United Farm Workers Organizing Committee v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 15 April 1971
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,S.F. 22791
• Citation: 483 P.2d 1215,4 Cal.3d 556,94 Cal.Rptr. 263
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 483 P.2d 1215, 77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2208, 65 Lab.Cas. P 52,538 UNITED FARM WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE,, et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF MONTEREY COUNTY, Respondent; BUD ANTLE, INC., Real Party in Interest.

Page 263

94 Cal.Rptr. 263

4 Cal.3d 556, 483 P.2d 1215, 77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2208,

65 Lab.Cas. P 52,538

UNITED FARM WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, AFL-CIO, et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF MONTEREY COUNTY, Respondent BUD ANTLE, INC., Real Party in Interest.

S.F. 22791.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

April 15, 1971.

Cohen, Farnsworth, Denison & Carder and William H. Carder, for petitioners.

Louis Garcia, Robert Gonzales, Mario Obledo, Alan Exelrod and Michael Mendelson, San Francisco, and Joe Ortega, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioners.

Titchell, Maltzman & Mark, Haskell Titchell, Richard D. Maltzman, Philip B. Bass, San Francisco, and Douglas James Morgan, San Francisco, for real party in interest.

BURKE, Justice.

Petitioners are the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee ('UFWOC'), and its two principal officers, Cesar Chavez ('Chavez'), and Dolores Huerta '(Huerta'). By this proceeding they seek a writ of prohibition restraining respondent court from enforcing, by contempt proceedings or otherwise, the provisions of a preliminary injunction issued by respondent on October 8, 1970. We have concluded that enforcement of a substantial portion of the preliminary injunction would violate petitioners' constitutional rights of free speech and that a peremptory writ should issue accordingly.

Real party in interest Bud Antle, Inc. ('Antle'), is engaged in the growing, harvesting, and shipping of various agricultural products. Since 1961, Antle has been a signatory to various collective bargaining agreements entered into with the General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local 890 ('Teamsters'), covering a number of categories of Antle's employees. On July 16, 1970, Antle and Teamsters executed a collective bargaining agreement which, for the first time, covered Antle's agricultural field workers. ¹ On or about August 19, 1970, petitioner Huerta approached officials of Antle and requested that UFWOC be recognized as the bargaining agent for Antle's agricultural workers. When this request was rejected by Antle, petitioners called a strike and established picket lines at various of Antle's agricultural operations.

On August 24, Antle filed an action against petitioners alleging, inter alia, that the strike and picketing activities violated the provisions of the California Jurisdictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, §§ 1115--1120.) ² On September 14, respondent court granted Antle's application for a preliminary injunction prohibiting petitioners from engaging in strikes, work stoppages or picketing at any of its agricultural operations. Petitioners do not here challenge the provisions of that injunction and it is not involved in this proceeding.

On September 21, 1970, an unfair labor practice charge was filed by another Salinas Valley agricultural employer alleging that UFWOC, by engaging in secondary boycott activities directed against Antle and several other agricultural employers, had violated section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act. ³ On October 19, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board notified the complainant of his decision not to issue a complaint, on the ground that UFWOC is not a 'labor organization' within the meaning of the Act, ⁴ because it represents only agricultural laborers who are specifically exempted from the coverage of the Act. ⁵ The complaint in that action has taken an appeal to the General Counsel of the N.L.R.B., in which appeal Antle has joined. The disposition, if any, of that appeal does not appear in the record herein.

Meanwhile, on September 25, Antle filed a supplemental complaint, alleging, inter alia, that petitioners 'wrongfully and unlawfully instituted a boycott against plaintiff's agricultural products ordering pickets to be placed at and around various grocery stores and other businesses selling plaintiff's products, throughout the State of California and the United States urging the patrons of such stores not to buy products bearing plaintiff's trade name.' An order to show cause was issued on that date and, on October 8, 1970, respondent court issued a second preliminary injunction, in part prohibitory and in part mandatory, which provides in substance that (1) Petitioners are enjoined from publicizing that Antle is engaged in a labor dispute; (2) Petitioners are enjoined from publicizing that Antle's employees are not represented by a labor organization; (3) Petitioners are enjoined from in any way boycotting Antle's products; (4) Petitioners are required to do anything reasonably required to ensure the cessation of boycott activities by members of UFWOC; (5) Petitioner Chavez is required to notify in writing all responsible personnel that all boycott activities against Antle must cease, and to file a copy of such writing with respondent court. ⁶

