U.S. v. Hill
| Decision Date | 16 December 1991 |
| Docket Number | 90-10036,Nos. 89-10643,s. 89-10643 |
| Citation | 953 F.2d 452 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Douglas James HILL, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Jesse J. Garcia, Laura J. Allan, Garcia and Schnayerson, Hayward, Cal., for defendant-appellant and cross-appellee.
John D. Lyons, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
Before SCHROEDER, PREGERSON and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
At Appellant Douglas Hill's trial for conspiracy and attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, testimony was admitted that the appellant had used cocaine with one of the members of the conspiracy five years prior. We conclude the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the evidence of prior cocaine use and that the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. For guidance of the district court on a possible retrial, we also discuss other issues raised by Hill and by the United States in its cross-appeal.
In June, 1988, a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent posing undercover as a cocaine smuggler was introduced to Carlos Gutierrez by a confidential informant. Gutierrez was introduced as someone interested in purchasing large amounts of cocaine. During June and July, 1988, the DEA agent met with Gutierrez and attempted to negotiate cocaine deals with him approximately eight times.
Mary Ann Mulhern is the mother of Gutierrez' child. In mid-July, Gutierrez spoke to Mulhern and asked her to find a financial backer for a cocaine deal he wanted to put together. Mulhern was to receive a "middling fee" for her participation and her motive for engaging in the transaction was to pay off her debts.
Mulhern later contacted appellant Hill, who was a friend of hers, to ask him to loan her $140,000. Hill had loaned Mulhern $4,000 in 1982 to retain a lawyer in a custody dispute case and for moving expenses. For a brief time in 1983, Mulhern and Hill had an intimate relationship. When contacted by Mulhern in 1988, Hill initially refused to become involved but Mulhern eventually prevailed upon him to produce the money and Hill provided $70,000.
After lining up the money, Mulhern contacted Gutierrez who then set up the cocaine deal with the undercover DEA agent. The DEA agents were not aware of Hill's involvement until the afternoon of the transaction. Surveillance teams observed Gutierrez, Mulhern and Hill leave Gutierrez' apartment building and drive in Hill's car to the designated place for the transaction. Hill had placed his briefcase, containing the $70,000 he provided and $10,000 Gutierrez added, in the trunk of the car.
Once at the site, Hill opened the trunk of his car and then walked to the front of the car with Mulhern. Gutierrez showed the DEA agent the money and they then discussed the exchange at the undercover car. Gutierrez, Hill and Mulhern were then arrested.
The DEA agent prepared an affidavit which was the basis of a search warrant for Hill's home. A triple-beam Ohaus scale seized in the search was introduced into evidence at trial. The DEA agent also testified he found $17,000 in cash in Hill's home.
Mulhern and Gutierrez entered into plea bargains and testified for the prosecution at trial. The government also presented the testimony of two DEA agents. On direct examination the government elicited testimony from Mulhern that during the time she and Hill were seeing each other they would occasionally use cocaine together. The defense objected to this line of questioning and the government countered that the evidence "has to do with this defendant's knowledge and association with the drug world." Reporter's Transcript at p. 132.
At the conclusion of Mulhern's testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. At this point the government stated Mulhern's testimony about the prior drug use was not FED.R.EVID. 404(b) evidence, but "direct evidence concerning the circumstances which led up to the transaction involved." Id. at 173. The government explained, and the trial court agreed, that the evidence was direct evidence establishing the circumstances and background under which it became logical and proper for Mulhern to contact Hill in an attempt to obtain money for the cocaine deal. The jury was later instructed that they should consider this evidence for the sole purpose of describing the relationship between Hill and Mulhern.
