United States v. Atchison
| Decision Date | 10 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11 C 6792 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel MIGUEL BRITO, Petitioner, v. MIKE ATCHISON, Warden, MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
Before the Court is Petitioner Miguel Brito's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies the Petition.
On December 2, 2004, Petitioner Miguel Brito (hereinafter, the "Petitioner") was charged with first degree murder for allegedly shooting and killing Jesus Campos on October 3, 2004. After a bench trial, on July 25, 2006, Petitioner was acquitted of the first degree murder charge, but was convicted of aggravated discharge of a firearm and armed violence pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) and 720 ILCS 533A-2(c). On November 21, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced as a Class X offender to 38 years' imprisonment.
Petitioner directly appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. While Petitioner's appeal was pending, the Illinois legislature enacted Public Act 95-688, which excluded as a predicate offense to armed violence "any offense that makes the possession or use of a dangerous weapon either an element of the base offense, an aggravated or enhanced version of the offense, or a mandatory sentencing factor that increases the sentencing range." Pub. Act 95-688, §4, eff. October 23, 2007.
While Petitioner's direct appeal was pending, he filed a Petition to Vacate his conviction and sentence in light of Public Act 95-688 pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401. The trial court denied this petition, and Petitioner appealed. The Illinois Appellate Court consolidated Petitioner's direct appeal with his 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 appeal.
On August 7, 2008, the Appellate Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and affirmed the trial court's denial of his 5/2-1401 petition. At this time, Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition.
Petitioner then filed for post-conviction relief under 725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq. In his post-conviction petition, he alleged several constitutional violations based on the fact that Public Act 95-688 should apply retroactively. The trial court rejected Petitioner's arguments and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed thetrial court's dismissal, reasoning that Section 4 of Illinois' Statute on Statutes justified its ruling. The Appellate Court noted that Petitioner's "criminal act and his conviction preceded the substantive amendment to the armed violence statute," and there was no language in Public Act 95-688 that suggested the legislature intended a retroactive application. See Resp't Answer at 5, citing Ex. B at 3-5. Petitioner then sought leave to appeal this ruling to the Illinois Supreme Court, which was denied.
On September 27, 2011, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition with this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In it, Petitioner alleges his conviction is unconstitutional because (1) his due process rights were violated when the trial court applied aggravated discharge of a firearm as a predicate offense for Petitioner's armed violence conviction; (2) his conviction was not final before Public Act 95-688 became effective; and (3) his due process and equal protection rights were violated because the courts failed to apply Public Act 95-688 retroactively.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 limits the ability of district courts to grant habeas relief to state prisoners. Relief will not be granted under Section 2254 unless the Court determines that the state court's adjudication of a claim resulted in either (1) a decision that "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United StatesSupreme Court[;]" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The federal courts review the decisions of the state courts on a deferential standard of review. Griffin v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 831, 841 (7th Cir. 2010). The factual findings of the state court are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption with "clear and convincing evidence." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007).
A federal court may not grant a Petitioner's habeas petition if the court finds that the state court applied state law incorrectly or inappropriately. Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2003). Instead, a federal court can issue a writ under Section 2254 only if it determines that the state court's application of federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). The burden is on the petitioner to show that the state court's determination of fact or its application of federal law was unreasonable. Sturgeon v. Chandler, 552 F.3d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 2009). This is a difficult standard particularly because the courts define unreasonable as "something lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion." McFowler v. Jaimet, 349 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir. 2003).
Additionally, pursuant to Section 2254, state prisoners cannot present a claim in federal court until they exhaust their state court remedies and subject their claims to a complete round of state appeals. See Malone v. Walls, 538 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2008). If a prisoner exhausts his remedies without subjecting each claim to a complete round of appeals, he has procedurally defaulted that claim. Id. When determining whether a petitioner has fairly presented a claim to the state courts, the federal court examines whether the prisoner provided both the relevant facts and law. Id.
At the outset, the Court notes that in the petition, Petitioner purports to raise three distinct claims for habeas review. However, the Court finds each of the three claims substantially similar. In all three, Petitioner argues that the state court should have applied Public Act 95-688 retroactively. Nevertheless, the Court will address each claim in turn.
In his first claim, Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated because his "conviction is an improper compromised judgment." Petr.'s Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5(A); [Dkt. 1, PageID # 13]. Petitioner argues that because the state court acquitted him of first degree murder charges, the court arbitrarily substituted an offense with prison time similar to that of first-degree murder to convict him. Petitioner also contendsthat the version of the statute which he was convicted under was "ambiguous" with respect to what predicate offenses could be used for armed violence convictions. Because of this, he proposes that the Court should apply the doctrine of lenity and vacate his armed violence conviction. See id.
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized that the 'touchstone' of the rule of lenity 'is statutory ambiguity.'" Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1990) citing Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980). However, when determining whether a statute is ambiguous, the courts refuse to apply the rule of lenity merely because it is "possible to articulate a construction more narrow than that urged by the Government." Id. citing McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 657-58 (1982). Instead, the Supreme Court instructs that the rule of lenity should apply only "in situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to "the language and structure, legislative history and motivating policies of the statute." Id. citing Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387.
When interpreting a statute, the courts first examine the plain language giving the words their ordinary meaning. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). "Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language must be ordinarily regarded as conclusive." United States ex rel.Bocian v. Godinez, No. 94-C-6147, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13225 at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1995).
In Illinois, a person commits aggravated discharge of a firearm if 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2. At trial, the court found Petitioner guilty of this offense and used this charge as a predicate offense for Petitioner's armed violence charge.
"A person commits armed violence when he or she personally discharges a firearm that is a Category I or Category II weapon that proximately caused . . . death to another person while committing any felony defined by Illinois law . . ." 720 ILCS 5/33A—1(b)(2). A category I weapon is a handgun. Id. The .22 caliber revolver Petitioner used qualified as a category I weapon. See People v. Ptak, 550 N.E.2d 711 (Ill. 1990) ().
Petitioner argues the words "any felony defined by Illinois law" in the armed violence statute are ambiguous. He contends that support for this argument lies in the Illinois legislature's decision to amend the armed violence statute in 2007 with Public Act 95-688.
After reviewing the plain language of the armed violence statute, as it existed at the time Petitioner was convicted, theCourt does not agree. In this case, because when Petitioner committed his offense, aggravated discharge of a firearm was a felony in Illinois not excluded by the statute, Petitioner was convicted for armed violence. See People v. Hauschild, 871 N.E.2d 1, 20 (Ill. 2007) overruled on other grounds ( a defendant's due process lack of notice argument because "the statutes at issue remained intact" when defendant committed his crime, he was "on notice that his conduct might fall within their scope.").
In People v. Hauschild, a...
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