Ulen v. Knecttle

• Decision Date: 09 June 1936
• Docket Number: 1944
• Citation: 50 Wyo. 94,58 P.2d 446
• Parties: ULEN v. KNECTTLE
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

58 P.2d 446

50 Wyo. 94

ULEN v. KNECTTLE

No. 1944

Supreme Court of Wyoming

June 9, 1936

ERROR to the District Court, Fremont County; LIN I. NOBLE, Judge.

Action by Charles J. Knecttle against Theresa S. Ulen. Judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

For the plaintiff in error, there was a brief by Durham & Bacheller of Casper, and oral argument by Mr. H. B. Durham.

The general rule as to an agent's authority is stated in 2 C J. 624. No claim is made that the defendant in error ever requested a release, or the return of his note. Ilgen Fritz v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, 81 F 27. As to agent's authority, see Goodyear v Williams, 85 P. 300. Equitable estoppel is defined in 21 C. J. 1113. Constructive fraud underlies every equitable estoppel. 10 R. C. L. 689. An estoppel in pais is sometimes said to be a moral question. Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall (U.S. 255, 271); California Growers v. Grocery Company, 15 F.2d 839. Estoppel must be pleaded. Bank v. Harlan, (New Mex.) 234 P. 305; Carstensen v. Brown, 26 Wyo. 356; 11 A. & E. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 434; Brant v. Company, 93 U.S. 326; 10 R. C. L. 695; Company v. Ferebee, (N. C.) 100 S.E. 310; Foard v. McAnnelly, (Mo.) 114 S.W. 990; Faulkner v. Bank, (Cal.) 231 P. 380; Saylor v. Corporation, (Ky.) 266 S.W. 388; Laberee v. Laberee, (Ore.) 228 P. 686; Ward Medicine Company v. Wolleat, (Minn.) 199 N.W. 738; Fortune v. Stockton, 182 Ill. 454; Budd v. Broen, (Minn.) 77 N.W. 979. As to collection by an agent in possession of evidence of debt, see Security Company v. Graybeal, (Iowa) 52 N.W. 497; U.S. Bank v. Burson, (Iowa) 57 N.W. 705; Bartel v. Brown, 80 N.W. 801. Annotations to the Graybeal case may be found in 208 P. 553; Bautz v. Adams, 131 Wis. 152, 111 N.W. 69. There is no evidence in the record of any express authority upon the part of Stuchell to receive payment of the note, nor any contention that defendant in error had any knowledge of the actual authority of Stuchell, nor any attempt by him to determine what Stuchell's authority might have been. The judgment should be reversed.

For the defendant in error, there was a brief and an oral argument by A. H. Maxwell of Lander.

If Stuchell had a right as agent to collect the principal of the Knecttle note, then there is nothing to the contention that the judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence. Taking into consideration, all the facts and circumstances, it is established that Ulen was in the loaning business through Stuchell, her agent, who was authorized to accept payments of interest and principal, and to make new loans without additional authority from Ulen. Catlin v. Reed, (Okla.) 283 P. 549; 10 Ency. of Evidence 21, 24. It was not necessary that Stuchell should have the Knecttle note when payment was made. 2 C. J. 625; Campbell v. Gowans, (Utah) 100 P. 397; 23 L.R.A. (L.R.A.) 414; Waisner v. Hasbrouck, (Wyo.) 241 P. 703; Pfeiffer v. Heyes, (Wash.) 6 P.2d 614. Almost on all fours is the case of Masterson v. Haislett, (Wash.) 206 P. 359. Authority to relend money conferred before the maturity of a loan implies authority to collect such loan. 2 C. J. 621. Even if this authority to accept payment of principal came from a ratification of Stuchell's acts, it did not have to be pleaded. Bank v. Haun, (Wyo.) 222 P. 45; 10 Ency. of Evidence 9; 2 C. J. 235. The facts in cases of this kind are never exactly similar. Catlin v. Reed; Quinn v. Dresbach, (Calif.) 16 P. 763. If for any reason, this court should find that the judgment should have been for Ulen, the remedy should be for a new trial and not a judgment for the plaintiff in error. The record plainly shows that Ulen exerted every effort to keep out of the record any reference to the agency of Stuchell.

BLUME, Justice. KIMBALL, Ch. J., and RINER, J., concur.

OPINION

BLUME, Justice.

This is an action brought by Charles J. Knecttle, as plaintiff, against Theresa S. Ulen, defendant, to enjoin the latter from foreclosing a mortgage on lands in Fremont County, Wyoming, given by the plaintiff on April 1, 1924, securing a note of even date in the principal sum of $ 1000, with ten per cent interest per annum, claiming that the indebtedness was duly paid on September 28, 1926, to J. W. Stuchel, defendant's duly authorized agent to collect the money. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff as prayed, and the defendant has appealed. The parties herein will be referred to as in the court below, or by name. The term "agent" used herein generally refers to one purporting to act for another, but ordinarily must not be understood as implying that he had authority in the particular matter under discussion unless the contrary is indicated.

The only two witnesses in the case were the plaintiff and J. W. Stuchel. The defendant denied that she had given any authority whatever to Stuchel to collect the principal of the debt involved in this suit. J. W. Stuchel testified in substance as follows: He had authority to negotiate loans for Mrs. Ulen and collect the interest thereon, but he had no general power of attorney for her, nor could he release any mortgages. He commenced to loan money for defendant about 1914, and placed more than twenty loans for her for the next ten years, including the Knecttle loan, the aggregate of the loans amounting to more than $ 25,000. He collected each of these loans, including the loan here in controversy, which he collected on September 28, 1926, and for which he gave a receipt, as agent for Mrs. Ulen. The money was paid by C. W. Dye, who bought the land which was security for the loan involved in this case from Knecttle, the money being part of the purchase price of the land. The money so paid was never remitted to Mrs. Ulen, but Stuchel, for the period of three years, continued to send her regularly every six months the sum of $ 50.00, as interest at 10 per cent on the loan for that period. He first stated that he did not do so, but being shown letters showing this fact, he admitted it, but could give no explanation therefor. He attempted, however, to show that he reloaned this money to S. B. Porter, and to enforce this point testified that he was authorized at various times to reloan money of defendant which he collected, and produced in court a letter of August 2, 1916, written to him by defendant, stating: "glad you have been able to place all the moneys you had on hand. The $ 3000 is ready any time you can use it." He at first mentioned the fact that the money collected from the Knecttle loan was embodied in a loan of $ 1900 to S. B. Porter, but when defendant produced a note of $ 1900 signed by Porter which was dated October 15, 1924, he explained that he thought he made a subsequent loan to Porter, though he was not able to tell the details thereof. Some of the securities he kept in his possession for a considerable period of time, mentioning particularly that Mrs. Ulen was gone part of the time to Europe and he had specific instructions to keep the securities for loans made during that period until her return. All of the securities were sent in, except one, a loan to Tom Herbst, for $ 200, secured by a chattel mortgage, running but a short time. All mortgages were taken in the name of the defendant, and were duly recorded in the county where the land was situated. Sometimes, if he could place a loan, he would let defendant know, and she would send the money; several times she asked him to put money out for her. Every loan was a separate loan, and a separate transaction. He was to receive one per cent of the principal of each loan, and 10 per cent for collecting the interest. He did not, however, charge anything on the amounts sent in on the Knecttle loan after it was paid.

"Q. In any of these matters of your collections of any money for Mrs. Ulen, before you collected the money did she ever give you express instructions to collect any amounts for her? A. No. Q. And in every instance, when you collected anything on any of these securities and they had to be released, it required Mrs. Ulen's personal signature to the release, did it not? A. Yes. Q. You would send to Chicago and get a release, and then make the collection of the principal or interest, as the case might be, and remit it to Mrs. Ulen? A. Not just that way. Q. Well in many instances? A. Sometimes I had to make remittance and then get my release, sometimes I would send (for) a release and then I would make remittance. Q. But you couldn't do, at any time, a single thing with that security or remittances, without her signature or her express authority? A. Not in releasing."

"Some of the time" she required the money to be in her hands before she sent a release. The note in controversy in this case was payable at the office of J. W. Stuchel; the S. B. Porter note was payable at a bank at Shoshoni. On November 25, 1933, Mrs. Ulen wrote a letter to Stuchel, complaining that the latter had not complied with her request for a statement, and "effective as of this date any arrangements had by you as acting agent for me is hereby rescinded." It was admitted on the trial that Stuchel had authority to collect interest on defendant's loans.

In this case, the so-called agent to whom payment of the principal sum of the indebtedness was made was not in possession of the evidence thereof, and it is insisted that without it, the payment to him was made at the risk of the debtor. There are numerous cases dealing with a situation similar to that at bar. We have never had one like it before us, and we have accordingly, thought it best to make a reasonably thorough investigation of the authorities, and to determine at least their general trend, bearing in mind that, after all, each case must to a more or less extent rest upon its own facts, and...