Ulysse v. Aar Aircraft Component Servs.

• Decision Date: 23 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–cv–2622 (ADS)(GRB).,11–cv–2622 (ADS)(GRB).
• Citation: 841 F.Supp.2d 659
• Parties: Robinson ULYSSE, Plaintiff, v. AAR AIRCRAFT COMPONENT SERVICES, AAR Parts Trading, Inc., AAR Aircraft & Engine Group, Inc., AAR Aviation Trading, Inc., AAR Allen Aircraft Corp., Joe DeLardi, Ian Smith, and Salim Kemzy, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

841 F.Supp.2d 659

Robinson ULYSSE, Plaintiff,

v.AAR AIRCRAFT COMPONENT SERVICES, AAR Parts Trading, Inc., AAR Aircraft & Engine Group, Inc., AAR Aviation Trading, Inc., AAR Allen Aircraft Corp., Joe DeLardi, Ian Smith, and Salim Kemzy, Defendants.

No. 11–cv–2622 (ADS)(GRB).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Jan. 23, 2012.

Law Office of Andrew C. Laufer, PLLC by: Andrew C. Laufer, Esq., of Counsel, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. by: Carrie Corcoran, Esq., of Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

The Plaintiff in this case, Robinson Ulysse, commenced an action in New York State court pursuant to New York State Labor Law § 740 for retaliation in the work place. The Defendants, AAR Aircraft Component Services, AAR Parts Trading, Inc., AAR Aircraft & Engine Group, Inc., AAR Aviation Trading, Inc., and AAR Allen Aircraft Corp. (collectively “AAR”), as well as the individual Defendants Joe DeLardi, Ian Smith, and Salim Kemzy, subsequently removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Presently before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion to remand the action back to state court. In addition, the Defendants have filed a cross motion to dismiss the case on the grounds of preemption and failure to state a claim.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the pleadings and the parties' submissions on the motions.

On August 18, 1998, the Plaintiff commenced his employment as a mechanic with the Defendants AAR in Garden City, New York. AAR is in the business of repairing and replacing commercial aircraft parts. The individually named Defendants were employed by AAR in supervisory capacities.

The Plaintiff alleges that in 2008, his supervisors required and directed him to use substandard, unserviceable and faulty aircraft parts, which was in contradiction to an instruction book he had previously received which described, among other things, whether to repair or replace airliner parts. The Plaintiff claims that this directive from his supervisors was also in violation of the rules governing the use of replacement parts as delineated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules and regulations. Ulysse further alleges that he complained to his supervisors on several occasions with regard to the quality of the replacement parts, warning that it could interfere with a plane's ability to operate which would endanger the plane's occupants. However, in response to these complaints, the Plaintiff claims that his supervisors retaliated against him by criticizing his work and that he was eventually terminated on April 17, 2009.

On March 26, 2010, the Plaintiff filed an action against the Defendants in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Kings, alleging a cause of action for violations of New York State Labor Law § 740 (the “whistleblower statute” or “Section 740”). Under Section 740, “[a]n employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because such employee ... (a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.” In order to maintain an action under Section 740, a plaintiff must: “ ‘establish a violation of a law, rule or regulation, which violation must be actual and not merely possible,’ ” and (2) demonstrate “ ‘that the lack of compliance presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.’ ” Perez v. Consol. Edison Corp. of N.Y., No. 02 Civ. 2832, 2006 WL 2707316, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006) (quoting Connolly v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., Inc., 161 A.D.2d 520, 555 N.Y.S.2d 790, 792 (1st Dep't 1990)).

On March 17, 2011, the state court action was dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to allege the violation of a law, rule, or regulation with the requisite particularity and specificity necessary to support a cause of action under Section 740. See§ 740(1)(c) (“ ‘Law, rule or regulation’ includes any duly enacted statute or ordinance or any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to any federal, state or local statute or ordinance.”)

On May 5, 2011, the Plaintiff commenced a second civil action against the same Defendants in New York State court, again bringing a cause of action for violations of New York Labor Law § 740. This complaint was nearly identical to the one in the first action, with the exception that the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated specific FAA regulations.

On June 1, 2011, the Defendants filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. According to the Defendants, the action is removable because the Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the Plaintiff's New York Labor Law § 740 claim is completely preempted by federal law, specifically the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. In addition, the Defendants assert as an alternative basis for removal that there is diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332 because AAR resides outside of New York and the Plaintiff is a New York resident. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff fraudulently joined the individual in-state Defendants in order to defeat federal jurisdiction.

On June 17, 2011, the Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to remand this action back to the Supreme Court for the State of New York, County of Kings, alleging that it was improperly removed to federal court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard for Removal

A cause of action that was initially filed in state court may be removed by a defendant where “the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Accordingly, one requirement of removal jurisdiction is that there must exist a basis for the exercise of the district court's original jurisdiction.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution and laws or treaties of the United States. However, where removal is predicated upon federal question jurisdiction, the “well-pleaded complaint rule” governs. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112–13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936)). Under this rule, “a case may be filed in federal court only if a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's ‘well-pleaded-complaint.’ ” Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assocs., 116 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir.1997). The Supreme Court stated that this rule “severely limits the number of cases in which state law creates the cause of action that may be initiated in or remanded to federal district court, thereby avoiding more-or-less automatically a number of potentially serious federal-state conflicts.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vac. Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9–10, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). The Supreme Court has added that:

Whether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional statute ... must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.

Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75–76, 34 S.Ct. 724, 58 L.Ed. 1218 (1914). Even if a valid federal defense exists, the Second Circuit has held that the case cannot be removed unless there exists either a federal question or diversity jurisdiction on the face of the original complaint. Hernandez, 116 F.3d at 38.

However, an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule exists “when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption.” Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law” and is thus removable. Id. See also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) (“Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal”).

“There are several well-established principles governing the propriety of removal petitions under Section 1446, which the court must keep in mind....” Town of Moreau, et al. v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, et al., No. 96 Civ. 983, 1997 WL 243258, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted). First, “[r]emoval jurisdiction must be strictly construed, both because the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and because removal of a case implicates significant federalism concerns.” In re NASDAQ Market Makers Antitrust Litig., 929 F.Supp. 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941)) (“Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.”); State of New York v. Lutheran Center for the Aging, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 393, 397 (E.D.N.Y.1997) ( “Removal statutes are to be strictly construed”). Thus, “all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.” Leslie v. BancTec Serv. Corp., 928 F.Supp. 341, 347 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In addition, “[t]he burden is on the removing part...