United Mine Workers of America v. Patton
Decision Date | 15 March 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 6699.,6699. |
Citation | 211 F.2d 742 |
Parties | UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. v. PATTON et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
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Stuart B. Campbell, Wytheville, Va., and M. E. Boiarsky, Charleston, W. Va. (Harrison Combs, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellants.
Robert T. Winston, Jr., and Fred B. Greear, Norton, Va. (Greear, Bowen, Mullins & Winston, Norton, Va., on brief), for appellees.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action to recover damages under the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 141 et seq. Plaintiffs are partners who were engaged in conducting a mining operation in the coal fields of Western Virginia. Defendants are the United Mine Workers of America and District 28 of that organization. The basis of the action is that the defendants by a strike at the mines of the Clinchfield Coal Corporation caused that corporation to cease doing business with plaintiffs and that this resulted in the destruction of plaintiffs' business. There was a trial before a jury which found in favor of plaintiffs and awarded them actual damages in the sum of $150,000 and punitive damages in the sum of $75,000. From judgment on this verdict the defendants have appealed. Four principal questions are presented by the appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury, (2) whether punitive damages were recoverable under the statute; (3) whether there was prejudicial error in the admission of testimony; and (4) whether there was prejudicial error in the charge of the court.
We think that the evidence adduced was amply sufficient to take the case to the jury with respect to the liability of both defendants for the damages which plaintiffs allege. The facts are that the plaintiffs in the year 1949 purchased from one Willard Moore the mining equipment at the Laurel Branch Mine, a truck mine which was being operated by him on the coal lands owned by the Clinchfield Coal Corporation, and acquired from the corporation a lease on coal lands which would enable them to continue the operation of the mine. The lease was cancelled in October 1949 pursuant to the terms of a cancellation clause, but plaintiffs were allowed to continue the operation of the mine from day to day until Nov. 26, 1949. Clinchfield was operating its mines on a union basis, but was having labor trouble because a number of truck mines upon its property, including that of plaintiffs, were being operated non-union. It is a fair inference from the testimony that the cancellation of plaintiffs' lease was because of this trouble. Upon receiving notice to discontinue mining operations at their mine, plaintiffs inquired of Clinchfield's production manager how operations could be resumed and were told to get in touch with the field representative of District 28 of the United Mine Workers. They did this and entered into an agreement with him to operate the Laurel Branch Mine on a union basis. A collective bargaining contract was accordingly entered into with District 28 and the mine again began operating.
Shortly after operations at the mine had been resumed, plaintiffs were told by one Rush, the land agent for Clinchfield, that they would be given by Clinchfield a three year non-cancellable lease on the coal lands that they were operating. They signed such a lease which was tendered them by Rush and left it with him to be completed by the signature of the proper officer of Clinchfield and the attachment of a survey setting forth the lands which it embraced. The lease was signed by the proper officer of Clinchfield but it was never completed by the attachment of the survey and was never delivered to plaintiffs.
In the course of the conversation with Rush, plaintiffs inquired whether they would have to operate the mine on a union basis and were told that that was a matter for them to decide. Following the conversation they decided to operate non-union and so notified their employees. Similar action was taken by other truck mines; and the union, blaming Clinchfield for this action, called strikes in mines operated by Clinchfield for the purpose of forcing unionization of the truck mines, thinking that they could accomplish this by force exerted on Clinchfield, as the truck mines were on the property of Clinchfield and their product was handled at the Clinchfield docks. These strikes lasted approximately a week, after which the men went back to work but with a threat from the union that, if the non-union operation of the truck mines was not ended within a week, the strikes would be resumed. Clinchfield thereupon notified plaintiffs to cease mining operations and plaintiffs, not having received the lease for which they had negotiated, and thinking that they had no right to continue mining on Clinchfield's property, desisted from further operations and sold their mining equipment to Clinchfield. There is some conflict in the testimony as to whether mining operations were voluntarily abandoned by plaintiffs or whether abandonment was forced by the demand of Clinchfield brought about in turn by the strikes and threats of the union; but when the evidence is viewed, as it must be on motion for directed verdict, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there can be no question but that there is substantial evidence to support plaintiffs' contention.
On the question of damages the evidence is that plaintiffs purchased the equipment of Moore for $25,000 paying only $10,000 in cash and the remainder on a tonnage basis as their mining operations went forward. From March 1949 to March 1950 they returned net income as a result of the operations of approximately $47,000 and contend that the actual profits were in excess of $60,000. They introduced a witness who estimated the profits for the remaining months of the three year lease at $125,274.92, based on the old operating costs and the current price of coal, and at $232,289.62, based upon reduced cost of operations considered possible.
On these facts we think that the case was one for the jury under § 303(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 158, 159, 29 U.S.C.A. § 187(b) which provides:
"Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or of any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit."
There was certainly evidence tending to show a violation by defendants of section 303(a) of the Act, 61 Stat. 158, 29 U.S.C.A. § 187(a), which provides:
The chief argument of defendants in support of their motion for directed verdict is that there is no evidence that they authorized or ratified the strikes upon which plaintiffs rely for recovery. It is true that there is no evidence of any resolution of either the United Mine Workers or District 28 authorizing or ratifying the strikes. There is evidence, however, that the strikes were called by the Field Representative of the United Mine Workers, who was employed by District 28, and that he was engaged in the organization work that was being carried on by the international union through District 28, which was a mere division of the international union. Members of the union are members of local and district unions as well as the international; and of the $4 monthly dues paid by them, $2 goes to the international union, $1 to the local union and $1 to the district organization. It is clear that in carrying on organizational work the field representative is engaged in the business of both the international union and the district and that both are responsible for acts done by him within the scope and course of his employment. Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 545-548, 20 L.Ed. 491; Hindman v. First Nat. Bk. of Louisville, 6 Cir., 112 F. 931, 57 L.R.A. 108; Oman v. United States, 10 Cir., 179 F.2d 738; United States v. Waters, 7 Cir., 194 F.2d 866; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 824, 27 S.E. 2d 198; 2 Am.Jur. 279; A.L.I. Restatement of Agency, sec. 212. The relationship between the international union and the district organization was pointed out by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694, 703-704, where the court said:
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