U.S. v. Webb

• Decision Date: 12 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-3236,95-3236
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles D. WEBB, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 913

83 F.3d 913

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles D. WEBB, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-3236.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 23, 1996.

Decided May 15, 1996.

Rehearing Denied June 12, 1996.

Mark D. Stuaan, argued, Office of the U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Mitchele J. Harlan, argued, Harris, Harris & Harlan, Jeffersonville, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before RIPPLE, MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Charles Webb appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Mr. Webb pleaded guilty to the single count after the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his car at the time of his arrest. Mr. Webb expressly reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress and now appeals the district court's order.

I

Officer Robert Cline of the Indiana Excise Police was conducting surveillance of a liquor store in Bedford, Indiana, when he noticed a disturbance at the tavern next door. At the same time, he heard a dispatch on his police scanner about a fight in progress at the tavern. As he approached the tavern slowly in his vehicle, Officer Cline observed the defendant, Mr. Webb, holding a shotgun at his shoulder and aiming it at another individual. When Officer Cline was about seventeen yards away from the scene, he turned on the emergency lights on his police car and got out of his car with his service revolver drawn. He then ordered Mr. Webb to get on the ground. Instead of responding immediately to Officer Cline's command, Mr. Webb went to his parked car, threw the shotgun he was holding in the open trunk, and then slammed the trunk lid closed. The keys were left in the trunk lock.

Mr. Webb and the other individual ¹ then complied with Officer Cline's orders to get on the ground, and Officer Cline waited for Bedford Police officers to respond to the scene. While the Bedford Police officers secured the defendant, Officer Cline went to the trunk of the car into which Mr. Webb had thrown the gun. Using the keys still in the trunk lock, Officer Cline opened the trunk, retrieved the gun, activated the weapon's safety, and removed its ammunition. Officer Cline then called to have the car towed and did an inventory search of the car. In addition to the federal charge of possession of a weapon by a felon, Mr. Webb was ultimately charged under Indiana state law with public intoxication, disorderly conduct, and criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon. Mr. Webb pleaded guilty to the federal charge after the district court denied his motion to suppress the shotgun. He expressly reserved his right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to suppress and was sentenced to thirty-three months of incarceration and three years of supervised release. Mr. Webb now appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds: first, that the search was not justified by any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement raised by the government; and second, that the district court's handling of the suppression hearing indicated clear prejudice against Mr. Webb.

II

A district court's denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. McGuire, 957 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir.1992). We give particular deference to the district court's findings of fact because of its opportunity to observe witnesses and hear testimony on the issue. United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 516 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 521, 133 L.Ed.2d 428 (1995). We shall not disturb the credibility determinations of the district court at a suppression hearing. McGuire, 957 F.2d at 314. We shall reverse only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Saadeh, 61 F.3d at 516.

Mr. Webb first challenges the district court's determination that the warrantless search, which resulted in Officer Cline's recovery of the shotgun, was justified under either the automobile exception or the exigent circumstances doctrine. We agree that the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress could be supported by either of these two exceptions to the warrant requirement.

A.

First, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits the search of a vehicle without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband or evidence. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285-86, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); United States v. Young, 38 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994). A lawful automobile search extends to all parts of the vehicle where contraband or evidence could be concealed, including the trunk. Id. Probable cause will exist if, under the totality of the circumstances, it is fairly probable that the car contains contraband or evidence. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); McGuire, 957 F.2d at 314.

In this case, Officer Cline had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. Officer Cline personally had witnessed the defendant with a weapon aimed at another individual. In fact, in addition to the federal weapons charge, the defendant was charged with public intoxication, disorderly conduct, and criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon. Thus, the firearm that Officer Cline saw the defendant toss into the trunk would be evidence of the crimes with which Mr. Webb was charged. Officer Cline therefore had probable cause to believe that the defendant's car contained contraband or evidence. The Carroll exception clearly allowed Officer Cline to retrieve the weapon from the trunk of the defendant's car.

B.

Officer Cline also could have retrieved the gun from the trunk under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Warrantless searches will be allowed when exigent circumstances exist which require immediate action by the police and the police do not have time to secure a warrant. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978); Saadeh, 61 F.3d at 516. We evaluate a claim of exigent circumstances from the perspective of the police officer at the scene to determine whether the police had a reasonable belief that there was a compelling need to act quickly and that there was no time to obtain a warrant. Id. Exigent circumstances exist when there is a reasonable belief by police that their safety, or the safety of the public, may be threatened. United States v. Hardy, 52 F.3d 147, 149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ...