United States v. Certain Parcels of Land In Fairfax County, Commonwealth of Virginia

• Decision Date: 06 April 1953
• Docket Number: No. 253,253
• Citation: 73 S.Ct. 693,345 U.S. 344,97 L.Ed. 1061
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND IN FAIRFAX COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

345 U.S. 344

73 S.Ct. 693

97 L.Ed. 1061

UNITED STATES

v CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND IN FAIRFAX COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, et al.

No. 253.

Argued Jan. 9, 1953.

Decided April 6, 1953.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1953.

See 345 U.S. 960, 73 S.Ct. 936.

Mr. Rowland F. Kirks, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Frederick A. Ballard, Washington, D.C., for respondents.

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This nine-year-old proceeding is for the condemnation of certain easements in land and title to sewer mains which together comprise the sewerage system of Belle Haven, a residential subdivision in Fairfax County, Virginia. It was brought under the authority of Title II, § 202 of the Act of June 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 361,¹ and a rider on the Appropriation Act of July 15, 1943, 57 Stat. 565,² both amendments to the Lanham Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, 42 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1521 et seq. Questions important in the administration of the Act moved us to grant certiorari, 344 U.S. 812, 73 S.Ct. 44, to review the dismissal of the government petition. 4 Cir., 196 F.2d 657, affirming, D.C., 101 F.Supp. 172.

During World War II defense housing needs in the Washington area led the government to construct a large sewer project to serve defense housing properties in Fair- fax County. It sought to utilize, as a part of its trunkline sewer, existing easements containing sewer pipes in the system originally constructed by respondent Belle Haven Realty Corporation. Negotiations produced an agreement under which the corporation, still holder of the fee, was to accept nominal compensation for its sewer properties on the condition that the government take the entire system and that the final order protect the Belle Haven householders against any future charges for its use. The government then filed a condemnation petition together with a declaration of taking and deposited estimated just compensation of $2. Possession was taken under court order, Belle Haven's outfalls into the Potomac River blocked off, and its sewage diverted into the government's trunkline system. In 1948, a group of Belle Haven householders intervened as defendants, alleging that the government had leased the integrated system to the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors and that the latter had undertaken to assess a use charge of $2 per month against each householder in Belle Haven subdivision. The intervenors claimed that they were the equitable owners in fee of the Belle Haven system since the developing corporation had included its construction cost in the purchase price of their lots, that they had been granted easements of user in that system and that the use charges assessed exceeded reasonable maintenance and operation costs. The prayer was that the court, in lieu of direct compensation for their interest, protect them against having to contribute to the amortization of the integrated system. The court decided that the householders had acquired implied easements in the Belle Haven system for which they were entitled to claim compensation and intervention was granted. D.C., 89 F.Supp. 571. But the district judge held that he could not make an award in the form of a limitation on future use charges and he denied a temporary injunction against the collection of current bills. D.C., 89 F.Supp. 567. The intervenors then amended their answer to attack the taking as unauthorized under the Lanham Act. The Belle Haven Realty Corporation, which had not previously answered the government's petition, did so in 1950, claiming it was the legal owner of the system and entitled to its present reproduction cost, less depreciation, as just compensation.

The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Lanham Act, as amended, required the consent of the intervenors as well as the realty corporation, that the corporation had only conditionally consented to the taking and that the householders had not consented at all. While the Court of Appeals approved the trial court's reading of the statutory consent requirement, it declined to base its affirmance on that ground because, 'It is perfectly clear * * * that the power of condemnation given by the Lanham Act extends only to lands or interests in lands; * * * there is nothing in the act which authorizes the condemnation of a public works system such as this.' 4 Cir., 196 F.2d 657, 662, relying on Puerto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 1 Cir., 131 F.2d 491.

