Union Title Co. v. State Bd. of Educ.

• Citation: 51 Ohio St.3d 189,555 N.E.2d 931
• Decision Date: 13 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-632,89-632
• Parties: , 61 Ed. Law Rep. 249 UNION TITLE CO., Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 189

51 Ohio St.3d 189

555 N.E.2d 931, 61 Ed. Law Rep. 249

UNION TITLE CO., Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.

No. 89-632.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 14, 1990.

Decided June 13, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

The act of the State Board of Education disapproving a transfer of territory request pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 is a quasi-judicial act and, as such, is appealable under R.C. 119.12, where the affected parties are provided with notice, a hearing, and the opportunity to present evidence pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 3301-89. (Bd. of Edn. of Marion v. Bd. of Edn. of Elgin [1981], 66 Ohio St.2d 152, 20 O.O.3d 165, 420 N.E.2d 990, syllabus, distinguished and limited.)

On December 23, 1986, appellant, Union Title Co. ("Union"), purchased approximately 29.876 acres of land located in the city of Alliance, Ohio. Then, on January 9, 1987, Union petitioned appellee Board of Education of the Alliance City School District to make an application with the appellee State Board of Education ("State Board") in order to transfer Union's land from the Marlington Local School District to the Alliance City School District. ¹

In response to Union's request the Alliance school board passed a resolution formally requesting that the State Board transfer the land to the Alliance City School District pursuant to R.C. 3311.06. On February 1, 1987, specific administrative rules governing transfer requests pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 went into effect.

The State Superintendent of Public Instruction formally notified both school districts of the State Board's intent to consider the transfer of territory. Next, a public hearing was held on June 30, 1987 before a referee. On October 6, 1987, the referee filed his report and recommendation against the transfer of territory from the Marlington Local School District to the Alliance City School District. Ultimately, the State Board passed a resolution on November 9, 1987 adopting the recommendation of the referee and denying the request to transfer territory.

Union brought an appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12 from the State Board's resolution. The appellee Board of Education of the Marlington Local School District and the State Board moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and Union lacked standing to bring the appeal. The court held that pursuant to R.C. 3311.06, the decision of the State Board was a legislative act; therefore, it was not appealable under R.C. 119.12. Further, the court chose not to reach the issue of Union's standing to bring the appeal, since the court determined it already lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision, and cited Bd. of Edn. of Marion v. Bd. of Edn. of Elgin (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 152, 20 O.O.3d 165, 420 N.E.2d 990, as controlling. The court stated that the failure of R.C. 3311.06 to impose on the State Board any guidelines or standards of procedure was the reason the State Board's power was perceived as legislative and not quasi-judicial. Furthermore, the court noted that although the State Board fashioned procedural rules since the decision in Marion, supra, it could not create its own jurisdiction or alter its power by its own act.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Dennis R. Clunk, Alliance, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Christopher M. Culley, for appellee State Bd. of Educ.

Rankin M. Gibson, Columbus, for appellee Bd. of Educ. of Marlington Local School Dist.

HOLMES, Justice.

The sole issue presented in this case is whether an order issued by the State Board of Education disapproving the transfer of certain school district territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 may be appealed to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12. For the reasons which follow, we hold that such an order may be appealed.

Section 4, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution mandates the creation of a State Board of Education and requires the General Assembly to prescribe its powers and duties. One of the powers and duties of the State Board pursuant to the constitutional mandate is found in R.C. 3311.06, which relates to the transfer of school territory following municipal annexations. Further, R.C. 3301.13 provides that "[i]n the exercise of any of its functions or powers, including the power to make rules and regulations and to prescribe minimum standards[,] the department of education, and any officer or agency therein" is subject to R.C. Chapter 119. And, R.C. 119.12 provides that "[a]ny party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin county." ²

