U.S.A v. Nicoll
| Decision Date | 14 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-00347-CR-T-26-TBM,No. 09-16330,09-16330,09-00347-CR-T-26-TBM |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFERY CHARLES NICOLL, JR., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Jeffery Charles Nicoll, Jr., appeals his convictions and 180-monthtotal sentence for two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and one count of possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. On appeal, Nicoll argues that: (1) the district court committed reversible error when it failed to conduct a hearing sua sponte on the issue of his competency to enter a guilty plea; and (2) the district court plainly erred in convicting him under § 922(g) because the statute violates the Commerce Clause, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995), and the Second Amendment, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.__, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010). Nicoll further argues that, in sentencing him, the district court erred by: (1) applying a four-level enhancement to his base offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), for having a firearm in connection with another felony offense; (2) permitting an individual whose wife was killed in a car crash caused by Nicoll to make a statement during his sentencing hearing; and (3) imposing an above-guideline sentence that was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Nicoll first argues that the district court erred in failing to conduct acompetency hearing sua sponte. We review a district court's failure to order a competency hearing sua sponte for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 468 F.2d 819, 820 (5th Cir. 1972).1
Tiller, 911 F.2d at 576. We "focus[] on what the trial court did in light of what it knew at the time of the trial or plea hearing." Id. "Because legal competency is primarily a function of defendant's role in assisting counsel in conducting the defense, the defendant's attorney is in the best position to determine whether the defendant's competency is suspect." Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 1996).
Applying these standards to the facts of the present case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a hearing sua sponte to determine whether Nicoll was competent to plead guilty. There is no evidence in the record that Nicoll behaved irrationally at the plea hearing. He unequivocally answered every question the district court asked and he never expressed any confusion with the proceeding. Moreover, Nicoll informed the district court that he had received a general equivalency diploma, had taken additional classes since receiving his diploma, and read, wrote and understood the English language. Although Nicoll informed the district court that he had been diagnosed and received treatment for bipolar disorder and depression, he also informed the court that he last received treatment three years prior and was nolonger taking medication. After learning of Nicoll's past diagnoses, the court received assurances from Nicoll that he was of a clear mind, was thinking appropriately, was not under the influence of any substances, and understood the plea proceeding and its significance. Further, Nicoll's attorney, who was in the best position to determine whether a question existed concerning Nicoll's competency, declined to make any further inquiries at the end of Nicoll's plea colloquy. See Watts, 87 F.3d at 1288
Nicoll argues that the district court should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing based on a mental health report that he filed after his guilty plea was accepted in relation to sentencing. However, it is well-established that, in determining whether a district court should have ordered a competency hearing, we focus on what the district court knew at the time of the plea hearing. See Tiller, 911 F.2d at 576. Because the mental health report was not available at the time of the plea hearing, it is not relevant to our determination.2 We conclude that there was not reasonable cause to believe that Nicoll was unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding or to assist in his defense.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order sua sponte a competency hearing.
Nicoll's next argument is that the statute under which he was convicted—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—is unconstitutional under both the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment. Where, as here, a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a statute under which he was convicted for the first time on appeal, we will review the claim for plain error only. United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2005). Under plain error review, we "may not correct an error the defendant failed to raise in the district court unless there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights." Id. at 1271 (quotations omitted). Even then, we will rectify the error only if it "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (quotation omitted). Here, because Nicoll did not object to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) before the district court, we review his claims challenging the statute as unconstitutional on its face for plain error. See id.
"The law of this circuit is 'emphatic' that only the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc can judicially overrule a prior panel decision." Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Woodard, 938 F.2d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 1991)). We have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g) against Commerce Clause challenges. E.g., United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (). In McAllister, we rejected a constitutional challenge identical to Nicoll's argument—that based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995), § 922(g) exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power because it does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 77 F.3d at 389-90. Based on these precedents, we reject Nicoll's Commerce Clause argument.
Nicoll also argues that § 922(g) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.__, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008), the Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia's ban on handgun possession in the home by law-abiding citizens violated the Second Amendment. 554 U.S. at__, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. The Court in Heller, however, qualified that the right to bear arms, "[l]ike most rights,... is not unlimited." Id. at__, 128 S. Ct. at 2816. The Court further stated that "nothing in [Heller] should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons...." Id. at__, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17. After Heller, we held that § 922(g)(1) is a "constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of" convicted felons. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3399 (2010). Noting that the Heller Court specifically disclaimed any erosion of the "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons," we held that "statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment." Id. (quotation omitted). Recently, in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the holding in Heller 561 U.S. at__, 130 S. Ct. at__, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 926 (quotation omitted). Based on these precedents, we reject Nicoll's argument that § 922(g) violates the Second Amendment.
Nicoll next argues that the district court erred in applying a four-level enhancement...
To continue reading
Request your trial