U.S. v. Schuler

• Decision Date: 26 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-5143,85-5143
• Citation: 813 F.2d 978
• Parties: 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1277 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott SCHULER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 978

813 F.2d 978

22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1277

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott SCHULER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-5143.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 2, 1986.

Decided March 26, 1987.

Richard M. Steingard, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Brian Hennigan, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before BOOCHEVER, NORRIS and HALL, Circuit Judges.

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge:

The Opinion and Dissent in this case filed September 12, 1986, are hereby withdrawn.

OPINION

Scott Schuler appeals his conviction for threatening the life of the President of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 871 (1982). At issue is whether, in closing argument, a prosecutor's reference to a non-testifying defendant's in-court behavior and demeanor, and his comment that the jury had all the admissible evidence before it constitute error. We find that it was reversible error to allow comment on the defendant's off-the-stand behavior, although the district court did not commit error in allowing the prosecutor to refer to "admissible" evidence.

I. FACTS

On December 26, 1984, Schuler was arrested for attempting to shoplift in the Bullock's Department Store in Indio, California. Security agents took Schuler to the store offices to await police. After reaching the store offices, Schuler began a tirade of name calling, racial slurs, and assorted vulgar comments. His tirade continued when the Riverside County Sheriff arrived and as Schuler was escorted from the department store to the police car. When he arrived at the police station and was being taken from the police car, Schuler told the arresting officer that when the President came to town, he would get him. On the basis of this remark Schuler was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 871.

At trial the defense asserted that Schuler's remark was merely an expression of anger directed at the law enforcement officers, not a serious threat to the President, and therefore, under United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358, 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 934, 100 S.Ct. 281, 62 L.Ed.2d 193 (1979), did not constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 871. The jury announced that they were unable to reach a verdict, and the trial resulted in a mistrial.

At a second trial, the same witnesses were called and the evidence was primarily the same. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated:

[W]hile Mr. Schuler was being interrogated by the two security agents, Schuler made a number of racial comments about the number of people he was going to kill, a number of sexual comments. I noticed a number of you were looking at Mr. Schuler while that testimony was coming in and a number of you saw him laugh and saw him laugh as they were repeated.

Defense counsel immediately objected and the district court overruled the objection, instructing the jury that the prosecutor's argument was proper. The prosecutor in closing argument also stated several times that the jury had heard all the "admissible" evidence. No objection was made to these remarks during the closing argument, but before the jury instructions were given, Schuler asked for a mistrial based on those and other statements.

The jury found Schuler guilty.

II. ANALYSIS

A. PROSECUTORIAL COMMENT ON COURTROOM BEHAVIOR OF A NON-TESTIFYING DEFENDANT

The prosecutor's comment in closing argument on Schuler's laughter during testimony about the threats Schuler made presents procedural and substantive questions. The procedural difficulty derives from the fact that there is nothing in the record indicating that the laughter did occur, although Schuler nowhere objects that it did not. It is very difficult for an appellate court to review an issue that is not grounded in the record. If counsel considers such an outbreak to be significant, he or she should ask the trial court to have it included in the record.

Assuming that the laughter did occur, we are faced with the substantive issue whether the failure to exclude the prosecutor's reference to Schuler's courtroom behavior constituted reversible error. This issue involves several facets, including whether such remarks (1) introduce character evidence solely to prove guilt, (2) violate a defendant's fifth amendment right not to be convicted except on the basis of evidence adduced at trial, and (3) violate fifth amendment rights by indirectly commenting on a defendant's failure to testify at trial. Although we usually review a trial court's discretion in controlling closing arguments for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Guess, 745 F.2d 1286, 1288 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1225, 105 S.Ct. 1219, 84 L.Ed.2d 360 (1985), the issue here involves alleged violation of fifth amendment rights presenting a question of law subject to de novo review. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202-04 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).

The Ninth Circuit has not ruled whether it is error to permit a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's courtroom behavior. Several other circuits, however, have held that such comment is reversible error and we find the rationale of those cases compelling. ¹

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) prohibits the introduction of evidence of the character of the accused solely to prove guilt. The prosecutor's remarks in effect did this by suggesting to the jury that Schuler's laughter was relevant apparently for the purpose of showing that he was of bad character because he considered the charges of threatening the life of the President to be a joke. The district court's comments in overruling Schuler's objections reinforced that suggestion. The jury may, also, have inferred that Schuler was, at the time of trial, of such a mental state that the President's life would be seriously jeopardized if Schuler were acquitted and allowed back on the streets. While the offense of threatening the life of the President requires proof of a "knowing and willful" act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 871, and to that extent involves proof of Schuler's mental state, his laughter at trial could not have any relevancy for that purpose. ² His courtroom behavior off the witness stand was legally irrelevant to the question of his guilt of the crime charged.

The District of Columbia Circuit, when faced with a similar situation, reversed the conviction based in part on the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's courtroom behavior and the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that such behavior must not be considered. United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181 (D.C.Cir.1973). The court stated Unless and until the accused puts his character at issue by giving evidence of his good character or by taking the stand and raising an issue as to his credibility, the prosecutor is forbidden to introduce evidence of the bad character of the accused simply to prove that he is a bad man likely to engage in criminal conduct....

This basic principle cannot be circumvented by allowing the prosecutor to comment on the character of the accused as evidenced by his courtroom behavior. That the jury witnesses the courtroom behavior in any event does not make it proper for the prosecutor to tell them, with the court's approval, that they may consider it as evidence of guilt.

Id. at 1186 (citations omitted). We agree that such comments are improper. See also United States v. Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208, 1210 (4th Cir.1982) (citing Wright with approval).

We also conclude that, in the absence of a curative instruction from the court, a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's off-the-stand behavior constitutes a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. That clause encompasses the right not to be convicted except on the basis of evidence adduced at trial. The Supreme Court has declared that "one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds ... not adduced as proof at trial." Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1934, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978). We have recognized that a prosecutor may not seek to obtain a conviction by going beyond the admissible evidence. See United States v. Schindler, 614 F.2d 227, 228 (9th Cir.1980). The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Pearson, 746 F.2d 787 (11th Cir.1984), was confronted with a prosecutor's closing argument commenting on the defendant's behavior off the witness stand, as follows:

Does it sound to you like he was afraid? You saw him sitting there in the trial. Did you see his leg going up and down? He is nervous. (Appellant's objection overruled) You saw how nervous he was sitting there. Do you think he is afraid?

Id. at 796. The court found such comments were reversible error, adding that

[i]n overruling [the defendant's] objection and in failing to give a curative instruction, the court, in effect, gave the jury an incorrect impression that [the defendant's] behavior off the witness stand was evidence in this instance, upon which the prosecutor was free to comment.

Id. We agree with the holding of the Eleventh Circuit that such comments in the absence of a curative instruction, constitute a deprivation of the fifth amendment right to a fair trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2062-63, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Estell v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). ³

In addition, prosecutorial comment on a defendant's non-testimonial behavior may impinge on that defendant's fifth amendment right not to testify. We do not accept Schuler's contention that such comments in every case violate the right to remain silent because jurors would naturally take them to be comments on the failure of the accused to testify. See Bishop v. Wainwright, 511 F.2d 664,...