Uebelacker v. Cincom Systems, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. C-870720,C-870720 |
| Citation | 48 Ohio App.3d 268,549 N.E.2d 1210 |
| Parties | , 118 Lab.Cas. P 56,614, 3 IER Cases 1853 UEBELACKER, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CINCOM SYSTEMS, INC., Appellee; Veith, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A provision in a written employment contract that that employment is terminable for any reason by either party cannot be altered by an employee handbook which includes a disclaimer that manifests the employer's intent not to be contractually bound by the policy statements and procedures in it.
2. Despite a written employment contract which is expressly made terminable at the will of either party, an employer's oral assurances of job security may be enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel if the employer should have expected his assurances to induce the employee not to seek other employment and if the employee did act or forbear from taking action in reasonable reliance on the assurances.
3. The parol evidence rule prohibits variation of a written contract by a contemporaneous or prior oral statement; it does not apply to a subsequent oral modification of the contract or to waiver of contractual terms by subsequent language or conduct.
4. An at-will employee who is discharged for reporting to his employer that it is conducting its business in violation of law does not have a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge.
5. An acquittal on a criminal charge of unlawful restraint does not bar a civil suit for false imprisonment based on the same conduct.
6. In a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the seriousness of the distress may be established by testimony of lay witnesses acquainted with the plaintiff concerning significant changes in the emotional or habitual makeup of the plaintiff.
7. An employer who does no more than to insist on his legal right to discharge an at-will employee bears no liability to the employee for resulting emotional distress, regardless of whether the employer intended or should have anticipated the distress.
8. It is a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution that the defendant had acted on advice of his counsel after full disclosure of the relevant facts.
Tobias & Kraus, David G. Torchia and Paul H. Tobias, Cincinnati, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Dinsmore & Shohl, Gerald V. Weigle, Jr. and Jerry S. Sallee, Cincinnati, for appellee Cincom Systems, Inc.
White, Getgey & Meyer Co., L.P.A., and Ronald A. Meyer, Cincinnati, for appellee and cross-appellant Frank Veith.
Plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee Carl O. Uebelacker has taken the instant appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Cincom Systems, Inc. ("Cincom") and defendant-appellee and cross-appellant Frank Veith on Uebelacker's complaint seeking damages for the events surrounding the termination of his employment with Cincom. Veith has also appealed in this matter and, on appeal, challenges the entry of summary judgment for Uebelacker on Veith's counterclaim for malicious prosecution.
Cincom employed Uebelacker as a sales representative in July 1982. In connection with his employment, Uebelacker executed a document entitled "Employment Agreement," and Cincom supplied him with an "Employee Benefit Book," which outlined Cincom's employee policies and procedures.
Throughout his tenure at Cincom, Uebelacker worked under the direct supervision of Veith. In the latter months of 1983, the professional and personal relationship between Uebelacker and Veith began to show signs of deterioration. On July 27, 1984, Uebelacker met with Veith's superior, Stan Sewall, to air his grievances against Veith and to discuss the advisability of a transfer to another division within the company or a change in employment. Sewall allegedly minimized the problem and agreed to speak with Veith. Sewall subsequently met with Veith, and on August 10, Veith and Uebelacker met.
Uebelacker left his August 10 meeting with Veith with the impression that their major differences had been resolved. However, on August 27, 1984, Veith prepared and submitted to Uebelacker a "First Warning of Dismissal." The warning outlined Veith's complaints with Uebelacker's performance, including missed sales quotas, tardiness, nonbusiness-related conversations during business hours, and the use of company resources for personal business, and mandated improvement in those areas by October 1, 1984. On September 4, Uebelacker responded to Veith's warning in a memorandum disputing Veith's contentions and defending his performance.
On September 19, Uebelacker again met with Sewall. Sewall allegedly expressed satisfaction with Uebelacker's work and told Uebelacker that his division had never fired or laid off anyone and that he need not worry about the warning of dismissal. However, Veith's warning of dismissal was not withdrawn, and in November 1984, Sewall, upon Veith's recommendation, decided to discharge Uebelacker.
On November 29, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Veith arrived at Uebelacker's cubicle, accompanied by Cincom employees Dennis Butler and Steve Ream, bearing empty boxes for Uebelacker's personal belongings. The events that then transpired are in dispute. Uebelacker asserts that Veith advised him of his termination and demanded that he gather his personal items and leave the building under escort, and that when he declined to accede to Veith's demands and asked to speak first with someone from the personnel office, Veith became incensed. Uebelacker contends that Veith prevented him from contacting the personnel office by telephone by grabbing his wrist and his arm, and that Butler prevented him from leaving the cubicle by blocking him with his body. Veith denies any physical contact between Uebelacker and him or any other Cincom employee. He asserts that Butler and Ream were present to assist Uebelacker with his boxes, and that Uebelacker was escorted from the building for fear that he would become disruptive or would leave with company property.
On December 19, 1984, Uebelacker instigated criminal proceedings against Veith through a private complaint program, charging Veith with unlawful restraint. The charge was tried to the court and was dismissed at the close of the prosecution's case upon the trial court's determination that Veith's restraint of Uebelacker was privileged.
On November 27, 1985, Uebelacker filed the complaint underlying the instant appeal, seeking damages against Cincom and Veith for false imprisonment, assault and battery, defamation, breach of express and implied contract, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cincom responded with an answer, substantially denying the allegations of Uebelacker's complaint, and Veith responded with an answer and a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. On January 15, 1987, Cincom and Veith filed a joint motion for summary judgment on Uebelacker's complaint, and Uebelacker moved for summary judgment on Veith's counterclaim. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the motions and the supporting evidentiary material, the trial court granted summary judgment for Cincom and Veith on all claims advanced by Uebelacker and for Uebelacker on Veith's counterclaim. From that judgment, Uebelacker and Veith have each appealed, and on appeal, each advances a single assignment of error.
The standard governing the disposition of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment is set forth in Civ.R. 56. Pursuant thereto, a party against whom a claim is asserted may move, either with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment in his favor on all or any part of the claim. Civ.R. 56(B). A motion for summary judgment may be granted if the court, upon viewing the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts set forth in the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, determines that (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party opposing the motion. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274; Civ.R. 56(C).
Uebelacker, in his sole assignment of error, challenges the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Cincom and Veith on all claims advanced in his complaint. He contends that issues of fact remain as to whether an obligation to discharge only for just cause arose from Cincom's policies and practices or under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, whether he was unlawfully detained, and whether the conduct of Cincom and Veith in discharging him was extreme and outrageous and caused him to suffer serious emotional distress. He further asserts that the defendants, through their pleadings, motion and supporting evidentiary material, failed to establish the absence of factual issues on his claims for defamation and assault and battery. We find this challenge to be well-taken in part.
We address initially Uebelacker's contention that issues of fact remain as to whether an obligation on the part of Cincom to discharge only for just cause arose from Cincom's policies and practices or under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
As we noted supra, Uebelacker, at the inception of his employment with Cincom, executed a document entitled "Employment Agreement." The agreement was for an indefinite term. As a general rule, an employment agreement of indefinite duration is terminable at the will of either party to the agreement unless the parties provide otherwise. Henkel v. Educational Research Council of America (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 249, 74 O.O.2d 415, 344 N.E.2d 118; Hedrick v. Center for...
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