United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ira

• Decision Date: 27 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 53A04-9007-CV-357,53A04-9007-CV-357
• Citation: 577 N.E.2d 588
• Parties: UNITED FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY d/b/a Farm Bureau Insurance, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Harold L. IRA, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 588

577 N.E.2d 588

UNITED FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY d/b/a Farm Bureau Insurance, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Harold L. IRA, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 53A04-9007-CV-357.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Fourth District.

Aug. 27, 1991.

Transfer Denied Dec. 30, 1991.

James W. Riley, Jr., Ryan L. Leitch, Riley, Bennett & Egloff, Indianapolis, for appellant.

William C. Lloyd, Ferguson, Ferguson & Lloyd, Bloomington, for appellee.

CONOVER, Judge.

Defendant-Appellant United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) appeals the trial court's ruling in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Harold Ira (Ira).

We affirm.

Farm Bureau presents eight issues for our review, which we have consolidated and restated:

1. whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the agreed judgment;

2. whether the trial court erred in conducting an indirect contempt proceeding;

3. whether the trial court erred in failing to specifically find the medical expenses were reasonably related to the accident;

4. whether the trial court erred in its conclusion of law Farm Bureau violated its duty of good faith, and

5. whether compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees are available to the court as remedies in an action for enforcement of agreed judgment and indirect contempt of court.

United Farm Bureau was Ira's auto insurance carrier. It became obligated by an agreed judgment to pay Ira's future medical expenses reasonably related to a 1981 car accident under the Michigan No-Fault law. In July, 1988, Ira underwent his third surgery. To support his claim for these expenses, he sent Farm Bureau letters from two physicians, Dr. Shields and Dr. Jelsma. Dr. Shields stated Ira's injuries were related to the 1981 accident but did not recommend surgery. Dr. Jelsma's letter stated Ira's cervical arthritis was acquired and probably aggravated by an accident in 1981.

Farm Bureau refused to pay, claiming Dr. Jelsma's letter created some doubts as to causation. Farm Bureau then contracted for the services of a medical advisory service to render an opinion. The physician who prepared the advisory report never examined Ira and based his opinion on documents sent to the service by Farm Bureau. Ira was forced to file a petition for bankruptcy in November, 1988.

In December, 1988, Dr. Jelsma submitted a second letter to establish a causal relationship. Farm Bureau attempted to negotiate a compromise for one-third of Ira's medical expenses.

In January, 1989, Ira filed a petition for enforcement of the agreed judgment and for a finding of indirect contempt of court.

After a pretrial conference, Ira took Dr. Jelsma's deposition in which he again established a relatedness. Later, at an "in camera" conference, Farm Bureau offered to pay Ira's medical expenses if all further proceedings would be dismissed. Ira refused.

After trial, the trial court determined the medical expenses were reasonably related to the accident and ordered the expenses paid. The court also found the attempts to persuade the insured to give up his action for damages for a present cash payment to be oppressive and in bad faith. The court ordered Farm Bureau to pay medical bills (stipulated by the parties to be $18,367.15) and compensatory damages of $37,000 and punitive damages of $105,000 together with statutory interest of $2,295.75.

In May, 1990, Ira filed a motion to correct errors and for additur. The Court awarded Ira additional compensatory damages to pay Ira's attorney fees by increasing its award of medical bills and compensatory damages to $55,000. The resulting total judgment is $162,295.75. Farm Bureau appeals.

Initially, we note this was a bench trial in which the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Ira's request. When the trial court has made special findings, the court on appeal must apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, the court must determine whether the evidence supports the findings. Then, it must determine whether the findings support the judgment. If the court concludes that the special findings support the judgment and are not clearly erroneous, the judgment must be affirmed. Buchonok v. Emerick (1990), Ind., 558 N.E.2d 1092, 1096. We will consider only the evidence in the record which supports the judgment along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Craig v. ERA Mark Five Realtors (1987), Ind.App., 509 N.E.2d 1144, 1147.

The first issue Farm Bureau raises is whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. Farm Bureau strongly urges an agreed judgment is contractual in nature and does not represent a judgment of the court. Farm Bureau urges it is governed only by the decree portion of the judgment which stated the action was dismissed with prejudice. (R. 28). Therefore, it posits the court did not retain subject matter jurisdiction since dismissed actions are as if they never existed. ¹ We disagree.

