Uebelacker v. Cincom Systems, Inc.

• Citation: 80 Ohio App.3d 97,608 N.E.2d 858
• Decision Date: 02 September 1992
• Docket Number: C-910364,Nos. C-910258,s. C-910258
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
• Parties: , 8 IER Cases 1005 UEBELACKER, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CINCOM SYSTEMS, INC. et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants. *

Page 97

80 Ohio App.3d 97

608 N.E.2d 858, 8 IER Cases 1005

UEBELACKER, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CINCOM SYSTEMS, INC. et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants. ^*

Nos. C-910258, C-910364.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

Decided Sept. 2, 1992.

Tobias & Kraus and David Torchia, Cincinnati, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Dinsmore & Shohl, Jerry S. Sallee and Gregory A. Harrison, Cincinnati, for appellee and cross-appellant Cincom Systems, Inc.

White, Getgey & Meyer Co., L.P.A., and Ronald A. Meyer, Cincinnati, for appellee and cross-appellant Frank H. Veith, Jr.

HILDEBRANDT, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee, Carl O. Uebelacker ("Uebelacker"), appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas in which the motion for a new trial or remittitur of the defendants-appellees Cincom Systems, Inc. ("Cincom") and Frank H. Veith, Jr. ("Veith"), collectively "appellees," was granted. We have assigned this court's case No. C-910258 to this appeal. The appellees appeal from that part of the trial court's judgment that denied their motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. To that appeal we have assigned this court's case No. C-910364. We have consolidated these appeals for purposes of briefing, argument and opinion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part, reverse it in part and remand the case for further proceedings.

On November 27, 1988, Uebelacker filed a complaint against Cincom (his employer) and Veith (his supervisor at Cincom), seeking damages for false imprisonment, assault and battery, defamation, wrongful termination, breach of express or implied contract, and intentional infliction of serious emotional distress. Cincom answered the complaint and denied Uebelacker's allegations. Veith answered and counterclaimed against Uebelacker for malicious prosecution. Following a period of discovery, the appellees jointly moved for summary judgment. Uebelacker moved for summary judgment as to Veith's counterclaim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellees on all claims advanced by Uebelacker. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Uebelacker on Veith's counterclaim. Uebelacker and Veith appealed to this court. See Uebelacker v. Cincom Systems, Inc. (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 268, 549 N.E.2d 1210. In our decision, we affirmed the trial court's judgment as it concerned Veith's counterclaim. However, we reversed the granting of summary judgment to the instant appellees regarding Uebelacker's claims for assault and battery, defamation, false imprisonment, promissory estoppel and emotional distress, and remanded the case to the trial court.

Trial commenced on May 7, 1990. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the appellees moved for a partial directed verdict as to the false-imprisonment and defamation claims based upon a failure of Uebelacker's evidence. The trial court overruled the motion, stating that a ruling as a matter of law was precluded because resolution of the disputed issues depended on the weight rather than the sufficiency of the evidence. ¹

The jury received the case on May 16, 1990, and returned its verdicts on May 17, 1990.

Prior to returning its verdicts, the jury communicated questions to the trial court, which included the following: "Can we award punitive damages and only nominal compensatory damages?" The trial court responded:

"You cannot award punitive damages if you find that the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to actual compensatory damages on his causes of action for (1) false imprisonment; (2) assault and battery; (3) intentional infliction of serious emotional distress; and (4) defamation. However, you may award punitive damages if you find that the plaintiff has met his burden of proof with respect to actual compensatory damages on any one of said four causes of action.

"With respect to nominal damages, please read jury instruction 25(D) on page 31."

The jury instructions were submitted to the jury in writing and may be found among the trial exhibits. Instruction 25(D) provides:

"If you find that any of the plaintiff's rights have been technically violated, but he has suffered no actual loss or has not produced the required evidence to prove his claims, then you may award nominal damages. Such damages are limited to some small or nominal amount in terms of money, generally a dollar."

