United States v. Christensen

• Decision Date: 24 April 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 17-cr-20037-JES-JEH
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. BRENDT A. CHRISTENSEN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. BRENDT A. CHRISTENSEN, Defendant.

Case No. 17-cr-20037-JES-JEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

April 24, 2019

ORDER AND OPINION

Now before the Court are the following:

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 101) to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravating Factor of "Obstruction of Investigation," the United States' Omnibus Response (Doc. 150) to Defendant's Motion to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravators, and Defendant's Reply (Doc. 177);

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 103) to Strike all Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors in their Entirety, and the United States' Response (Doc. 151);

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 104) to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravating Factor of "Lack of Remorse" as Duplicative of "Future Dangerousness," and the United States' Response (Doc. 149);

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 105) to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravating Factor of "Vulnerability of Victim," the United States' Omnibus Response (Doc. 150) to Defendant's Motion to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravators, and Defendant's Reply (Doc. 176); • Defendant's Motion (Doc. 106) to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravating Factor of Victim Impact Evidence, and the United States' Omnibus Response (Doc. 150) to Defendant's Motion to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravators;

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 107) to Strike "Substantial Planning and Premeditation" as an Aggravating Factor, and the United States' Consolidated Response (Doc. 152) to Defendant's Motions to Strike All Alleged Statutory Aggravating Factors;

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 108) to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravating Factor of "Other Serious Acts of Violence," the United States' Omnibus Response (Doc. 150) to Defendant's Motion to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravators, and Defendant's Reply (Doc. 175);

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 109) to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravating Factor of "Lack of Remorse," and the United States' Omnibus Response (Doc. 150) to Defendant's Motion to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravators;

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 111) to Strike Statutory Aggravating Factor of "Especially Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Manner" of Committing the Offense, and the United States' Consolidated Response (Doc. 152) to Defendant's Motions to Strike All Alleged Statutory Aggravating Factors;

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 112) to Strike "Death During the Commission of Another Crime" as an Aggravating Factor, and the United States' Consolidated Response (Doc. 152) to Defendant's Motions to Strike All Alleged Statutory Aggravating Factors; and

• Defendant's Motion (Doc. 122) to Strike Aggravating Factor Alleging Future Dangerousness, and the United States' Omnibus Response (Doc. 150) to Defendant's Motion to Strike Non-Statutory Aggravators.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Brendt A. Christensen was arrested by federal agents on June 30, 2017, pursuant to a criminal complaint which charged him with the kidnapping of Yingying Zhang, a female Chinese national, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201. Doc. 1. Christensen was later indicted by a federal grand jury sitting in the Urbana Division of the Central District of Illinois. See Doc. 13 (Indictment), Doc. 26 (Superseding Indictment). The Superseding Indictment charges Christensen with kidnapping resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (Count 1), and making false statements to FBI agents investigating Yingying Zhang's disappearance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (Counts 2, 3). Doc. 26. The Superseding Indictment returned by the grand jury also included a notice of special findings regarding the nature of the offense charged in Count 1, including that the death of the victim was intentional, that it occurred during the commission of kidnapping, that it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, and that Defendant committed the offense after substantial planning and premeditation. Id. The special findings alleged in the Superseding Indictment made the case eligible for capital punishment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq.

On January 19, 2018, the United States filed its Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death. Doc. 54; see also 18 U.S.C. §3593(a). The NOI alleges the following four intent factors: (1) Defendant intentionally killed Y.Z. (18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)); (2) Defendant intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of Y.Z. (18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(B)); (3) Defendant intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken and intending that lethal force would be used in connection with a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, and Y.Z. died as a result of the act (18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(C)); and (4) Defendant intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of violence, knowing that theact created a grave risk of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, such that participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for human life and Y.Z. died as a result of the act (18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(D)). Doc. 54, at 1-2.

The NOI also alleged the following aggravating factors:

II. STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS

1. Death during commission of another crime. The death, or injury resulting in death, occurred during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission of, an offense under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1201 (kidnapping). (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3592(c)(1));

2. Heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of committing the offense. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim, Y.Z. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3592(c)(6));

3. Substantial planning and premeditation. The defendant committed the offense after substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 3592(c)(9)).

III. NON-STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS

1. Victim impact evidence. The defendant caused injury, harm, and loss to Y.Z. and loss to her family, friends, and co-workers. The injury, harm, and loss caused by the defendant is evidenced by Y.Z.'s personal characteristics and by the impact of her death upon her family, friends, and co-workers.

2. Future dangerousness of the defendant. The defendant is likely to commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would constitute a continuing and serious threat to the lives and safety of others, as evidenced by, at least, his demonstrated lack of remorse for his acts of violence; his other serious acts of violence; his expressed desire to be known as a killer; and his claims of additional victims and expertise in avoiding detection.

3. Lack of remorse. The defendant has demonstrated, by statements he made following the offense, that he lacked remorse for the kidnapping resulting in the death of Y.Z.

4. Other serious acts of violence. The defendant has committed other serious acts of violence including, at least, the following: in or about 2013, the defendant choked and sexually assaulted M.D., in the Central District of Illinois.

5. Vulnerability of victim. The victim, Y.Z., was particularly vulnerable due to her small stature and limited ability to communicate in English.

6. Obstruction. The defendant attempted to obstruct the investigation of this offense by, at least, making false statements to investigators; destroying or concealing the victim's remains; and sanitizing the crime scene.

Id. at 2-4.

Defendant now moves to strike various aggravating factors. See generally Docs. 101, 103-09, 111-12, 122. The Court will address each Motion in turn, beginning with the challenges to the non-statutory aggravating factors.

LEGAL STANDARD

A constitutional capital sentencing scheme must "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). The capital sentencing process can be divided into two different aspects, the eligibility phase and the selection phase. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971 (1994). "In the eligibility phase, the jury narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, often through consideration of aggravating circumstances." Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998). "In the selection phase, the jury determines whether to impose a death sentence on an eligible defendant." Id.

The Federal Death Penalty Act accomplishes the narrowing objective by requiring the jury to find that the defendant possessed the requisite intent and by requiring the jury to find at least one statutory aggravating factor. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (intent factors); § 3592(c) (statutory aggravating factors). The requirements of § 3591(a) narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty because they limit the specter of capital punishment to those who possess the requisite intent, excluding, for example, those convicted of felony murder. United States v. McCluskey, No. CR 10-2734 JCH, 2013 WL 12329344, at *2 (D.N.M. Oct. 7, 2013) (citing United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 355 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Solomon, 513 F. Supp. 2d 520, 534 (W.D. Pa. 2007); United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 90, 97 (D.D.C. 2000)).

Additionally, the statutory aggravating factors in § 3592(c) narrow the range of conduct for which the death penalty may be considered. United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 944 (10th Cir. 2008). "At the eligibility stage, aggravators have a distinct constitutional function: narrowing the range of conduct for which the death penalty may even be considered." Fields, 516 F.3d at 944-45. Thus, a statutory aggravating factor may not be overbroad—i.e., it must not be applicable to every defendant convicted of murder. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993). Additionally, statutory aggravators must not be vague. An aggravating factor is not...