United States v. Bailey
Decision Date | 13 June 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-1799.,72-1799. |
Citation | 480 F.2d 518 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darwin Clark BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John B. Farese, Ashland, Miss., for defendant-appellant.
H. M. Ray, U. S. Atty., Alfred E. Moreton, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Oxford, Miss., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and WISDOM, GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN, CLARK, INGRAHAM and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
The court convened en banc to consider the propriety of the Allen1 charge. The facts of the case and the charge in question are set out in the panel opinion. United States v. Bailey, 5 Cir., 1972, 468 F.2d 652. We adhere to our decisions approving the Allen charge within the limitations therein delineated. See, e. g., United States v. Sutherland, 5 Cir., 1972, 463 F.2d 641, 647-648; United States v. Williams, 5 Cir., 1971, 447 F.2d 894, 898-900; Posey v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 545, 551-552; Sanders v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 415 F.2d 621, 629-632; Thaggard v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 354 F.2d 735, 738-739. Cf. Green v. United States, 5 Cir., 1962, 309 F.2d 852, 854-856; Powell v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, 297 F.2d 318, 319-322, for supplemental charges which went beyond the pale.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.2
For the reasons stated in my opinion in Thaggard v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 354 F.2d 735, 739, I would, if it were within my power, do away with the Allen charge. Since, however, the Supreme Court of the United States has approved it and after seventy six years has never seen fit to withdraw that approval I consider myself bound by the unchanged views of the High Court.
I concur in the en banc Court's affirmance of this conviction, but for the reasons stated in the panel opinion, 468 F.2d 652, I must respectfully dissent from the Court's refusal to prohibit further use of the "dynamite charge" in this Circuit. The instant conviction was obtained after the trial judge delivered an Allen charge that the original panel held was in compliance with all requirements heretofore laid down in this Circuit. The panel was nevertheless troubled by the use of the charge, and we expressed a desire to reverse the case. Being bound by precedent, however, we were compelled to affirm the conviction, as we can overrule prior Fifth Circuit cases only when we sit en banc. We have now considered the issue while sitting en banc, and the majority of the Court has refused to put an end to any further use of "this abusable relic." 468 F.2d at 669.
My view of the developing law, which has been greatly aided by the excellent briefs supplied by all parties to this appeal, convinces me that this Court should overrule our prior decisions allowing use of the Allen charge and thereby join the jurisdictions that have abolished this type of jury instruction. E. g., United States v. Thomas, 1971, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 449 F.2d 1177 (en banc); United States v. Fioravanti, 3 Cir. 1969, 412 F.2d 407, cert. denied sub nom. Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837, 90 S.Ct. 97, 24 L.Ed.2d 88; United States v. Brown, 7 Cir. 1969, 411 F.2d 930, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017, 90 S.Ct. 578, 24 L.Ed.2d 508. In so doing, I would adopt the persuasive words of Judge Aldisert, who speaking for the Third Circuit in United States v. Fioravanti, supra, wrote:
412 F.2d at 419-420 (footnotes omitted).
It is settled that use of the Allen charge does not per se offend the Constitution, but it is also clear that we have the supervisory power to end its use. Our custodial responsibility over the District Courts is not acquitted merely by the interpretation and application of relevant principles of existing law. As the stewards of justice in this Circuit, we are charged with an additional duty to establish and maintain civilized standards of procedure governing the conduct of trials. As the Ninth Circuit has recently pointed out, a springtide of authority bears witness to the irrefutable existence of this supervisory power:
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