Thus, it appears that an order of the State Board denying a transfer of certain school district territory under R.C. 3311.06 is appealable by a party adversely affected by that order. However, there are further considerations necessary when construing an administrative order, such as whether the order is quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative in character. In M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 150, 61 O.O.2d 394, 290 N.E.2d 562, paragraph one of the syllabus, this court held: "The review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies, authorized by Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, contemplates quasi-judicial proceedings only, and administrative actions of administrative officers and agencies not resulting from quasi-judicial proceedings are not appealable to the Court of Common Pleas under provisions of R.C. 2506.01. (Fortner v. Thomas [1970], 22 Ohio St.2d 13 , approved and followed.)" Also, "[p]ermitting appeal from a quasi-judicial proceeding is based on the premise that an adjudication has been made by the agency which determines the rights or duties of parties with conflicting interests--in other words, there is a justiciable dispute requiring evaluation and resolution. Implicit in this concept is the exercise of discretion." Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 356, 359, 544 N.E.2d 651, 654.

In explaining the distinction between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial proceedings, this court stated in Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 436, 438, 71 O.O.2d 411, 413, 329 N.E.2d 686, 688, that "[q]uasi-judicial proceedings require notice, hearing and the opportunity for introduction of evidence. * * * Quasi-legislative proceedings do not. More frequently, however, courts have examined the nature of the proceedings themselves, to ascertain whether they involve the making or revising of rules, rather than the application of rules in an adjudicatory manner." Similarly, in Donnelly v. Fairview Park (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 42 O.O.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500, this court held, at paragraph one of the syllabus, that: "A public body essentially legislative in character may act in an administrative capacity." In Donnelly, the appellants appealed the city of Fairview Park's failure to accept a resubdivision proposal. The city claimed that its actions were legislative in nature and, therefore, non-appealable. This court disagreed by holding that the adoption or amendment of a zoning regulation or ordinance is a legislative act, but the failure or refusal to approve a resubdivision of land coming within the terms of a zoning regulation or ordinance already adopted and in existence is an administrative matter, and that an appeal from such failure or refusal to approve lies to the court of common pleas under R.C. Chapter 2506.

Also, in Donnelly, this court established a test for distinguishing between quasi-legislative and administrative actions taken by legislative bodies. "The test for determining whether the action of a legislative body is legislative or administrative is whether the action taken is one enacting a law, ordinance or regulation, or executing or administering a law, ordinance or regulation already in existence." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, if the action of a legislative body creates a law, that action is legislative in character, but if the action of that body consists of executing an existing law, the action is adjudicatory (quasi-judicial) ³ or administrative in character. Id. at 4, 42 O.O.2d at 3, 233 N.E.2d at 502; Rankin-Thoman, Inc., supra.

In Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 117, 120, 74 O.O.2d 215, 217, 341 N.E.2d 589, 592, this court held that former "R.C. 3311.06 gives the board no guides or standards to use in approving or disapproving the transfer of territory from one school district to another * * *. Therefore, the act of the board in approving a transfer of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 is itself a legislative act. * * * " In interpreting Bd. of Edn., supra, this court later held that "[t]he act of the Ohio State Board of Education disapproving a transfer of territory pursuant to [former] R.C. 3311.06 is a legislative act, and, as such, is not appealable pursuant to R.C. 119.12." Bd. of Edn. of Marion v. Bd. of Edn. of Elgin (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 152, 20 O.O.3d 165, 420 N.E.2d 990, syllabus; see, also, Rossford Exempted Village School Dist., supra, 45 Ohio St.3d at 360, 544 N.E.2d at 655.

Recently, the State Board promulgated ⁴ Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-01 through 3301-89-03 in order to provide a framework for the transfer of territory under R.C. 3311.06 and 3311.24. Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-01(A). These administrative code provisions provide for notice, hearing and the exercise of discretion. Specifically, Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-01(D) provides: " * * * In those situations where agreement does not exist, the state board of education will thoroughly examine the stated reasons for and against the requested transfer and provide due process to all parties involved as set forth in paragraph (E) of rule 3301-89-02 of the Administrative Code." (Emphasis added.)

...