U.S. v. Sanchez, Docket No. 99-1016
| Decision Date | 01 August 1999 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 99-1016 |
| Citation | 225 F.3d 172 |
| Parties | (2nd Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. CARLOS SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant, ADAM DIAZ, VICTOR PEREZ, ALBERTO PALMA and YSRAEL PALMA, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Appeal from the amended judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Arthur D. Spatt, Judge), upon a December 22, 1998 memorandum of decision and order, denying Defendant-Appellant Carlos Sanchez's motion to dismiss a summons charging him with violation of conditions of his supervised release.
AFFIRMED.
Jonathan D. Libby (Lynne F. Stewart, on the brief), New York, NY, for Appellant.
Demetri M. Jones (Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Peter A. Norling, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, of counsel), Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
Before: MINER, PARKER, and STRAUB, Circuit Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant-Appellant Carlos Sanchez, also known as Luis Garcia, appeals from the amended judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Arthur D. Spatt, Judge), upon a December 22, 1998 memorandum of decision and order, denying Defendant-Appellant Carlos Sanchez's motion to dismiss a summons charging him with violation of conditions of his supervised release.
The probation department served Sanchez with a summons charging him with a violation of supervised release approximately four years after he pleaded guilty to the state drug charges which form the basis for the violation. At issue is whether the delay between the violation and the issuance of the summons violated Sanchez's due process rights and the Sentencing Commission Policy Statement at U.S.S.G. § 7B1.2(a). We affirm the decision of the district court and hold that Sanchez's due process rights were not violated because he was not prejudiced by the delay, and that U.S.S.G. § 7B1.2(a) does not grant Sanchez a right to prompt reporting of his violation of supervised release.
On March 2, 1990, Sanchez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. On May 30, 1990, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced him to 63 months' imprisonment to be followed by five years' supervised release. On December 27, 1993, Sanchez was released from custody and began his term of supervised release in the District of New Jersey. A condition of his supervised release was that he "not commit another Federal, state or local crime." United States v. Sanchez, 30 F. Supp. 2d 595, 596 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)(internal quotation marks omitted).
On May 27, 1994, while on supervised release, Sanchez was arrested by New Jersey state police under the name Luis Garcia for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. On September 22, 1994, Sanchez pleaded guilty in New Jersey Superior Court to state charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. On January 23, 1995, the court sentenced Sanchez to seven years' imprisonment. On June 11, 1996, the State of New Jersey released Sanchez to parole supervision through July 15, 1999.
There was some dispute below, not resolved by the district court, as to when the U.S. Department of Probation in the Eastern District of New York was notified of Sanchez's New Jersey arrest and conviction. SeeSanchez, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 596. According to Sanchez, he reported regularly to his probation officer in the District of New Jersey and promptly informed him of the arrest and guilty plea. But it was not until August 20, 1998, over four years after the New Jersey arrest, that the Department of Probation sought a warrant for Sanchez's violation of the conditions of his supervised release.
On October 9, 1998, Sanchez moved the district court to dismiss the summons charging him with violation of his supervised release, arguing the summons violated his due process rights as well as the Sentencing Commission Policy Statement at U.S.S.G. § 7B1.2(a). He argued, as he does on appeal, that the delay from the date of the violation to the summons was "so 'unreasonable' as to violate the principles of 'fundamental fairness' guaranteed by due process." Sanchez, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (). Sanchez argued "that he suffered 'significant prejudice' from this delay in that 'it is quite possible that the New Jersey case would have resulted in a sentence concurrent to that federal sentence' had a summons or warrant been promptly executed." Id. (quoting same). Finally, he argued that the delay contravened the Sentencing Commission Policy Statement at U.S.S.G. § 7B1.2(a), see id. at 596-97, which states: "The probation officer shall promptly report to the court any alleged . . . violation [of probation or supervised release punishable by over one year imprisonment]." U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.2(a), 7B1.1(a).
At a hearing on December 11, 1998, the district court denied Sanchez's motion. SeeSanchez, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 600. The court concluded that Sanchez's due process rights had not been violated because he had not been prejudiced by the delay. See id. at 597-98. The court also concluded that the policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 7B1.2(a) was not mandatory, and therefore that it did not afford Sanchez a basis for relief. See id. at 600. Following the hearing, Sanchez pleaded guilty to one count of violating his supervised release.1 He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.