The original Lanham Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, was designed to provide relief for defense areas found by the President to be suffering from an existing or impending housing shortage. In such cases, the Federal Works Administrator was empowered to acquire 'improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands' for construction sites by purchase, donation, exchange, lease or condemnation. The quoted language describing the kind of property which the Administrator could condemn was carried over into Title II of the Act added in 1941 which extended the statute to public works shortages in defense areas. 'Public work,' as defined, included sewers and sewage facilities. § 201. While the general lan- guage 'improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands' included within § 202 of Title II of the Lanham Act appears to authorize the taking here, United States v. Carmack, 1946, 329 U.S. 230, 242, 243, n. 13, 67 S.Ct. 252, 257, 258, 91 L.Ed. 209, it is not necessary to depend on that section alone. In 1943, the Act was amended to provide that 'none of the funds authorized herein shall be used to acquire public works already operated by public or private agencies, except where funds are allotted for substantial additions or improvements to such public works and with the consent of the owners thereof * * *.' 57 Stat. 565, 42 U.S.C. § 1534, note, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1534, note. The 1943 amendment was in effect when the present petition was filed and its applicability here is common ground among the parties. It explicitly authorized the condemnation of such property subject to the conditions stated.

In this connection, we do not believe that the consent requirement bars acquisitions by condemnation. This interpretation would strip it of significance since the other means of acquiring property described in the statute necessarily rest on consensual transactions. Although condemnation is sometimes regarded as a taking without the owner's consent, 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 1, it is not anomalous to provide for such consent which can, in effect, represent an election to have value determined by a court rather than by the parties. In addition, 'friendly' condemnation proceedings are often used to obtain clear title where price is already settled. Cf. Danforth v. United States, 1939, 308 U.S. 271, 60 S.Ct. 231, 84 L.Ed. 240. Thus construed, all of the statutory terms are given effect.

Here, the consent of Belle Haven Realty Corporation was implicit in its promise to accept nominal damages. That consent cannot be characterized as conditional. Indeed, the corporation's answer, filed six years later, recognized this; rather than resisting the taking, it merely asserted a claim for more than nominal compensation.

Whether the intervening householders were 'owners' whose consent was required is a different matter. Their interests were regarded by both courts below as implied easements or rights of user in the sewer system. It is true that easement holders have been held to be 'owners' as that term is used in condemnation statutes. Swanson v. United States, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 442, 445, 170 A.L.R. 258; United States v. Welch, 1910, 217 U.S. 333, 30 S.Ct. 527, 54 L.Ed. 787; cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 1945, 323 U.S. 373, 378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 359, 89 L.Ed. 311. But the relevant question in those cases is whether the holders of such interests are entitled to compensation under the Constitution. The compensability of these interests is not in issue here; it follows that the cases on which intervenors rely are not controlling.³ In deciding who are 'owners' here, we look to the scheme of the Act itself. We think it unlikely that, in providing for the condemnation of public works, Congress at the same time intended to make preliminary negotiations so cumbersome as to virtually nullify the power granted. Yet the interpretation pressed by respondents would have that effect. It would compel the government, before taking public works, to deal with the holder of every servitude to which the property might be subject. We hold that intervenors were not 'owners' under the 1943 amendment and that the government was not required before condemning to engage in a round robin to secure from each of them a self-serving 'Barkis is willin'.'

We do not pass on other issues raised by respondents, some of which if decided adversely to the government might be cured by amendment, and others we deem not ripe for adjudication because of factual questions not yet resolved.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Chief Justice VINSON, with whom Mr. Justice REED joins, dissenting.

Respondent-intervenors, the Belle Haven property owners, have paid for the property under condemnation. They are held to be 'owners pro tanto', of the sewerage system under Virginia law,¹ and their interest in the system is characterized as constituting '* * * the only real value that it had.'² Yet, this Court holds that they are not 'owners' for the purposes of a federal law, in which Congress reluctantly authorized acquisition of privately owned utilities on the condition that consent of the owners first be obtained.

One basic error underlies the decision—the assumption that Congress intended to facilitate national acquisition of going private utilities by the amended provisions of the Lanham Act.³ 54 Stat. 1125, 55 Stat. 361, 57 Stat 565, 42 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1521 et...