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power to hear and determine a general class or kind of case. If the tribunal possesses the power to determine cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs, it possesses subject matter jurisdiction to consider a particular case. State ex. rel. Hight v. Marion Superior Court (1989), Ind., 547 N.E.2d 267, 269.

If there is some question as to the exact meaning of a judgment, the court may go further than the decree portion in construing the language of the judgment. Courts have inherent power to entertain an action to determine whether a judgment has been carried out and satisfied. Wilson v. Wilson (1976), 169 Ind.App. 530, 349 N.E.2d 277, 279. A judgment may have prospective application. State v. Martinsville Development Co. Inc. (1977), 174 Ind.App. 157, 366 N.E.2d 681.

The judgment also states Farm Bureau shall pay future medical expenses reasonably related to the accident. (R. 28). If the judgment only dismissed the action, the agreed judgment for reasonably related future medical payments would be ineffectual. ²

A consent judgment is both contractual in nature and an entry of judgment. Ingoglia v. The Fogelson Companies (1988), Ind.App., 530 N.E.2d 1190, 1199, reh. denied. A compromise or settlement of litigation is always referable to the action or proceeding in the court where the compromise was effective; it is through that court the carrying out of the agreement should thereafter be controlled. The twin interests of judicial economy and encouragement of settlement agreements are both served by an enforcement proceeding in the court where the compromise was effected. Brant Construction Company, Inc. v. Lumen Construction, Inc. (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 868, 876, trans. denied. The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce its judgment.

Farm Bureau alleges the trial court erred in conducting an indirect contempt proceeding. Farm Bureau contends that the order portion of the agreed judgment did not contain order language; therefore, it did not disobey any command of the court for which it could be held in contempt.

Farm Bureau urges the agreed judgment merely declared the rights of the parties without an express command and cannot provide the foundation for contempt. Farm Bureau cites Nicholas v. Nicholas (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 770, and H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nat. Friction Products (7th Cir.1978), 568 F.2d 24, for the proposition there must be specific language in the judgment portion of the decree turning a contractual duty into an operative command of the court before a contempt action is available.

Farm Bureau raises the inappropriateness of contempt as a proper remedy for the first time in its appellate brief. ³ Farm Bureau failed to allege the inappropriateness of the remedy in its Answer Re: Indirect Contempt (R. 60-63), failed to raise the same in any proceedings prior to trial, and failed to object at trial. We cannot consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Christensen v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1991), Ind.App., 565 N.E.2d 1103, 1107, reh. denied. Ind.Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7).

Farm Bureau argues if the language requiring it to pay future medical expenses was, in fact, a judgment, then it was a money judgment for which execution or proceedings supplemental are the exclusive remedies, not a contempt action. We disagree.

The key to a money judgment is the statement of an amount due. A money judgment must be certain and definite. It must name the amount due. Kist v. Coughlin (1944), 222 Ind. 639, 57 N.E.2d 199, modified on other grounds, 222 Ind. 639, 57 N.E.2d 586. ⁴

The total amount the agreed judgment requires Farm Bureau to pay is not certain or definite. It directs future payments as relatedness is established. Therefore, the agreed judgment was not a money judgment. The trial court did not err in conducting a contempt proceeding.

Farm Bureau next alleges the trial court erred because it did not specifically state in its findings of fact the medical expenses were related to the accident.

Findings of fact are to be liberally construed together, consistent with the resulting judgment. A fair inference can be drawn from them. Buchonok, supra, at 1095. We note finding no. 19 states Dr. Jelsma's December 13, 1988, letter asserted the operation was a result of the 1981 accident. (R. 166). A fair inference can be drawn from this finding that the medical expenses were reasonably related to the accident.

Farm Bureau also urges the evidence does not support the finding that Dr. Jelsma's December letter established the surgery was related to the accident. We disagree.

Dr. Jelsma's December letter stated "the report would suggest that the changes occurred immediately after the accident and were related to the accident itself and then aggravated with the passage of time...." (Emphasis supplied). (R. 1491).

Medicine is not yet an exact science. No threshold level of certainty or conclusiveness is required in an...