U.S. v. Lindsay

• Decision Date: 05 February 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 1620,D,1621,s. 1620
• Citation: 985 F.2d 666
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. David J. LINDSAY and D.J. Lindsay, Inc., Defendants-Appellants, David J. Lindsay, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. ockets 91-1648, 91-1692.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 666

985 F.2d 666

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. David J. LINDSAY and D.J. Lindsay, Inc., Defendants-Appellants, David J. Lindsay, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 1620, 1621, Dockets 91-1648, 91-1692.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued May 22, 1992.

Decided Feb. 5, 1993.

Charles J. Wilcox, Troy, NY (The Wilcox Firm, of counsel), for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.

Henry M. Greenberg, Albany, NY, Asst. U.S. Atty., N.D.N.Y. (Gary L. Sharpe, U.S. Atty., of counsel), for appellee, cross-appellant.

Before: PRATT and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges, and KELLEHER, District Judge of the District Court for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

GEORGE C. PRATT, Circuit Judge:

In case # 91-1648, David J. Lindsay appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Con. G. Cholakis, Judge. In case # 91-1692, the government cross-appealed the sentence, but thereafter requested the dismissal of the cross-appeal, because the solicitor general had failed to authorize the cross-appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We therefore dismiss # 91-1692, and discuss only the appeal by Lindsay, # 91-1648. The notice of appeal recited that both David J. Lindsay and D.J. Lindsay, Inc. were appealing. No separate brief or argument has been presented on behalf of the corporation and we deem its appeal to have been abandoned.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

Although he was the proprietor of D.J.'s Lounge, a bar in Whitehall, New York Although Lindsay and his corporation were convicted as charged, and Guitar was convicted on one count of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, this opinion deals only with Lindsay's convictions, which included 21 drug and firearm counts, and one count ordering the forfeiture of Lindsay's house and tavern under 21 U.S.C. § 853. Specifically, the jury convicted Lindsay of managing a continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE") (count 1), see 21 U.S.C. § 848; conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute (count 2), see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846; possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (count 3), see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (count 18), see 26 U.S.C. §§ 5842, 5861(h), and 5871; possession of three unregistered silencers (counts 19-21), see 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and 5871; and forfeiture of any interest of Lindsay or D.J. Lindsay, Inc., in Lindsay's house and D.J.'s Lounge (count 22), see 21 U.S.C. § 853.

                David Lindsay sold more than alcohol from his tavern.   From 1983 to 1988, Lindsay ran a drug operation which distributed millions of dollars worth of cocaine.   On February 2, 1990, government agents arrested Lindsay on the basis of a criminal complaint alleging one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.   Ultimately, in a second superseding 22-count indictment, filed on June 27, 1991, the government charged Lindsay, his corporation, and his girlfriend, Lisa Guitar, with multiple violations of federal narcotics and firearms laws.   We address further facts as necessary in discussing the various issues raised by Lindsay
                

The jury also convicted Lindsay of 14 violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)--using a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking offense. Counts 4 through 10 imposed penalties for using seven firearms during and in relation to the CCE offense set out in count 1, and counts 11 through 17 imposed the same penalties for using the same seven firearms during and in relation to the cocaine-conspiracy offense set out in count 2:

                                 CCE                              Cocaine Conspiracy
                Count 4  .22 caliber rifle w/silencer   Count 11  .22 caliber rifle w/silencer
                Count 5  Raven Arms .25 caliber         Count 12  Raven Arms .25 caliber
                Count 6  Mossburg .12 gauge shotgun     Count 13  Mossburg .12 gauge shotgun
                           Serial: J640709                          Serial: J640709
                Count 7  Mossburg .12 gauge shotgun     Count 14  Mossburg .12 gauge shotgun
                           Serial: J649775                          Serial: J649775
                Count 8  Remington 760 rifle Serial:    Count 15  Remington 760 rifle Serial
                           A7098421                                 A7098421
                Count 9  Smith & Wesson Model 1500      Count 16  Smith & Wesson Model 1500
                           rifle Serial: PN74006                    rifle Serial: PN74006
                Count    Savage rifle Serial: 267049    Count 17  Savage rifle Serial: 267049
                  10
                ----------
                

As shown by this chart and as will be discussed in more detail below, the seven § 924(c)(1) violations set forth in counts 4 through 10, involving the use of seven different firearms in relation to the CCE offense, parallel the violations set forth in counts 11 through 17, involving the use of the same seven firearms, but in relation to the cocaine-conspiracy offense.

