United States v. Birnbaum
Decision Date | 04 October 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 378-379,Dockets 32063-32064.,378-379 |
Citation | 402 F.2d 24 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Saul I. BIRNBAUM, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
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Peter Fleming, Jr., Douglas S. Liebhafsky, Asst. U. S. Attys., Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., for appellee.
Arnold Bauman, Morton Schlossberg, Christy, Bauman, Frey & Christy, Jerome Lewis, New York City, for appellant.
William J. vanden Heuvel and Charles G. Moerdler, New York City, for St. Augustine's Episcopal School, and others, amicus curiae.
Before WATERMAN and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges, and BARTELS, District Judge.*
Certiorari Denied March 24, 1969. See 89 S.Ct. 1181.
Appellant Birnbaum was convicted upon two counts, the only counts in which he was named, of a four-count indictment charging him with having conspired with others to bribe, and with having bribed, an Internal Revenue Agent. He was sentenced to serve one year on each count, the terms to run concurrently. Upon appeal to our court the conviction was affirmed, United States v. Birnbaum, 373 F.2d 250 (2 Cir.), rehearing denied, 375 F.2d 232 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837, 88 S.Ct. 53, 19 L.Ed.2d 99 (1967).
At the time of the imposition of the sentence on April 1, 1966, the trial judge, Judge Irving Ben Cooper, knowing that Birnbaum would seek a reversal of his conviction, as he had successfully done after a prior conviction upon the same indictment, see United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490 (2 Cir. 1964), addressed the following remarks to him.
Birnbaum's attorneys interpreted the court's remarks to mean that if the conviction was sustained Birnbaum could, by following the guidelines contained in the court's remarks, avoid imprisonment and receive probation.
Judge Cooper's reference to Justice Heller prompted Birnbaum to seek out Justice Heller and ask for advice on how best to follow the course seemingly suggested by Judge Cooper's remarks. Justice Heller1 then approached Judge Cooper at a charity dinner and mentioned Birnbaum's case and the fact that Birnbaum was troubled because he did not know what to do in light of what Judge Cooper had said at the sentencing. Judge Cooper told Justice Heller that Justice Heller could, if he wished, provide guidance for Birnbaum. Justice Heller then suggested three charities in which Birnbaum might become active, and Judge Cooper indicated that he had no objection.
Thereafter, Birnbaum, while his appeal was pending, contributed large amounts of money2 to the charities and devoted one or two days a week to their work. This fact was mentioned when Justice Heller happened later to meet Judge Cooper at the theater. According to Justice Heller, Judge Cooper said: "That is fine, that is good."3
After Birnbaum's conviction had been affirmed and certiorari to the United States Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals had been denied, Birnbaum, represented by counsel, moved Judge Cooper pursuant to Rule 35, Fed.R.Crim.P. for a reduction of the one year imprisonment term and for a suspension of the imprisonment sentence. The motion was argued at length on November 15, 1967. Decision was reserved, and Judge Cooper called for an updated probation report.4 On December 6, 1967, Judge Cooper filed an opinion denying Birnbaum's application. He stated that he had "given long and careful consideration to all of the facts and circumstances of this case, including the defendant's background, the nature and gravity of the offense of which he stands convicted, the probation report from which we have obtained the greatest possible assistance, the papers on which this application is predicated and the presentations of learned and able counsel," and was "satisfied that the sentence imposed on April 1, 1966, should not be disturbed."
Birnbaum then moved for a reargument of this motion. Judge Cooper considered this new motion and, on January 4, 1968, denied it after "estimating the extent of defendant's activities since imposition of sentence and weighing the justice due community and defendant alike * * *." Birnbaum timely appealed from this order.
On January 23, 1968, Birnbaum applied to the district court for an order to show cause why a writ of coram nobis should not be granted, to review and correct the sentence so as to place Birnbaum on probation, and, in any event, why, inasmuch as Birnbaum was challenging the legality of Judge Cooper's act, a hearing should not be had at which Judge Cooper would be a summoned witness, to present the relevant facts to the court. This application was heard on January 27 by Judge Inzer Wyatt who promptly denied it after extensive oral argument. This order has been appealed to this court.
The two appeals have been consolidated, several stays of execution have been granted, and appellant has not yet commenced to serve his sentence of imprisonment.
Appellant first contends that he has been serving a suspended sentence and has legally been a probationer since April 1, 1966; therefore Judge Cooper's orders directing that appellant's prison sentence be served constituted an illegal revocation of probation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656. Appellant maintains that Judge Cooper's sentencing statements and subsequent actions have shown a judicial intention to invoke the provisions of the Federal Probation Act and to place appellant on a probationary status. Of course Judge Cooper's actions failed to comply with the requirements of the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656, which appellant admits, but appellant argues that the Federal Probation Act is a remedial statute which must be liberally construed, e. g., Scalia v. United States, 62 F.2d 220, 223 (1 Cir. 1932); Reeves v. United States, 35 F.2d 323, 325 (8 Cir. 1929); Nix v. James, 7 F.2d 590, 592 (9 Cir. 1925), and liberal construction of the Act permits the status of probation to exist under the Act even though the technical requirements that are prerequisites under the statutes authorizing the act of grace are not fulfilled. McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252 (1 Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966, 76 S.Ct. 1030, 100 L.Ed. 1486 (1956); Campbell v. Aderhold, 36 F.2d 366 (N.D.Ga.1929).
This contention must be rejected. Judge Cooper's statements at appellant's sentencing do not reflect any present intention to place the appellant on probation. At most, the statements only contain an intimation that if appellant made an "impressively convincing showing" of a change in attitude and character before the jury's verdict received the final approval of the appellate courts the sentencing court might then consider suspending the appellant's sentence of imprisonment and might grant probation. The lack of a clear, present intent at the time of sentencing to impose some form of probationary status distinguishes the present case from those cited by appellant. See McHugh v. United States, supra; Campbell v. Aderhold, supra. Both McHugh and Campbell involved situations where the sentencing judge obviously intended to place the convicted person on probation but failed to articulate his intentions unambiguously.
Judge Cooper's and Justice Heller's private conversations at social gatherings do not materially aid appellant's contentions. Even if intended to result in probationing appellant, the conversations could not have had that legal effect. Liberal construction of the Federal Probation Act does not permit a complete disregard of the technical requirements of the Act. The Act expressly contemplates extensive investigation of an accused's background by the probation service of the court before probation may be initially authorized, and close supervision thereafter by a person formally appointed by the court for that purpose, see 18 U.S.C. § 3654, who usually is an officer of the probation service. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656; Rule 32, Fed.R.Crim.P. To allow the status of probation to be formulated and administered during purely social gatherings would not only cause a great deal of enforcement uncertainty but would be contrary to the general policies underlying the Act. Furthermore, Justice Heller's private conversations with...
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