U.S. v. Lande

• Decision Date: 08 April 1992
• Docket Number: Nos. 91-30185,91-30186,s. 91-30185
• Citation: 968 F.2d 907
• Parties: 20 Media L. Rep. 1753 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack LANDE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 907

968 F.2d 907

20 Media L. Rep. 1753

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack LANDE, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 91-30185, 91-30186.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 8, 1992 ^*.

Decided June 30, 1992.

Gregory A. Jackson, Jackson & Rice, Helena, Mont., for defendant-appellant.

Carl E. Rostad, Asst. U.S. Atty., Great Falls, Mont., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana.

Before: BROWNING, WRIGHT and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

JAMES R. BROWNING, Circuit Judge:

Jack Lande modified General Instruments Videocipher II descrambler units to enable home satellite dish owners to view scrambled pay television programming without payment. He pled guilty to numerous charges and was sentenced to 35 months in prison.

Before pleading guilty, Lande moved to dismiss charges against him based on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (also known as Title I or the Wiretap Law), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, arguing the ECPA does not apply to piracy of satellite television. The district court denied his motion. Lande's guilty plea reserved his right to appeal the denial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). ¹

The Circuits are divided as to whether the ECPA prohibits modification of descramblers to allow unauthorized viewing of scrambled satellite television. Compare United States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.1990) (holding section 2512 of the ECPA prohibits modification of descramblers) with United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932 (11th Cir.1991) and United States v. Hux, 940 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.1991) (2-1) (reaching the opposite conclusion). ² We agree with the Tenth Circuit that the ECPA does apply, and affirm the district court.

I

Sellers of pay television programming beam their signals via communications satellites to subscription television services, such as cable television systems, and to individual subscribers who own satellite dishes. To prevent nonsubscribers from viewing the programming, sellers scramble their transmissions with the Videocipher II encryption system, the de facto industry standard at the time of Lande's conduct. See James C. Goodale, All About Cable § 5.10[b] (1991 ed.). Subscribers with home satellite dish antennas use the Videocipher II satellite descrambler module to descramble programming for which they have paid. Each descrambler unit has a unique electronic "address." When a customer subscribes to a pay television service, the program provider registers the unique "address" of the subscriber's unit in the provider's satellite transmission of the programs of the station or stations the subscriber has ordered. See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir.1990). This allows the subscriber's unit to descramble those programs.

Lande modified the Videocipher II satellite descrambler module by copying the electronic "address" of a subscriber's Videocipher unit on blank computer chips, which he then installed in other Videocipher descramblers, giving the modified units the same electronic address as the unit of the subscriber. This technique is known as "cloning." See id. at 835 & n. 1. Lande then added a new computer chip to the "cloned" Videocipher units so the modified descramblers would unscramble all stations. This is referred to as the "Three Musketeers" technique--"one-for-all and all-for-one." Id. ³ Lande then sold the modified Videocipher descramblers to nonsubscribers, enabling them to receive scrambled satellite television programs without payment of the subscription fee. He was charged with violating three provisions of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), 2512(1)(a), and 2512(1)(b).

II

We interpret the statute de novo. California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir.1990). " 'The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' " Id. at 1175 (citation omitted). Because the language of the ECPA covers Lande's conduct, and the evidence of contrary legislative intent is ambiguous at best, we conclude the ECPA applies.

A

Section 2511(1) prohibits the interception of electronic communications. It provides in part that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who--(a) intentionally intercepts ... any ... electronic communication ... shall be punished...." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). ⁴

A person who views satellite television programming by use of a modified descrambler and a satellite dish "intentionally intercepts" ⁵ the satellite television signal, which is an "electronic communication." ⁶ ] Subsection 2511(1) prohibits all such intentional interception, "except as ... specifically provided." Subsections 2511(2), (4) and (5) contain numerous exceptions to the broad reach of subsection 2511(1). ⁷

However, no exception is "specifically provided" for the unauthorized viewing of scrambled satellite television signals. ⁸

Thus, by its plain language section 2511(1) prohibits the conduct with which Lande was charged.

B

Section 2512 deals with devices for the interception of electronic communications. It applies however, only to devices "primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of ... electronic communications." ⁹

We agree with the Tenth Circuit that the interception of signals by modified descramblers is "surreptitious" within the meaning of section 2512. See McNutt, 908 F.2d at 565 ("Because the providers of pay television programming are unaware that their signals are being intercepted by cloned descramblers, such interception is surreptitious."). Satellite transmissions could not be intercepted any more "surreptitious[ly]" than by these devices which cannot be detected by producers of electronic television programming.

We also agree that the "design" of these modified descramblers renders them "primarily useful for the purpose of ... surreptitious interception." It is difficult to imagine any purpose for these modified descramblers other than the unauthorized interception of satellite television signals. To be sure, before modification the descramblers might be put to legitimate use, but once modified they serve no purpose except to allow surreptitious interception.

We need not decide if a modified descrambler that was simply a "clone" of a legitimate descrambler would be covered by section 2512. These modified descramblers were not mere clones; they also contained a new computer chip that caused the unit to descramble programming from every pay television station, not just from those stations the electronic "address" was authorized to receive. The design of Lande's modified descramblers thus differs from the design of a legitimate descrambler in a way that makes his modified descramblers useful only to a satellite pirate.

The "specifically provided" exceptions to section 2512 are essentially the same as those to section 2511(1), and do not aid Lande.

We conclude that by its language section 2512 also prohibits the conduct with which Lande was charged.

III

Relying on the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Herring, Lande argues that, despite the clear language of sections 2511 and 2512, Congress did not intend the ECPA to cover the interception of satellite television.

There are " 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.... [and in] such cases the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls,' " United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (citation omitted), but "only 'the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions ... would justify a limitation on the "plain meaning" of the statutory language,' " United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.1991) (citation omitted).

A

As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out in Herring, the legislative history of the ECPA contains a number of statements that "satellite cable programming" as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 605 is excluded from the coverage of the ECPA. ¹⁰ The most natural interpretation of these statements, however, is that they refer not to both subsections of section 605, but only to subsection 605(b), which excludes unencrypted satellite transmissions of television programming from the prohibition in section 605(a). Unencrypted satellite transmissions are also expressly excluded from the ECPA by subsection 2511(2)(g)(iii)(II) by reference to the exclusion in subsection 605(b). Subsection 2511(2)(g)(iii)(II) provides that "[i]t shall not be unlawful under this chapter ... to engage in any conduct which ... is excepted from the application of [section 605(a) ] by [section 605(b) ]," and subsection 605(b)(1) expressly exempts only programming that "is not encrypted." ¹¹

If Congress had intended to exempt all satellite pay television transmissions from the coverage of the ECPA, it would have been unnecessary to include in the ECPA the narrower exclusion provided by subsection 2511(2)(g)(iii)(II). It is unlikely Congress intended a broad implicit exception of all satellite television transmissions that would render the explicit exclusion in subsection 2511(2)(g)(iii)(II) of the statute surplusage.

B

The Eleventh Circuit points out in Herring that section 605 criminalizes satellite television piracy, and reasons that it is unlikely Congress, by later enacting the ECPA, "intended to override or create an overlap with section 605." 933 F.2d at 938. We cannot agree that Congress intended to avoid all overlap between the ECPA and section 605. The language of the ECPA does not suggest such an interpretation. It exempts from the ECPA only conduct that "is excepted from the application of [section 605(a) ] by section [605(b) ]," 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(iii)(II), not conduct covered by section 605. In contrast, the immediately preceding subsection, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(iii)(...