death with sufficient certainty to satisfy the requirement of Ball. 1
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3005, any person indicted for a "capital crime" is entitled to two attorneys. The district court declined to appoint a second attorney, concluding that since the death penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 was rendered unconstitutional by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), 2 first degree murder under section 1111 did not constitute a "capital crime."
We have not previously decided whether Furman's invalidation of the death penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 also invalidates the right to two attorneys in prosecutions for "capital crimes." 3 Other circuits have decided this issue. United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 158, 58 L.Ed.2d 155 (1978) ( ); United States v. Weddell, 567 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1977) ( ); United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973) ( ).
We recently approved the method of inquiry employed by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Watson, supra, but we expressly declined to decide whether we accepted the Watson court's conclusion. United States v. Kennedy, 618 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980). Id. at 558.
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that the purpose of the two-attorney right is "to reduce the chance that an innocent defendant would be put to death because of inadvertence or errors in judgment of his counsel." United States v. Shepherd, supra at 729. Since the statute's purpose, in our opinion, derives from the severity of the punishment rather than the nature of the offense, the elimination of the death penalty eliminates Dufur's right under 18 U.S.C. § 3005 to a second court-appointed attorney.
Dufur contends that the prosecutor commented indirectly on his failure to testify...
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