United States v. Cascella
| Decision Date | 29 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 17-038 WES |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JON CASCELLA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Defendant/Movant Jon Cascella has filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Mot. to Vacate”), ECF No. 192, in the above-captioned matter. He has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel (“Mot. for Counsel”), ECF No. 193. The government has filed an objection to the Motion to Vacate (“Gov't Obj.”), ECF No. 198, to which Cascella filed a letter in reply (“Reply”) ECF No. 199. The Court has determined that no hearing is necessary. For the following reasons, the Motion to Vacate is DENIED. The Motion for Counsel is also DENIED.
Between March 29, 2017, and May 4, 2017, Cascella sold methamphetamine on six separate occasions to a Warwick, R.I., undercover police detective to whom he had been introduced by a confidential informant (“CI”) . United States v. Cascella, 943 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2019) (“Cascella II”). The May 4, 2017, transaction also involved a “drugs-for-firearm” trade, assisted by an undercover agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). Id. at 5. Cascella was arrested immediately thereafter. Id. A subsequent search of Cascella's home turned up additional methamphetamine and a smoke grenade. Id. Cascella told the arresting officers that he had been selling drugs to four different customers and wanted a gun for protection because he had previously been robbed. Id.
Cascella was indicted by a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Rhode Island on nine counts: four counts of distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Counts I-IV); two counts of distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (Counts V-VI); one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count VII); one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count VIII); and one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (Count IX). Cascella II, 943 F.3d at 5; Mot. to Vacate at 1; Superseding Indictment at 1-3, ECF No. 51. Cascella pled not guilty and went to trial, proceeding pro se with standby counsel, then hybrid representation. Cascella II, 943 F.3d at 5; Mot. to Vacate at 14. He argued that he was “merely a drug user whom [the CI] and [the undercover detective] entrapped into selling drugs and buying a firearm.” Cascella II, 943 F.3d at 5. Nonetheless, the jury convicted him on all counts. Id.; Am. J. at 1, ECF No. 156.
On April 19, 2018, the Court sentenced Cascella to an aggregate term of 120 months imprisonment, followed by seven years of supervised release. Mot. to Vacate at 1; Transcript of April 19, 2018, Sentencing Hearing Tr. at 49 (“ ”), ECF No. 165; Am. J. at 3-4. A special assessment of $900 was also imposed. Am. J. at 7; Sent. Hr'g. Tr. at 49. An Amended Judgment was entered on April 27, 2018.[1] Am. J. at 1. Cascella appealed, but the First Circuit affirmed the convictions.[2] Cascella II, 943 F.3d at 4, 12; Mot. to Vacate at 2. The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. Cascella v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 2791 (2020) (“Cascella III”); Mot. to Vacate at 2.
On February 23, 2021, [3] Cascella timely filed the instant Motion to Vacate.
Section 2255 provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Generally, the grounds justifying relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) are limited. A court may grant relief pursuant to § 2255 in instances where the court finds a lack of jurisdiction, a constitutional error, or a fundamental error of law. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979). “[A]n error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, § 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal. Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 772 (1st Cir. 1994).
“Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause' and actual ‘prejudice,' or that he is ‘actually innocent'” of the crimes for which he was convicted. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998)(internal citations omitted); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). “Cause” consists of “some objective factor external to the defense . . . .” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488; see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 ( that the Carrier Court “explained clearly that ‘cause' under the cause and prejudice test must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him”). To demonstrate prejudice, the “habeas petitioner must show ‘not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.'” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)) (alteration in original); see also Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 45 (1st Cir. 2002)( ) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A petitioner must show both cause and prejudice. Derman, 298 F.3d at 45.
The “actual innocence” standard “requires the habeas petitioner to show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)(citing Carrier, 447 U.S. at 496). To establish the requisite probability, “a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Moreover, a credible claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324. “The standard is ‘demanding and permits review only in the extraordinary case.'” United States v. Marandola, 372 F.Supp.3d 7, 11 (D.R.I. 2019) (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)). “‘[A]ctual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623. III. Motion to Vacate
In his Motion to Vacate, Cascella presents four claims of error for the Court's consideration. First, he alleges that the Court abused its judicial discretion when it sustained the CI's “blanket assertion” of his Fifth Amendment Privilege against selfincrimination. Mot. to Vacate at 5. Next, Cascella argues that the government interfered with his Sixth Amendment rights by questioning and intimidating a defense witness the day before the witness was scheduled to testify, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. Id. at 7. Third, Cascella claims the government committed misconduct by tampering with evidence, specifically his cell phone data. Id. at 10. Lastly, Cascella alleges that his seven years of supervised release constitutes excessive punishment. Id. at 12. The government counters that all of Cascella's claims are procedurally barred, speculative, or both. Gov't Obj. at 1, 510.
Cascella first argues that the Court abused its discretion by sustaining a defense witness's “blanket assertion” of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, “without ever meeting him and holding a proper Voi [sic] Dire hearing to conduct a particularized inquiry as to each question the defense may wish to explore and pose to . . . the ‘CI', their own witness, to assess the validity of his invocation of his claim ....” Mot. to Vacate at 5. The government responds that Cascella “has already litigated this very claim before the appellate court . . . [and] is barred from pursuing it in the § 2255 context.” Gov't Obj. at 5. The government is correct.
As noted above, § 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal. Knight, 37 F.3d at 772. Nor is it a forum for re-litigating claims that have already been raised and decided. United States v. Singleton, 26 F.3d 233 240 (1st Cir. 1994) ; Dirri...
To continue reading
Request your trial