The district court sentenced Lindsay to 30 years' imprisonment on each of the

                three drug-trafficking offenses, to run concurrently with each other;  the 10-year sentences for each of counts 18-21 also run concurrently with the drug-trafficking sentences.   The other significant aspect of Lindsay's sentence is the district court's imposition of mandatory 30-year terms for each of the two § 924(c)(1) silencer violations (counts 4 and 11), and five years' mandatory imprisonment for each of the 12 remaining § 924(c)(1) violations (counts 5-10 and 12-17).   The district court provided that these § 924(c)(1) sentences would run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other counts.   Lindsay thus received, in effect, 30 years' imprisonment for the underlying offenses, plus a mandatory, additional 30-year term for the § 924(c)(1) violations.   In sum, the district court imposed 720 months' imprisonment, 17 years' supervised release, and a special assessment of $1,050.   The district court also ordered the forfeiture of Lindsay's home and tavern
                

DISCUSSION

We have carefully reviewed the record against Lindsay's challenges to certain evidentiary rulings, the jury charge, and the sufficiency of the evidence, and we find these challenges to be so lacking in merit as to be unworthy of further discussion.

We write, however, to address Lindsay's challenge to two significant aspects of his sentence: (1) the imposition of a sentence on count 2 for his cocaine-conspiracy conviction that is separate from the sentence on count 1 imposed for the CCE violation, and (2) the imposition of multiple sentences for his convictions for using multiple firearms during the commission of a drug-trafficking crime.

Our consideration of these sentencing claims deals more with form than with substance because, in the end, Lindsay's 60-year sentence remains unchanged by our disposition of this appeal. Getting to this result, however, requires considerable analysis, as we must focus both on the relationship between the sentences imposed for the CCE and the lesser-included cocaine-conspiracy violations, and on the relationship between these drug-trafficking convictions and the § 924(c)(1) firearms counts.

A. Combination of Lesser-Included and Greater Offenses.

At sentencing, the district court imposed concurrent sentences for the convictions on count 1 (CCE) and count 2 (conspiracy to distribute cocaine). Lindsay points out, and the government agrees, that this was error.

Since Lindsay's narcotics conspiracy conviction is a lesser-included offense of the CCE violation, see United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 73 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988), it cannot be treated as a separate conviction for sentencing purposes. In the past, when the sentencing court has imposed a separate sentence on a lesser-included charge, we have vacated that sentence, but we generally have declined to vacate the lesser-included conviction. Instead, we have remanded the matter to the district court so that the lesser-included conviction may be " 'combined' with the conviction on the greater offense, although it is not 'merged out of existence.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir.1984), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 757 F.2d 27, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830, 106 S.Ct. 97, 88 L.Ed.2d 79 (1985)).

We have previously acknowledged that our practice of "combining" convictions for lesser-included offenses with convictions for greater offenses is somewhat inconsistent with the Supreme Court's practice as described in Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985), where the Court held that a convicted felon who handled a firearm on one occasion could not be punished for both receiving, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), and possessing, see 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1), a firearm.

The district court in Ball had imposed concurrent sentences for the two violations, but the Supreme Court held that having In United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.1985), decided after Ball, we noted that Ball did not address the possibility that the greater offense on which the district court imposed judgment on remand might subsequently be reversed, and thereby permit the defendant to completely escape punishment for his crime. Id. at 634. Thus, we continued our pre-Ball practice of combining a lesser-included conviction into a greater conviction, see, e.g., Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d at 135, concluding that

                the sentences run concurrently still did not cure the double-punishment problem, citing to the potential adverse collateral consequences that stem from a separate conviction.   See id., 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. at 1673 (collateral consequences might include delayed parole eligibility, increased sentence under recidivist statute for future offense, and impeachment of defendant's credibility).   Instead, the Court remanded to the district court to exercise its discretion by vacating one of the

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