U.S. v. Morales, 00-20811
Decision Date | 05 November 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 00-20811,00-20811 |
Citation | 272 F.3d 284 |
Parties | (5th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDUARDO MORALES, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
Eduardo Morales was an 18-year-old student at Milby High School in Houston, Texas at the time of the internet communications at issue. He entered an internet chatroom and, in a conversation with a stranger in the state of Washington, threatened to shoot and kill students at Milby High. The stranger alerted the police, who ultimately traced the communications to Morales. He was indicted for knowingly and intentionally transmitting in interstate commerce a threat to injure another in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).1 He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to twenty-four months probation. Based on this court's earlier decision in United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997), we affirm the conviction of Morales and the district court's holdings.
Morales's conviction stemmed from an internet conversation Morales had with Crystal Lees, a 26-year-old mother of two living in Puyallup, Washington, whom Morales did not know at the time. Both Morales and Lees were in a "Young Latinos" chat room when Morales, using the screen name "Fusion_2", sent an instant message directed to Lees, who was using the screen name "Crystalita."2 The following exchange via instant messages ensued:
Morales: I will kill
Lees: huh? - me
You will kill what - me
Morales: TEACHERS AND STUDENTS AT MILBY
Lees: Why do you want to do that
Morales: CAUSE AM TIRED ......HOUSTON
Lees: are you really going to go and kill people
Who has made you mad
r u ok do you want to talk to me
Lees: r u ok
Morales: I HATE LIVE
Lees: I am here
Morales: YES MY NAME S ED HARRIS
Lees alerted the police because she was concerned about the well-being of Milby High School students. Milby High School's principal was informed, and he increased security measures at the school.
That same day, police traced the screen name "Fusion_2" to a friend of Morales, who informed the police that Morales had been using his WebTV internet terminal device. Morales was arrested after admitting that he was the individual who had parlayed with Lees in the chat room. However, Morales insisted that he was only joking. He told police he was trying to joke that he was the ghost of Ed Harris, whom he mistakenly thought was the assailant at Columbine High School, who in fact was Eric Harris.
Morales filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds, arguing that his statements to a distant third party did not constitute a true threat under Supreme Court jurisprudence. That motion was denied. During the jury trial, Morales moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting again that no true threat was made because the statements were made to a third party. He also argued that no evidence established that he made the statements with the intent to intimidate. Again, the motions were denied.
Morales then objected to the court's proposed jury instruction that the government was not required to prove that Morales subjectively intended to communicate a threat. The court rejected his proposed instructions that 1) the government must prove that the defendant has communicated the threat to the target or someone he intended would communicate the threat to the target, and 2) that the government must prove that the defendant intended to make a threat. The jury convicted Morales of the single § 875(c) count, charging him with knowingly and intentionally transmitting a threat to injure another. The court thereafter denied Morales's post-verdict motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial.
On appeal, Morales challenges his conviction on three grounds. First, Morales argues that his communication was not a "true threat" given the context in which it was delivered. Second, Morales asserts that his statements were not actionable under § 875(c) because they were communicated to a third party. Third, Morales argues that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that the government must establish that Morales intended to communicate a threat.
We review de novo the denials of Morales's motions for judgment of acquittal. United States v. DeLeon, 170 F.3d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1999). United States v. Cathey, 259 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
We first address whether Morales's statements constituted a "true threat." In this circuit, a communication is a threat under § 875(c) if "in its context [it] would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor." United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997), citing United States v. Bozeman, 495 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Prosecution under § 875(c) "requires proof that the threat was made knowingly and intentionally." Myers, 104 F.3d at 79. An act is performed "knowingly" when it is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident. See id. "A threat is knowingly made if the maker of it comprehends the meaning of the words uttered by him, and a threat is willfully made if in addition to comprehending his words, the maker voluntarily and intelligently utters the words as a declaration of an apparent determination to carry out the threat." United States v. Pilkington, 583 F.2d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
However, "[b]ecause § 875(c) contains nothing suggesting a specific intent requirement, it defines only a general intent offense." Myers, 104 F.3d at 81. The Supreme Court has held that Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
Before analyzing a defendant's willfulness or intention, the Supreme Court has noted that federal statutes prohibiting threats "initially require[] the Government to prove a true threat." Id. at 708. The Court distinguished "political hyperbole" from a "true threat," and recognized the importance of examining statements "in context" to determine whether they are true threats punishable by law. Id. Thus, in Myers we determined that "[i]n order to convict, a fact finder must determine that the recipient of the in-context threat reasonably feared it would be carried out." 104 F.3d at 80, citing Bozeman, 495 F.2d at 510.
Morales admitted making the statements. He admitted more, however: that he did it to see how Lees would react. Morales further testified that he could see why Lees "would get scared or why she reacted the way she did." Morales admitted that he was aware of a prior incident in which a student at Milby had made threats over the internet,3 and that he knew it was wrong to do so. Under Myers all that is required is general intent. 104 F.3d at 81. It is up to the jury to decide whether Morales made the statements knowingly and intentionally. Id. at 78. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Morales acted with knowledge and intent.
Additionally, however, the trier of fact must have found that the communication "in its context would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor." Id. at 79. The jury was presented with evidence that Lees felt apprehension that "Fusion_2" would act on his threat to kill. Morales repeated his threats to kill several times, and gave no indication that he was joking. Morales admitted that he attempted to refer to Eric Harris, one of the perpetrators of the Columbine High School killings. Thus, his statement in context cannot be divorced from the reality of that tragedy. We should also observe that the context of Morales's statement is different from that in Watts. Unlike Watts, Morales was not engaged in political speech as part of a public debate, in which the listeners laughed in response to Watts's comments. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. Given these factors and the length of the communication between Morales and Lees, a reasonable juror could find all the facts necessary to make Morales's communication a "true threat."
Morales contends, however, that his statements cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a true threat because they were made to a random third party who had no connection with Milby High School.
Our precedent does not allow for this distinction. For example, in Myers, the defendant was a Vietnam veteran with a history of mental illness. In two telephone conversations he directly threatened a member of his congressman's staff. In a third telephone conversation, Myers communicated a threat against the Veterans Administration and Congress to an employee of the Paralyzed Veterans of America ("PVA"). Myers was convicted on three separate counts of violations of § 875(c) for each individual phone call. This court affirmed Myers's conviction, drawing no distinction between the threat made to the PVA and two other threats communicated directly to their targets. Myers, 104 F.3d at 77-78. Again, the focus was on whether the...
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