United States v. Batre

• Decision Date: 12 March 1934
• Docket Number: No. 7124.,7124.
• Citation: 69 F.2d 673
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BATRE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

69 F.2d 673 (1934)

UNITED STATES v. BATRE.

No. 7124.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

March 12, 1934.

Clifton Mathews, U. S. Atty., and K. Berry Peterson, both of Phœnix, Ariz., for appellant.

Before WILBUR, SAWTELLE, and GARRECHT, Circuit Judges.

GARRECHT, Circuit Judge.

Appeal from judgment and decree of District Court adjudging a prior contractual lien, held by the mortgagee of an airplane, to be superior and paramount to a lien created by statute for violation of section 11 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (49 USCA § 181).

There is no dispute as to the facts which were found by the District Court to be substantially as follows: One Clair K. Scholey, the owner of a certain biplane, flew the same from Mexico into the United States, landing near Florence, Ariz., which had not been designated as an airport of entry by the Secretary of the Treasury. Scholey reported no circumstances of a forced landing to the collector of customs for the District of Arizona, as would be required to avoid penalty. About three days after his landing in Florence the airplane was seized by inspectors of customs and was placed in the custody of the collector. Alma R. Batre, appellee, was the holder of a duly recorded chattel mortgage in the sum of $4,000, secured by said airplane. A libel in rem to collect the penalty was filed against the airplane, as provided by statute (49 US CA § 181). Thereupon appellee filed an "Intervener's Cross Bill" alleging existence of a chattel mortgage; that it remained unpaid; and that the intervener had no knowledge that the aircraft was being used in violation of the Air Commerce Act. The prayer in intervention was for a declaration that the lien of the chattel mortgage be adjudged superior to the lien for the penalty and that if the airplane be ordered sold the proceeds be first applied to payment of the mortgage. The judgment of the lower court imposed the penalty required, declared the same to be a lien upon the airplane, and ordered the airplane sold with the proceeds to be applied as follows: First, to costs and expenses of seizing, holding, and sale; second, to payment of amount of mortgage; and, third, to payment of the penalty. From this judgment the government appeals. The record comes to us on the undisputed facts, the sole point urged as error upon appeal being the action of the court in giving the lien of the chattel mortgage priority to the penalty lien of the statute.

By the statute the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to designate places as ports of entry at which airplanes crossing the international border must land, and to make such regulations as may be deemed necessary. 49 USCA § 177. For the violation of this statute penalties were imposed, among others being a civil penalty of $500 upon any person violation any regulation, and in case the violation be by the owner or the person in command of the airplane the penalty shall be a lien against the aircraft collectible by proceedings in rem, against the aircraft, conformable to civil suits in admiralty. 49 US CA § 181. In conformity to this statute regulations were promulgated by the Department of Commerce and by the Secretary of the Treasury, making it incumbent upon the person in command of aircraft contemplating entry into the United States from any foreign port or place to inform the collector of customs at the place of intended first landing of the proposed flight; to immediately report upon landing to said collector; and providing for declaration of contents. Should there be a forced landing the regulations make provision for immediate report and inspection. There is also provision exempting regular carriers from certain of the regulations.

This is the first time this court has been called upon to construe the penalty provisions of the Air Commerce Act, and we have applied thereto the recognized rules of construction.

"Cardinal rules for the construction of a statute are that the intention of the legislative body which enacted it should be ascertained and given effect, if possible, regardless of technical rules of construction and the dry words of the enactment; that that intention must be deduced not from a part but from the entire law; that the object which the enacting body sought to attain and the evil which it was endeavoring to remedy may always be considered for the purpose of ascertaining its intention; that the statute must be given a rational, sensible construction; and that, if this be consonant with its terms, it must have an interpretation which will advance the remedy and repress the wrong." Stevens v. Nave-McCord Merc. Co. (C. C. A.) 150 F. 71, 75.

See U. S. v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds (C. C. A.) 139 F. 961, 965, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185; Interstate Drainage & Inv. Co. v. Board of Com'rs, etc. (C. C. A.) 158 F. 270, 273; U. S. v. Hogg et al. (C. C. A.) 112 F. 909, 912.

Generally speaking: "Statutes are construed strictly against forfeiture. A statute which subjects one man's property to be affected by, charged or forfeited for the acts of another, on grounds of public policy, should be strictly construed; it cannot be done by implication." Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) vol. 2, p. 1020.

However, there is a long line of cases which hold that: "Statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public good and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore, although they impose penalties and forfeitures are not to be construed like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature." U. S. v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1, 12, 10 S. Ct. 244, 33 L. Ed. 555, and cases there cited.

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