U.S. v. Munn

Decision Date17 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09-7525.,09-7525.
Citation595 F.3d 183
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raeford Nathaniel MUNN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: Daniel Micah Blau, Robert H. Hale, Jr. & Associates, Attorneys at Law, PC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert H. Hale, Jr., Robert H. Hale, Jr. & Associates, Attorneys at Law, PC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge DAVIS joined. Judge DUNCAN wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Raeford Nathaniel Munn pursues this appeal from the district court's denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Munn's motion was predicated on Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 706, which revised the Drug Quantity Table of section 2D1.1(c) by reducing the base offense level applicable to cocaine base ("crack") offenses. The court denied the motion on the ground that, because Munn had been designated as a career offender under Guidelines section 4B1.1, Amendment 706 did not lower his applicable guideline range and he was therefore ineligible for a sentence reduction. The sole appellate contention being pursued here is that Munn is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) because the sentencing court — having concluded that career offender status overrepresented Munn's criminal history — sentenced him according to the Drug Quantity Table, which Amendment 706 altered. As explained below, we conclude that Munn is eligible for a sentence reduction and therefore vacate and remand.

I.
A.

In January 2001, Munn was charged in the Eastern District of North Carolina, by way of information, with a single count of distribution of fifty grams or more of crack, in contravention of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Munn waived his right to be indicted and pleaded guilty to the information, pursuant to a written plea agreement, on January 22, 2001.

On March 21, 2001, following Munn's guilty plea, the probation officer prepared and submitted a Presentence Investigation Report (the "PSR") to the sentencing court. On the basis of Munn's offense of conviction, the drug quantity attributable to him (155.1 grams of crack), his managerial role in the offense, and his prior criminal history, the PSR calculated his adjusted offense level at 36 and his criminal history category as IV.1 The PSR recommended, however, that Munn be deemed a career offender under Guidelines section 4B1.1 (the "Career Offender Provision") and that his offense level and criminal history category be enhanced accordingly.2 Because Munn's offense of conviction provided for a statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the PSR recommended calculating his offense level as 37 and his criminal history category as VI, see USSG § 4B1.1. After applying a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the PSR recommended a total offense level of 34 and a guideline range of 262 to 327 months.

Prior to Munn's sentencing hearing, each party moved for a downward departure. On June 6, 2001, the Government filed a motion requesting that the sentencing court, pursuant to Guidelines section 5K1.1, depart from the guideline range prescribed by the PSR on the basis of Munn's substantial assistance in the prosecution of others. Two days later, Munn filed his response to the PSR. Most pertinent here, Munn objected to his classification as a career offender, contending that one of his prior convictions was not a crime of violence for purposes of the Career Offender Provision. In the alternative, Munn moved for a downward departure under Guidelines section 4A1.3 (an "Overrepresentation Departure") because his career offender status significantly overrepresented his likelihood of recidivism.3 Importantly, neither party's motion specified the extent of the departure sought.

At Munn's sentencing hearing, conducted on June 13, 2001, the court first assessed and rejected Munn's contention that he did not qualify as a career offender. The court thus adopted the PSR's recommended offense level (34) and criminal history category (VI), as prescribed by the Career Offender Provision. The court determined, however, that an Overrepresentation Departure, as sought in Munn's motion, was warranted under Guidelines section 4A1.3 because "his criminal history category is overstated." J.A. 23.4 The court also elected to grant the Government's request for a substantial assistance departure, pursuant to Guidelines section 5K1.1. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court explained that it would "depart down 60 months by virtue [of] the fact . . . that [Munn's] criminal history overstates the seriousness of his offense" and "depart down an additional 51 months honoring the Government's 5K1 motion . . ., which will result in a sentence of 151 months." Id. at 23-24. Offering no further explanation for the extent of either departure, the court then sentenced Munn to 151 months of imprisonment, with five years of supervised release. Munn did not appeal either his conviction or his sentence.

B.

On May 1, 2007, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. That Amendment, addressing crack-related drug offenses, reduced by two levels the base offense level assigned to each threshold quantity of crack listed in the Drug Quantity Table (the "Crack Guidelines"). See USSG § 2D1.1(c) (2007); USSG Supp. to App. C, Amend. 706 (2007).5 Thereafter, the Commission made Amendment 706 retroactive, effective March 3, 2008. See USSG Supp. to App. C, Amend. 713 (2008).

Accordingly, on July 24, 2009, Munn filed a post-sentencing motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).6 In his motion, Munn explained that his 151-month sentence was predicated on an offense of conviction involving 155.1 grams of crack, which corresponded to a base offense level of 34 under the then-applicable Crack Guidelines. See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(3). Under Amendment 706, however, Munn's corresponding base offense level was reduced to 32. See id. § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2007). According to Munn, § 3582(c)(2) authorized the district court to reduce his sentence because he was "sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered." See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The Government opposed Munn's § 3582(c)(2) motion, however, contending that his sentence was predicated on the Career Offender Provision rather than the Crack Guidelines, thereby rendering him ineligible for a sentence reduction.

The district court agreed with the Government, concluding that Munn was ineligible for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2) because Amendment 706 did not affect Munn's status as a career offender and therefore did not lower his applicable guideline range. Because Munn was deemed ineligible for a sentence reduction, the court concluded that it lacked the authority to reduce his sentence and, on August 10, 2009, denied his § 3582(c)(2) motion. Munn thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision on whether to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Goines, 357 F.3d 469, 478 (4th Cir.2004). We review de novo, however, a court's conclusion on the scope of its legal authority under § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, 250 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2401, 173 L.Ed.2d 1296 (2009).

III.

The sole issue before us on appeal is whether the district court properly concluded that it lacked authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce Munn's sentence. As explained below, the court misinterpreted the limits of its authority when it denied Munn's § 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduced sentence.

A.

We begin our analysis by examining the authority that § 3582(c)(2) grants a district court to modify a defendant's sentence. In general, a court lacks authority to modify a term of imprisonment "once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section 3582(c)(2), however, creates a limited exception to the general rule, authorizing the court to modify a defendant's term of imprisonment if it was "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." Id. § 3582(c)(2). Any such reduction must be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id.

The applicable policy statement implementing § 3582(c)(2), found in Guidelines section 1B1.10 (the "Policy Statement"), provides that a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) "is not authorized" if an amendment "does not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range." USSG § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (2008). The Policy Statement then sets forth specific instructions for determining whether a particular amendment lowered the applicable guideline range. According to the Policy Statement, "the [district] court shall determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment[] . . . had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1). Importantly, the Policy Statement instructs that the court "shall substitute only the amendment[ ] . . . for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected." Id. In other words, a defendant is ineligible for a reduced sentence...

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