Sanchez argues on appeal that his Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated by the more than four-year delay between his violation of supervised release and the issuance of the summons charging that violation. Sanchez argues that the delay in and of itself violated his due process rights-that is, that this Court should recognize a due process violation without requiring a showing of prejudice. In the alternative, Sanchez argues that he was prejudiced by the delay because it "may have . . . subjected [him] to more incarceration than he otherwise might have received." We review de novo the district court's denial of Sanchez's motion to dismiss. See United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1110 (2d Cir. 1995).
This Court considers the constitutional protections for revocation of supervised release to be the same as those afforded for revocation of parole or probation. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994). We have recognized that the loss of liberty entailed in the revocation of probation is "worthy of some due process protection." United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973)). That protection takes the form of a collection of due process rights. "Foremost among these is the right to a hearing at which the court determines two issues: whether the probationer violated a condition of probation as a matter of fact and, if so, whether this fact warrants revocation." Brown, 899 F.2d at 193-94 (citing Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985)(footnote omitted); Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786); see alsoMorrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 488-89 (1972). In addition, as a matter of due process, a probationer is entitled to: written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489); Black, 471 U.S. at 612. The Supreme Court does not, however, attach to revocation proceedings the full range of procedural safeguards associated with a criminal trial, see Black, 471 U.S. at 613, because a probationer already stands convicted of a crime. See Brown, 899 F.2d at 192.
The district court concluded, "[b]earing these principles in mind, . . . that the four years of delay between the violation and summons did not violate due process." Sanchez, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 597. The court found that Sanchez had received the right to a hearing and that he had at his disposal all of the other required procedural safeguards. See id. at 597-98. The district court correctly concluded that delay between a defendant's violation of supervised release and the execution of the violation warrant does not, in and of itself, violate a defendant's due process rights. See id. at 598; see also Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1976); United States v. Throneburg, 87 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1994)(per curiam); United States v. Lopez, 985 F. Supp. 59, 64 (D.R.I. 1997). In Moody, the Supreme Court considered the issue "whether a federal parolee imprisoned for a crime committed while on parole [wa]s constitutionally entitled to a prompt parole revocation hearing when a parole violator warrant [wa]s issued and lodged with the institution of his confinement but not served on him." 429 U.S. at 79. The Court held that due process did not require an immediate hearing. See id.at 86. Because we afford the same rights for revocation of supervised release as for parole revocation, we therefore hold that the delay in this case, in and of itself, did not violate due process.
Moody also speaks to the issue of prejudice. The Supreme Court reasoned that the prospect of future incarceration for the defendant's violation of parole was speculative, and therefore that issuance of the warrant, without its execution, did not have "any present or inevitable...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cornel v. Hawaii
...and the execution of the violation warrant does not, in and of itself, violate a defendant's due process rights." United States v. Sanchez , 225 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2000). This is because "execution of the warrant and custody under that warrant [is] the operative event triggering any los......
-
Brown v. Keane
...Cir.1996) (a court's observations that are "`unnecessary to the disposition of the case before it'" are dicta). 50. United States v. Sanchez, 225 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). 51. FED. R.CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2), 1979 advisory committee's note. 52. Morrissey v. Brewer......
-
State v. Hernandez
...supra note 8; Wickham, supra note 13; Inscore, supra note 13; Stelljes, supra note 13. 25. Washa, supra note 10. 26. See, U.S. v. Sanchez, 225 F.3d 172 (2d Cir.2000); U.S. v. Throneburg, 87 F.3d 851 (6th Cir.1996); U.S. v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 88 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Sackinger, 537 ......
-
U.S. v. Pettus
...of this question of statutory interpretation and of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) is de novo. See United States v. Sanchez, 225 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir.2000). DISCUSSION The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473 tit. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, replaced mos......
-
Sentencing
...11 (1st Cir. 1994) (due process entitles probationer to notice that certain conduct can result in probation revocation); U.S. v. Sanchez, 225 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2000) (due process entitles probationer to consideration of whether violation was serious enough to warrant probation revocati......