U.S. v. Wattleton, No. Crim.A. 1:99-CR306-TWT.

• Decision Date: 29 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. Crim.A. 1:99-CR306-TWT.
• Citation: 110 F.Supp.2d 1380
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. David Earl WATTLETON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

Page 1380

110 F.Supp.2d 1380

UNITED STATES of America, v. David Earl WATTLETON, Defendant.

No. Crim.A. 1:99-CR306-TWT.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

August 29, 2000.

Brian Mendelsohn, Federal Defender Program, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

Gregory Stuart Smith, Federal Defender Program, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

ORDER

THRASH, District Judge.

This is a criminal case in which Defendant was indicted for making telephonic bomb threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). He entered a plea of not guilty. The jury found Defendant not guilty only by reason of insanity. The case came before the Court for a post-trial hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243. The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether Defendant's release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to another's property. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found that the Defendant's release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person. Defendant contends that Section 4243(d), which shifts the burden of proof in these hearings to the defendant, unconstitutionally violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendant's due process rights are not violated by shifting the burden of proof to him in a Section 4243 hearing.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant David Earl Wattleton was charged with four counts of telephonic bomb threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). The Court conducted a trial on the charges June 6-8, 2000. The government and the Defendant presented testimony from mental health professionals, both of whom agreed that the Defendant had a mental disease resulting in a paranoid delusional disorder. The government did not seek a guilty verdict against Defendant, but instead asked that the jury return a verdict of not guilty only by reason of insanity. The Defendant sought a not guilty verdict on the grounds that his mental disease made it impossible to form the specific intent required to violate 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). The jury returned a verdict that Defendant was not guilty only by reason of insanity on all four counts. Because of this verdict, Defendant was committed to Butner Federal Correctional Institution until the Court could conduct a hearing as to his dangerousness pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4243 and 4247. The Court scheduled the hearing for July 19, 2000, but granted Defendant's request for a continuance until August 9, 2000. At the commencement of the August 9 hearing, Defendant for the first time raised the issue that 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) unconstitutionally violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by shifting the burden of proof required at the hearing to the defendant. The Court heard Defendant's argument on the issue and the government's response. After hearing the arguments, the Court concluded that shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in a Section 4243 hearing does not violate his due process rights for two reasons. First, the jury in the criminal trial found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed a criminal act. Second, the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant was insane at the time he committed the criminal act. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found that Defendant was suffering from a severe mental disease and that his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury and property damage to other persons. Consequently, the Court ordered the Defendant committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e). The Court enters this written order to explain its decision that 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) does not violate a defendant's due process rights by shifting the burden of proof as to dangerousness to the defendant.

II. DISCUSSION

The Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4243, which Congress enacted in 1984, provides for the mandatory hospitalization of defendants found not guilty of federal crimes by reason of insanity. Once the special verdict of not guilty only by reason of insanity is rendered in a case, the Act provides that the defendant shall be committed to a suitable facility for care and treatment until he is eligible for release. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a). The defendant must be granted a hearing no later than 40 days after the verdict to determine whether his release endangers others or their property. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(c). The hearing is to be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d). Importantly, the burden of proof in this hearing rests not with the government, but with the defendant:

(d) Burden of proof. — In a hearing pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, a person found not guilty only by reason of insanity of an offense involving bodily injury to, or serious damage to the property of, another person, or involving a substantial risk of such injury or damage, has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage of property of another due to a present mental disease or defect. With respect to any other offense, the person has the burden of such proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

18 U.S.C. § 4243(d). If the defendant fails to meet his burden of proof, the court must commit him to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for care and treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e); United States v. Clark, 893 F.2d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir.1990).

Defendant contends that 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d), which shifts the burden in the post-trial hearing to defendants, is an unconstitutional infringement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Defendant contends that even if this burden-shifting is not unconstitutional in the typical case where the defendant raises the insanity issue, it is unconstitutional in this case because the government requested the insanity verdict. The Court disagrees.

First, as to the preliminary matter of statutory interpretation, Congress plainly shifted the burden of proof at the post-trial hearing to the defendant, regardless of whether the defendant or government raised the issue at trial. The statute states that the "person found not guilty only by reason of insanity ... has the burden of proof...." 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d). The statute does not qualify this burden based on which party sought the insanity verdict at trial. According to the statute's plain terms, the burden always rests with the defendant. Thus the statute's plain meaning supports the conclusion that the burden of proof rests with the defendant even if the government sought the insanity verdict.

Second, the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have long held that Congress is authorized to shift the burden of proof regarding insanity to the defendant, even in the criminal trial itself. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574, 1576 (11th Cir.1986); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (citing Leland with approval); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 650, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (same); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 18, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (same); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 n. 17, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (same); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 122 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (same); Patterson v. State of New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (same); Williams v. Wainwright, 712 F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir.1983) (indicating that a state may make insanity an affirmative defense that defendant must prove). There is no persuasive reason to afford a defendant greater protection at the post-trial hearing, where his criminal culpability is no longer the issue, than at the trial itself. This is especially true since the issue at the post-trial hearing is only whether the defendant continues to suffer from a mental disability that would endanger others or their property.

Third, while neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has addressed specifically whether Section 4243(d) is unconstitutional, two other circuits have confronted the issue and concluded that the statute is constitutional. In United States v. Wallace, 845 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir.1988), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 4243(d) does not violate the Due Process Clause because it satisfies the three-factor test the Supreme Court provided in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Whether procedures satisfy due process depends on the balancing of (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation; and (3) the government's interest, taking into account the fiscal and administrative burdens the government will incur if saddled with additional procedural requirements. Id. As to the first factor, the Eighth Circuit concluded that while commitment under Section 4243 restricts one's liberty, confinement does provide hospitalization, care and treatment. Wallace, 845 F.2d at 1474. Turning to the second factor of possible erroneous deprivation, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the risk of error is lessened since the defendant herself advanced insanity as a defense and proved that the criminal act was the product of mental illness. Id. Thus, it is unlikely the defendant is being confined for mere "idiosyncratic behavior." Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). As to the final Mathews factor, the court emphasized the government's strong interest in avoiding relitigation of the defendant's criminal trial. Id. After analyzing the factors, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Section 4243(d) does not violate due process in the typical case where the defendant himself has raised the insanity...