Thereafter, the jury returned its verdicts in which it concluded, inter alia, that Uebelacker was not an employee at will, but that the appellees had cause to discharge him. The jury further determined that the appellees were guilty of false imprisonment, intentional infliction of serious emotional distress and defamation. The jury determined that the appellees' actions were malicious. The jury awarded Uebelacker $100 on each of the above claims and punitive damages totalling $90,000. ² The jury further concluded that Uebelacker was entitled to an award of attorney fees. The jury found for the appellees on Uebelacker's assault-and-battery and wrongful-discharge claims.

On June 1, 1990, the appellees filed a joint motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur. Uebelacker filed his memorandum in opposition on July 20, 1990. The appellees filed their reply memorandum on August 10, 1990.

On December 4, 1990, the trial court overruled the appellees' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. However, the court granted the remittitur and reduced the punitive-damage award to $10,000. The trial court also awarded Uebelacker attorney fees in the amount of $7,500.

On March 7, 1991, a judgment entry was placed of record memorializing the action taken by the trial court. In this entry the court further provided that "[i]n the event that plaintiff does not assent to the remittitur of the punitive-damage award, the court hereby orders a new trial with regard to the same."

From that judgment both Uebelacker and the appellees have filed timely appeals, each asserting two assignments of error.

Because Uebelacker's first assignment of error and part of the second assignment asserted by appellees in the cross-appeal pertain to the punitive-damage award, we address them jointly. Uebelacker claims that the jury's $90,000 assessment for punitive damages was neither excessive nor the product of passion and prejudice and that, therefore, the trial court erred by reducing that award. The appellees, on the other hand, contend that the jury's compensatory award of $100 for each of the three tort claims constituted mere nominal damages from which punitive damages could not have been assessed and that, therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the punitive-damage award.

As noted supra, during its deliberations, the jury asked the trial court whether it could award punitive damages with nominal compensatory damages. The court answered in the negative and directed the jury to review that portion of the jury instructions defining nominal damages. In granting the appellees' request for remittitur, the trial court stated:

"[This] case is not one in which low compensatory damages and high punitive damage are to be considered in and of themselves, nor one in which a large disparity is standing alone. [Rather,] the jury's expression of intent in the query to the court coupled with the prompt return of the verdict * * * cannot be viewed as other than a response motivated by passion and prejudice on the part of the jury in its attempt to award excessive punitive damages." (Emphasis sic.)

Upon Uebelacker's failure to accept the remittitur, the trial court ordered a new trial.

Courts are not encouraged to substitute their judgment for that of juries. Remittitur is only proper where a court can affirmatively find that the jury's verdict is manifestly excessive. Toledo, Columbus & Ohio River RR. Co. v. Miller (1923), 108 Ohio St. 388, 140 N.E. 617; Jones v. Gray Drug Fair, Inc. (Nov. 16, 1990), Ashtabula App. No. 89-A-1465, unreported, 1990 WL 178941. Excessive damages can only be determined from reviewing the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Schendel v. Bradford (1922), 106 Ohio St. 387, 140 N.E. 155.

In Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 36, 543 N.E.2d 464, syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a jury verdict as to punitive damages which is not a result of passion and prejudice or prejudicial error should not be reduced on appeal. There, the jury's award to the plaintiff of $250 compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages was upheld in an action arising out of a verbal altercation over the release of a car which was repaired by the defendant car dealership. After concluding that the evidence supported the finding of actual malice needed to assess punitive damages, the court turned to the issue of whether the amount awarded for punitive damages was excessive, and stated at 40, 543 N.E.2d at 469:

"Low compensatory damages and high punitive damages assessed by a jury are not in and of themselves cause to reverse the judgment or to grant a remittitur, since it is the function of the jury to assess the damages and, generally, it is not for a trial or appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. A large disparity, standing alone, is insufficient to justify a court's interference with the province of the jury."

In the instant action, it was established that during the months preceding Uebelacker's termination, the professional and personal relationship between Uebelacker and Veith had begun to deteriorate. Veith prepared and submitted to Uebelacker a written "warning of dismissal," which prompted Uebelacker to draft a memorandum disputing the contentions contained in Veith's warning. Uebelacker met with Veith's supervisors at Cincom to discuss the increasing...