On appeal, Hill contends Mulhern's testimony was both improper and prejudicial; that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant was improperly admitted because the search warrant and search were invalid; and that the prosecutor violated Hill's fifth amendment rights by commenting on his failure to testify. The government cross-appeals Hill's sentence of 51 months incarceration and a $10,000 fine, contending that the court erred by setting Hill's base offense level based on a finding Hill was responsible for only 2.0 to 3.4 kilograms of cocaine. The government also alleges error in the court's downward adjustment in sentencing for acceptance of responsibility and minor participation. The court has jurisdiction of the timely appeal and cross-appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Whether Mulhern's testimony about prior cocaine use with Hill was "other crimes" or prior similar act evidence within the meaning of FED.R.EVID. 404(b) is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. United States v. Mundi, 892 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1072, 112 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1991); United States v. Soliman, 813 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir.1987). Admission of evidence of prior similar acts or of other crimes is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Conners, 825 F.2d 1384 When reviewing a motion to suppress based on lack of probable cause, the court's conclusion is reviewed de novo. Alfonso, 759 F.2d at 741. The underlying facts are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Determinations of probable cause must be upheld if, under the totality of the circumstances surrounding a warrant request, the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir.1987).
1390 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 739 (9th Cir.1985).
Whether there has been a violation of a defendant's fifth amendment right not to testify is reviewed de novo. United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2168, 109 L.Ed.2d 497 (1990). Application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir.1990). The district court's factual findings in the sentencing phase are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Burns, 894 F.2d 334, 336 (9th Cir.1990).
Evidence of specific wrongful conduct is not admissible to prove the character of a person or to show he acted in conformity therewith. "It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED.R.EVID. 404(b).
Prior to trial, defense counsel requested the government give him notice of any evidence of prior acts it intended to introduce pursuant to Rule 404(b). Prior to the start of the first day of trial, defense counsel reminded the court of this request. In response, the prosecutor made a relatively sarcastic and only partially informative reply to the effect that Rule 404(b) evidence was in the eye of the beholder and it was up to defense counsel to determine whether what he had already seen included 404(b) evidence. However, as noted above, in the face of Hill's challenge at trial, the government attempted to justify its use of Mulhern's testimony as direct evidence concerning the circumstances which led up to the transaction involved. On appeal, the government argues alternatively that the evidence was permitted under Rule 404(b) to show intent, motive, and plan and association.
It was error to admit the Mulhern testimony of prior drug use with Hill. The government's argument that the prior use of cocaine evidence was direct evidence of the conspiracy charged and therefore not 404(b) evidence is not persuasive. The government cites us to United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.1984) and United States v. Campbell, 774 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.1985) for the proposition that narcotics involvement can be direct evidence relevant to the proof of conspiracy. Those cases are distinguishable from this case.
In Lester, this court rejected the defendants' argument that the trial court erred in admitting, without limiting instructions, evidence of a gang leader's narcotics operation and their connection with it. 749 F.2d at 1299. The trial court specifically rejected Rule 404(b) as a basis for admissibility and found the narcotic ring evidence to be relevant to the proof of the conspiracy to prevent an individual from testifying in the drug prosecution of the gang leader. Id. The evidence was direct evidence of a reason why the two defendants would hide a witness from the authorities to prevent his testimony at the drug trial. In this case, Hill's personal drug use five years prior with Mulhern is not direct evidence of the conspiracy to possess and distribute multi-kilos of cocaine in 1988.
In United States v. Campbell, the defendant was charged with offenses relating to the theft and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Sarno
...we reverse unless it is "more probable than not that the erroneous admission did not affect the jury's verdict." United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 458 (9th Cir.1991). A. Exclusion of Evidence of Complicity on the Part of Bank Officials in the Approval of the The government acknowledges t......
-
Sechrest v. Baker
...to the defendant's own failure to testify.” United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 460 (9th Cir.1991). The prosecutor's argument, in this case, did not call attention to Sechrest's failure to testify. In fact, the prosec......
-
U.S. v. Cortes
...Cortes's statements and conduct made it clear that his contrition was sincere, he was entitled to the reduction. See United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 461 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding acceptance of responsibility reduction where defendant was sincerely remorseful even though his expressions......
-
Hart v. Broomfield
...272-79; Traverse at 196-98.) A prosecutor has a duty to refrain from using improper methods to procure a conviction. United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 458 (9th Cir. 1991). However, a prosecutor must have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d ......