U.S. v. Payne

• Decision Date: 27 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-1437,92-1437
• Citation: 2 F.3d 706
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darryl Nichols PAYNE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 706

2 F.3d 706

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darryl Nichols PAYNE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-1437.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 22, 1993.

Decided Aug. 27, 1993.

James C. Mitchell, Jennifer Mulhern Granholm, Kathleen Moro Nesi, Asst. U.S. Attys. (argued and briefed), Detroit, MI, for plaintiff-appellee.

Douglas R. Mullkoff (argued and briefed), Ann Arbor, MI, for defendant-appellant.

Before: JONES and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; and WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-Appellant Darryl Nichols Payne appeals his conviction for obstruction and desertion of mail. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court with respect to several of the issues raised by Payne; however, we reverse Payne's conviction and remand for further proceedings.

I.

A.

On September 25, 1991, a grand jury charged Payne in a seven-count indictment with four counts of soliciting bribes and attempting to solicit bribes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 201(b)(2)(A) (1988) and 201(b)(2)(C) (1988); two counts of obstructing mail, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1701 (1988); and one count of deserting mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1700 (1988).

On December 20, 1991, a jury found Payne guilty on the obstruction and desertion counts and not guilty on the other counts.

On April 2, 1992, the district court sentenced Payne to three months home confinement and two years probation.

B.

Payne was a postal carrier for the U.S. Postal Service in Jackson, Michigan. The charges in the indictment arose from several complaints which the Postal Service received from postal patrons along Payne's regular delivery route. As a result of numerous complaints about problems with delivery of Social Services checks, the Postal Service began an investigation of Payne. The fruits of that investigation provided the following evidence at Payne's trial (as it relates to the counts the jury found Payne guilty of):

On October 27, 1990, Karen Mass did not receive her Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) check in the mail as she expected. Later, Payne told her that he did not deliver her check because of a vicious dog being present in the neighborhood.

On December 1, 1990, Charlotte Cole was waiting for delivery of her ADC check with her neighbor, Patricia Peterson. According to Cole, Payne had previously warned her that he would not deliver mail if her dog was running loose. As a result of that warning, Cole testified that she had her dog locked up on December 1, 1990. Nonetheless, Payne did not deliver Cole's mail because of the presence of a "vicious dog" on the premises. Michael Willis, a postal inspector, determined at a later date that Cole's dog was nonaggressive. In addition, Payne's supervisor, William Gibbs, also encountered no dog problems when he investigated complaints against Payne.

Deborah Miller also had problems with Payne delaying the delivery of her ADC check. He had previously told her that he would not deliver her check unless she kept her name on the mailbox, repaired a step, and kept her steps swept clean of snow. According to Miller, on February 6, 1991, her name was written on paper and taped to the mailbox with duct tape. Payne did not deliver the mail until the next day because, he alleged, her name was not on the mailbox the previous day.

On some occasions, Payne gave mail to Barry Kirkum, a neighborhood resident who was not employed with the post office. Payne would expect Kirkum to complete the mail delivery in the neighborhood for him. Other times, Payne would leave mail at one person's house and expect that person to deliver it to his/her neighbor. Payne admitted that he handed mail to people to deliver to their neighbors, but he claimed that he received approval from his supervisors to do so and that he did it on only two occasions.

II.

Payne first argues that a prior administrative decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) should have collaterally estopped the government from bringing this particular prosecution. Before Payne was indicted federally, the U.S. Post Office removed Payne from his employment because of allegations substantially similar to those in the indictment. Payne appealed the removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), an administrative law tribunal. After a hearing before an ALJ and prior to its decision, Payne was indicted federally on substantially similar claims of wrongdoing. Subsequent to the indictment being filed, the ALJ concluded that the removal action was improper because the U.S. Postal Service had failed to prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. The Postal Service did not appeal the ALJ's decision, therefore, that decision became the final decision of the Board. J.A. at 53.

Collateral estoppel prevents an issue of ultimate fact that has been determined by a valid and final judgment from being relitigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). "The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a judicially developed mechanism to 'relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.' " United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). Collateral estoppel is not proper unless the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had "a full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issues. Allen, 449 U.S. at 95, 101 S.Ct. at 415.

In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 335, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1085, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 2, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2142, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the Supreme Court noted that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not made inapplicable by the fact that the second proceeding is a criminal case and the prior proceeding was civil in nature. Furthermore, the courts have increasingly given collateral estoppel effect to the determinations of administrative agencies acting in a judicial capacity where the second proceeding is civil in nature. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1321-23 (7th Cir.1978).

Notwithstanding the above, the Seventh Circuit has stated, "In no case has a federal court presiding over a criminal trial granted preclusive effect to a prior administrative ruling contrary to the Government's position in the criminal case." Alexander, 743 F.2d at 476. See also United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir.) ("We have found no case in which a defendant in a criminal proceeding sought to use a prior favorable administrative decision to preclude trial of the matters contained in the indictment."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979). ¹

In Alexander, an ALJ denied an injunction request by the U.S. Postal Service against the defendant's company. The ALJ found that the Postal Service had failed to prove that the company had been involved in a scheme to defraud. Between the time the Postal Service filed its complaint and the decision of the ALJ was rendered, the government indicted the defendant on criminal charges based upon most of the same transactions through which the Postal Service had sought to establish its right to an injunction. The defendant claimed that the ALJ's decision collaterally estopped the government from bringing charges against him. The Seventh Circuit held that although there was mutuality of parties, the court would not grant the ALJ decision estoppel effect. In support of its holding, the court stated, "To allow such preclusion would present a debilitating impediment to the enforcement of the federal criminal law." Id. at 476. The court also noted:

Furthermore, collateral estoppel in this context would affect seriously the executive branch decisions to enforce regulatory schemes. If an administrative decision against the Government precluded subsequent prosecutions, the Government might hesitate to bring enforcement proceedings at all. The clear intent of Congress in the establishment of these regulatory schemes was to provide an informal and expeditious adjudicatory setting for the determination of regulatory violations, subject, of course, to various mechanisms of review. If we were to endow initial administrative decisions with preclusive effects on criminal actions, the Government would either have to postpone the administrative action until it obtained a favorable result in the corresponding criminal case or have to allocate substantially greater resources to the enforcement of regulations to increase the likelihood of a favorable outcome at the administrative level. We refuse to impose such a burden upon the Government's decision as to the allocation of its limited resources.

Id. at 477. Although the Seventh Circuit was dealing with an initial determination, the court stated, in dictum, that it would have reached the same result even if the indictment followed a final administrative determination. The court stated, "Even had the Judicial Officer affirmed the administrative law judge's decision in the present case, we would not grant the final administrative decision estoppel effects because of the strong policy in favor of the enforcement of the criminal law." Id.

In People v. Sims, 32 Cal.3d 468, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 92-93, 651 P.2d 321, 336-37 (1982) (Kaus, J., dissenting), Justice Kaus reasoned similar to the Seventh Circuit by stating:

[I]t becomes evident that there are many administrative bodies which in the course of their ordinary duties frequently pass on factual disputes concerning conduct that may also be the subject of a criminal prosecution. Professional licensing boards, prison disciplinary panels, local school boards, the State Personnel Board, labor relations boards and the like may all have...