United States v. Castillo

• Decision Date: 14 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-10830,17-10830
• Citation: 899 F.3d 1208
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wuilson Estuardo Lemus CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

899 F.3d 1208

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Wuilson Estuardo Lemus CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10830

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

August 14, 2018

Lemus Castillo Wuilson, FCI Jesup—Inmate Legal Mail, JESUP, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jonathan Colan, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney Service—SFL, MIAMI, FL, Scott Behnke, Phillip Drew DiRosa, U.S. Attorney's Office, FORT LAUDERDALE, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Valentin Rodriguez, Jr., Valentin Rodriguez, PA, WEST PALM BEACH, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and WOOD,^* District Judge.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide three questions about Wuilson Estuardo Lemus Castillo's conviction and sentence for drug trafficking under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: whether the Fifth Amendment entitles Castillo to relief from his mandatory minimum sentence; whether the Act exceeds the powers of Congress; and whether the government violated Castillo's constitutional rights when it detained him for 19 days before presenting him to a magistrate judge. The Coast Guard stopped Castillo's vessel in international waters on suspicion of drug trafficking. The Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security then detained Castillo for over two weeks while they transported him to Florida, where he received a hearing before a magistrate judge. The government charged Castillo under the Act, and Castillo moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the Act and his detention were unconstitutional. After the district court denied the motion, Castillo pleaded guilty without reserving the right to complain about his detention on appeal. The district court then sentenced him to 132 months of imprisonment after ruling that it could not give Castillo judicial relief from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for his crimes. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2016, the Coast Guard intercepted the Cap Caleb approximately 105 nautical miles from the western coast of Guatemala. When Coast guardsmen approached the Cap Caleb , its crew began to jettison neon green bales that later tested positive for cocaine. Five people, including Wuilson Estuardo Lemus Castillo, were aboard the vessel, and all five asserted Guatemalan nationality. The Coast Guard informed Guatemala about the stop, and Guatemala confirmed the nationality of the vessel and gave the Coast Guard permission to board the Cap Caleb . Guardsmen then boarded the vessel and detained its crew members.

The government held Castillo between August 20 and September 9 while it transported him to the United States and coordinated prosecution with Guatemala. On September 8, the Coast Guard dropped Castillo at Guantanamo Bay, and the Department of Homeland Security airlifted Castillo to Florida on the same day. The next day, the government presented Castillo for an appearance before a magistrate judge.

After the government charged Castillo with drug-trafficking crimes under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b), Castillo moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on three grounds. First, he contended that the Act "violates the Due Process Clause because it does not require proof of a nexus between the United States and a defendant." He underscored that the Coast Guard intercepted the Cap Caleb far from the United States and that he "is a Guatemalan national ... [who] has no connection to the United States whatsoever." Second, he argued that the Act is "beyond the authority granted to Congress under Article I." Third, he complained that his detention violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The district court denied Castillo's motion to dismiss, and Castillo pleaded guilty in a written agreement with the government. Castillo's plea agreement contained no reservation of a right to appeal any issue about his detention.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained that it could not give Castillo and his codefendants the benefit of a statutory safety valve, which permits relief from a mandatory minimum sentence for other kinds of drug offenses, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), because this Court has held that the safety valve does not apply to the Act, see United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz , 679 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2012). The district court stated that, had the safety valve applied, it "very well may have given" Castillo and his fellow crew members "less than [the] 120 month[ ] [mandatory minimum]." But it instead sentenced Castillo to 132 months of imprisonment. The district court explained that this sentence was necessary to punish Castillo more than other crew members who had received the minimum sentence after they "quickly" "accept[ed] responsibility" for their actions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review constitutional questions de novo . See United States v. Osburn , 955 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir. 1992).

III. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion in three parts. First, we explain that Castillo is not entitled to judicial relief from the mandatory minimum sentence. Second, we explain that our precedents foreclose Castillo's arguments about the constitutionality of the Act and its application to him. Third, we explain that Castillo cannot object to his detention on appeal.

A. Castillo Is Not Entitled to the Safety Valve.

The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act grants the United States jurisdiction over "a vessel registered in a foreign nation if that nation has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United States," 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(C), and it forbids individuals on such vessels from both "possess[ing] with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled substance," id. § 70503(a), and conspiring to do the same, id. § 70506(b). First-time offenders are subject to a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years of imprisonment for a violation that "involv[es] ... [five] kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of [cocaine]." 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B) ; see also 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a).

Other federal laws that concern domestic drug offenses provide similar mandatory minimums, see, e.g. , 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) & (b)(1)(A), 960(a) & (b), but a statutory safety valve grants courts the authority to impose sentences below the statutory minimum for certain less-culpable defendants, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). This safety valve does not apply to offenses under the Act. See id. (specifying offenses eligible for the safety valve). As we explained in Pertuz-Pertuz , the "plain text" of the statute compels this disparate treatment, 679 F.3d at 1329, because "the safety valve provision applies only to convictions under five specified offenses," which do not include violations of the Act, id. at 1328 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ("No Title 46 offense appears in the safety-valve statute.").

Castillo contends that the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment entitles him to the kind of relief that the safety valve provides because "[t]here is no rational reason to subject defendants who commit drug trafficking offenses outside the United States to harsher penalties than those who traffic drugs within [its] borders." He underscores that "even defendants who import drugs into the country" or possess "illicit drug[s] while on board a vessel arriving in the United States" may benefit from the safety valve if they are convicted of a domestic trafficking offense, while "a defendant who commits a similar offense half a world away, without any direct effect on the United States, [is] denied the same relief." Castillo concludes that the distinction between domestic and extraterritorial offenders is "at best ... an oversight, and at worst an irrational and arbitrary distinction." We disagree.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. V, forbids the federal government from "denying to any person the equal protection of the laws," United States v. Windsor , 570 U.S. 744, 774, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013), but not all allegations of discrimination are created equal. Instead, the rigor of judicial review depends on the kind of classification at issue. When "the classification infringes fundamental rights or concerns a suspect class," we apply heightened scrutiny. Doe v. Moore , 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005). But other kinds of classifications are subject to a weaker "rational basis test [that asks only] whether they are ‘rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.’ " Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. , 473 U.S. 432, 446, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) ).

Under rational basis review, we apply "a strong presumption of validity," Heller v. Doe by Doe , 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993), and narrowly inquire if the "enacting government body could have been pursing" "a legitimate government purpose," United States v. Ferreira , 275 F.3d 1020, 1026 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Joel v. City of Orlando , 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000) ). If we discern a legitimate goal, we then ask only "whether a rational basis exists for the enacting governmental body to believe that the legislation would further the hypothesized purpose." Id. (quoting Joel , 232 F.3d at 1358 ). This inquiry occurs entirely in the abstract because "[t]he actual motivations of the enacting governmental body are entirely irrelevant," as is whether the legitimate "basis was actually considered by the legislative body." Id. (quoting Joel , 232 F.3d at 1358 ). Indeed, the government "has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification," Heller , 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, and the complaining party has the burden to "negat[e] every conceivable basis which might support it," id. (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. , 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (...