Union Pacific R. Co. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 14 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-99-00384-CV.,12-99-00384-CV. |
| Citation | 85 S.W.3d 300 |
| Parties | UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. Seymore WILLIAMS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Kim Whittington, Houston, for appellant.
Stephen Evans, Palestine, David Furlow, Houston, for appellee.
Panel consisted of DAVIS, C.J., WORTHEN, J., and GRIFFITH, J.
Union Pacific Railroad Company ("the railroad") appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of a railroad worker, Seymore Williams ("Williams"), for damages caused by its negligence. The railroad raises three issues concerning foreseeability. We affirm.
Williams was working at the site of a derailment, where he was laying new tracks. A company hired by the railroad to clean up derailments began dragging a derailed car across tracks a disputed 25 to 70 feet away from Williams. The railroad car was pulled over a signal mast. The pressure caused a metal rain cap on the top of the signal mast to blast through the air, hitting Williams in the back.
Since the defendant was a railroad, and the plaintiff was a railroad worker, the action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"). At trial, when the railroad was trying to prove that this was a "freak accident," and that something like this had never happened before, and was thus unforeseeable, Williams objected on relevance grounds. The trial court overruled his objection. A few minutes later, the trial judge stated the following:
The question was asked of the witness if he had ever heard of a prior incident, as I understand it, involving a clean-up. The law in FELA cases does not include the element of foreseeability, therefore the objection is sustained, and I withdraw my prior ruling. You will disregard that question and answer." At the charge conference, the railroad requested an instruction on foreseeability, which the trial court denied. The jury found in favor of Williams and awarded him damages in the amount of $414,836.75, after credits and offsets.
In three issues, the railroad has complained that there was no evidence that it did or could have foreseen this type of risk, that the trial court erred when it "instructed" the jury that foreseeability was not an element in an FELA case, and that the trial court erred when it refused the railroad's proffered jury charge instruction on foreseeability.
When FELA cases are brought in state court, federal law governs the substantive rights of the parties and state rules govern procedural matters. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 1348, 84 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985). Under federal law, a railroad carrier is liable for damages to its employees who suffer an injury "resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliance ... or other equipment." 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (West 1986). Although grounded in negligence, the FE LA does not define negligence. See Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1027, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949). Courts applying and interpreting the statute have held that an FELA plaintiff must prove the common law components of negligence, including duty, breach, foreseeability, causation, and injury. See Adams v. CSX Transp. Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir.1990). Section 51 of the FELA, however, departs from the common law in the area of causation by establishing a standard of "in the whole or in part" causation which replaces the common law standard of proximate causation. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957); Nicholson v. Erie R.R. Co., 253 F.2d 939, 940 (2d Cir.1958). However, Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 117, 83 S.Ct. 659-665, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963), makes it clear that reasonable foreseeability of harm insofar as it relates to duty is still an essential ingredient of FELA negligence.
In its first issue, the railroad has complained that there was no evidence that it did or could foresee the type of event which occurred in this case. In determining a "no evidence" issue, we are to consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the judgment has been rendered, and to indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in that party's favor. Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). If there is more than a scintilla of such evidence to support the finding, the claim is sufficient as a matter of law. Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex.1996). A "no evidence" issue may only be sustained when the record discloses one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla of evidence, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997) (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEX. L.REV. 361, 362-63 (1960)). There is some evidence when the proof supplies a reasonable basis on which reasonable minds may reach different conclusions about the existence of the vital fact. Orozco v. Sander, 824 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex.1992).
In Texas, the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court. Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1998). In conducting a duty analysis, the court must balance the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant. Read v. Scott Fetzer Co., 990 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.1998). Among these factors, foreseeability has traditionally been considered the most significant. See Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 163 Tex. 632, 358 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (1962). In the absence of foreseeability, there is no duty. NationsBank, N.A. v. Dilling, 922 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex.1996). In the instant case, the railroad does not complain of no duty in general, but that there is no evidence of foreseeability in the context of duty.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "foreseeability requires only that the general danger, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm, be foreseeable." Mellon Mortgage Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 655 (Tex. 1999). It is not required that the particular accident complained of should have been foreseen. All that is required is that (1) the injury be of such a general character as might reasonably have been anticipated, and that (2) the injured party should be so situated with relation to the wrongful act that injury to him or to one similarly situated might reasonably have been foreseen. Id.
In the context of FELA cases, the FELA requires railroad employers to use "reasonable care in furnishing their employees with a safe place to work." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 550, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 2408, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). Consequently, the railroad had a non-delegable duty to provide Williams with a safe work place at the derailment where he was injured. See id. A railroad may be liable for failure to provide a safe workplace "when it knows or should know of a potential hazard in the workplace, yet fails to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees." Syverson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824, 826 (2nd Cir.1994), quoting, Gallose v. Long Island R.R., 878 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2nd Cir.1989). Foreseeability does not require proof, however, that a similar incident had already occurred. See Gallick, 372 U.S. at 121, 83 S.Ct. at 668.
At the trial of this case, Willfred Foehrs, the railroad's employee, testified on behalf of Williams. He testified that he had been a company foreman for two and a half years prior to trial and had worked for the railroad for the preceding twenty-five years. On the day in question, he was working with a separate labor gang from Williams, but in the same area. Foehrs witnessed Williams's injury and described it in detail to the jury. He also stated the following:
. . .
. . .
The railroad's track foreman Charles Butler testified as follows:
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