U.S. v. Lightfoot

• Decision Date: 26 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-3864.,05-3864.
• Citation: 483 F.3d 876
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Xavier LIGHTFOOT, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

483 F.3d 876

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Xavier LIGHTFOOT, Appellant.

No. 05-3864.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: December 14, 2006.

Filed: April 26, 2007.

Charles M. Rogers, argued, Kansas City, MO (Cheryl A. Pilate, on the brief), for appellant.

K. Michael Warner, Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Kansas City, MO (Bradley J. Schlozman, Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

This case is once again before us. In 1999, Xavier Lightfoot and Cornelius Peoples were convicted of aiding and abetting the murder of a federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1)(A), 1512(a)(1)(C), 1512(a)(2), and 1111. We reversed their convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir.2001). Peoples eventually pled guilty to aiding and abetting the murder of a federal witness. Lightfoot proceeded to trial and was convicted of conspiracy to commit a bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to murder a federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1111, and the murder of a federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1), 1111, and 2. Lightfoot was convicted on all counts and the district court¹ sentenced him to a term of life in prison. Lightfoot appeals from his convictions, claiming numerous evidentiary errors, error in the jury selection process, a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, and improper questioning by the prosecutor. We affirm.

I.

Lightfoot and Peoples perpetrated several robberies in the fall of 1997. In December 1997, Lightfoot was arrested and charged with one of these robberies (a federally insured credit union in Omaha, Nebraska). While he was being held in a pretrial detention facility, Lightfoot learned that his lover and housemate, Jovan Ross,² had supplied information to law enforcement about the robbery. Lightfoot subsequently informed Peoples (who had not yet been charged with participation in the robberies) that he wanted a witness against him murdered.³ Lightfoot suggested that if this witness was not killed, Lightfoot might try to arrange some sort of deal with law enforcement, which Peoples believed would entail Lightfoot's "snitching" on Peoples. Lightfoot provided Peoples with identifying information about Ross, including her address and the kind of car she drove. Peoples contacted Anthony Hunter about murdering Ross. Hunter declined to commit the murder himself. Instead, he spoke with Curtis Barfield and Carl Haskell about killing Ross. It was eventually agreed that Haskell would kill Ross. Hunter and Barfield provided Haskell with a car and Hunter gave him a firearm. Peoples testified that Lightfoot was responsible for paying these individuals.

On June 8, 1998, Haskell shot Ross to death. Lightfoot, still incarcerated pending trial for robbery, was anxious for verification that the murder had in fact occurred. When Peoples confirmed that Ross had been murdered, Lightfoot reacted by saying "beautiful" five times and expressed his gratitude to Peoples, saying, "[t]hat's perfect, that's perfect, I can't ask for no more."

As noted above, Lightfoot and Peoples were convicted of aiding and abetting Ross's murder. After we reversed the convictions, Barfield and Haskell (who had been previously indicted for their involvement in the murder), were joined with Peoples and Lightfoot under a single superseding indictment. Barfield and Haskell were later severed from the case and Peoples pled guilty. At the second trial, Peoples was the government's principal witness. Among other things, Peoples deciphered recordings of telephone conversations between Lightfoot and Peoples in which the two men, aware that their conversations were being recorded, spoke in an indirect, veiled manner. Other witnesses at trial included Hunter and an individual named Larry Platt, who had participated in a robbery with Lightfoot and Peoples. Lightfoot testified on his own behalf and denied that he had wanted Peoples to kill Ross. He stated that Ross's murder was all Peoples's doing and that Lightfoot had wanted Ross to be bribed so that she would leave town.

II.

Lightfoot argues first that the district court improperly restricted his cross-examination of government witnesses and erroneously precluded him from introducing important evidence. We disagree.

The Confrontation Clause guarantees defendants the opportunity to effectively cross-examine adverse witnesses. United States v. Triplett, 104 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407, 415 (8th Cir.1993)). The "exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). A defendant's Confrontation Clause rights are not boundless, however, and "trial judges retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).⁴ "We will not reverse a trial court's decision to limit cross-examination absent a `clear abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice to [the] defendant.'" United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 753 (8th Cir.2005) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Love, 329 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir.2003)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 433, 166 L.Ed.2d 307 (2006). "A key factor in determining whether a defendant's right of confrontation has been violated is whether the defendant had other means at his disposal to obtain the effect that the excluded examination would have allegedly established." United States v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 1024 (8th Cir. 1996).

Because Lightfoot's principal evidentiary contention is that the district court improperly impaired his ability to challenge the motivations and credibility of Peoples, Hunter, and Platt, we note at the outset that the jury was given a great deal of information bearing on these witnesses' reasons for cooperating with the government and their credibility. The jury learned that Peoples was a gang-affiliated criminal with a prior felony conviction for aggravated battery. Peoples acknowledged that he had lied to law enforcement about the robberies. Peoples also stated that he had reached a plea agreement with the government, that he had not wanted to risk the death penalty for his involvement in Ross's murder, and that he was hoping for a sentencing reduction for his cooperation in the case. As for Hunter, he stated that he had a prior conviction for aggravated robbery and testified that he had been an "enforcer" in a street gang. Hunter also acknowledged that he had pled guilty to aiding and abetting Ross's murder pursuant to a plea agreement and that he had received a sentencing reduction. The jury heard Platt testify that he had prior convictions and that he had been involved in a number of crimes. Platt stated that he had entered into a plea agreement with the government, pursuant to which he pled guilty to transporting stolen property across state lines and agreed to testify against others. Platt acknowledged that he hoped for a sentencing benefit in the case. He also stated that he had cooperated against codefendants in another case, after which he received probation. Platt also acknowledged that he had repeatedly lied to law enforcement about what he knew about the bank robberies and that he had falsely denied knowing anything about Ross's murder. It is in light of the foregoing factual background that we examine Lightfoot's contention that he was unduly circumscribed in examining Peoples, Hunter, and Platt.

A. Exclusion of Evidence Pertaining to a Telephone Call from Michelle Peoples to Lightfoot

The district court precluded Lightfoot from questioning Peoples about a telephone call that Peoples's wife, Michelle, placed to Lightfoot prior to trial while Lightfoot was in jail. Lightfoot argues that this call — which was made at Peoples's behest — was relevant because, inter alia, it exposed Peoples's motivation in testifying and reveals Peoples's attempts to influence Lightfoot. Lightfoot also argues that "[t]he conversation is significant because Peoples's statements, made through his wife, are lies." We conclude that these arguments lack merit.

First, even assuming that Michelle's statements can be attributed to Peoples, it is not clear that Lightfoot offered Peoples's motivation for cooperating with the government as a ground for cross-examining Peoples about the telephone call. Instead, Lightfoot stated that the calls were relevant to show that Peoples was a "schemer" and that he sought to exert some kind of influence over Lightfoot:

COUNSEL: I think I need to show that this guy is a schemer and that he's not just a forthcoming good citizen, and I think him putting his wife up —

THE COURT: Scheming about what?

COUNSEL: There are lies in the phone call that he had—as I have just been reminded, there are attempts by Michelle on behalf of [Peoples] to influence Mr. Lightfoot, which he resists, but I think it shows —

THE COURT: Influence him to do what?

COUNSEL: It's hard to tell.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to deny that. Objection sustained.

In any case, even if the district court should have understood from this exchange that Lightfoot was seeking to elicit evidence concerning Peoples's motivation in testifying, it is difficult to see how evidence that Peoples sought to influence Lightfoot in some vague, unexplained manner would have contributed to or differed from the other testimony regarding Peoples's motivations. Peoples admitted that he hoped for a sentencing reduction and acknowledged a concern...