The preliminary injunction also provides, however, that nothing in it shall be construed as 'enjoining conduct which reasonably could be construed to be an unfair labor practice under 8(b)(4) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 * * *.' The injunction then specifies that the following described conduct is Not within the purview of section 8(b)(4): '(1) Handbilling to advertize (sic) that a labor dispute exists between plaintiff and defendant UFWOC unless the same has an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than plaintiff in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer other than plaintiff engaged in distribution of plaintiff's products. (2) Picketing, handbilling, or advertising to encourage consumers of plaintiff's products not to buy such products, or to buy the products of producers other than plaintiff.'

On November 9, petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the preliminary injunction entered on October 8. Respondent, on November 17, issued an order specifying that petitioners' appeal would not stay the enforcement of the injunction unless petitioners filed an undertaking in the sum of two million dollars. On the same day, respondent issued an order to show cause directed to petitioners Chavez and UFWOC, requiring them to appear on December 4 and show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the provisions of the October 8 injunction. On December 4 the hearing was held and UFWOC was fined $1,000 for violation of the prohibitory provisions of the injunction. Chavez was sentenced to and served five days in jail for violation of the prohibitory provisions of the injunction, and was further ordered to remain in jail until such time as he agreed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the injunction. In light of the serious constitutional issues raised by petitioners, we issued an alternative writ of prohibition, staying enforcement of all provisions of the injunction except that which prohibits petitioners from representing that Antle's employees are not represented by a labor organization, and ordering Chavez released on his own recognizance. ⁷

Petitioners challenge the validity of the injunction on two distinct grounds: First, they allege that the activities restrained by respondent are arguably subject to regulation under sections 7 or 8 of the Act ⁸ and, hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board; ⁹ second, petitioners contend that the provisions of the injunction infringe upon their rights of free speech and the injunction is, therefore, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We have concluded that the jurisdiction of respondent court is not preempted by federal law, but that the injunction is, in major part, overly broad and violative of petitioners' First Amendment rights.

Turning first to petitioners' contention that jurisdiction has been preempted, we note that it is well settled that if the activity restrained by respondent is subject to regulation under the Act, state court jurisdiction is preempted. ¹⁰ And even though the conduct in question is not clearly so subject, if it is arguably within the scope of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, the state courts must defer to the jurisdiction of the board. ¹¹ Here petitioners place substantial reliance on the fact that unfair labor practices were alleged in a charge filed with the regional director. But as we have noted above, the director refused to issue a complaint in the matter. We deem it of no consequence that the charging party has chosen to appeal that decision, ¹² since the bare assertion by an interested party that certain conduct is within the scope of the Act is obviously insufficient to oust a state court of jurisdiction. Petitioners contention must therefore stand or fall on UFWOC's being either a 'labor organization' or the agent of a labor organization, within the meaning of the Act.

For purposes of the Act, a 'labor organization' is defined in section 2, subdivision (5), of the Act, as an organization 'in which employees participate and which exists for (certain enumerated purposes).' ¹³ The term 'employee' is defined in section 2, subdivision (3), of the Act specifically to exclude 'any individual employed as an agricultural laborer.' ¹⁴ Petitioners concede that UFWOC represents only agricultural laborers and, therefore, is not a 'labor organization,' but they contend that since section 8, subdivision (b), subsection (4), of the Act ¹⁵ prohibits unfair labor practices by a labor organization 'or its agents,' they are arguably subject to the provisions of the Act, as 'agents' of the AFL--CIO.

The AFL--CIO is a 'labor organization' for purposes of the Act. ¹⁶ Hence, if UFWOC were acting as the agent of the AFL--CIO in engaging in the activities in question, it might well come within the cited...