United States v. Davis

• Decision Date: 07 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-4035,20-4035
• Citation: 997 F.3d 191
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Howard DAVIS, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

997 F.3d 191

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Howard DAVIS, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-4035

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 26, 2021

Decided: May 7, 2021

Marvin D. Miller, THE LAW OFFICES OF MARVIN D. MILLER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Joshua L. Rogers, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Gabriel J. Diaz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Thacker joined.

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

In Arizona v. Gant , the Supreme Court held that incident to an arrest, a vehicle may be searched without a warrant if it was reasonable for the police to believe that the arrestee "could have accessed his car at the time of the search." 556 U.S. 332, 344, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). Here, while Davis was handcuffed with his hands behind his back and lying on his stomach, the police searched his nearby backpack.

The issue we confront in this appeal is whether the Supreme Court's holding in Gant applies beyond the automobile context to the search of a backpack. We join several sister circuits in answering, yes. Accordingly, we vacate and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

On March 1, 2017, at around 2:45 pm, police officer Derek Richardson of the Holly Springs, North Carolina Police Department stopped a gray Honda Accord driven by defendant Howard Davis because he believed that the vehicle's windows were tinted too dark in violation of North Carolina law. Richardson approached Davis and explained that he had pulled Davis over because of the vehicle's window tint and obtained Davis's license and proof of insurance. A search of the relevant databases revealed that Davis's license was valid and that he "had a history of felony drug charges and convictions." J.A. 141.¹

Two additional uniformed officers, David Veiling² and Paul Boyd, arrived in a separate patrol car, parked behind Richardson's vehicle, and activated their car's lights. About three minutes into the stop, while Richardson talked with the other two officers, Davis put his hand out of his window and "ma[de] a pointing gesture indicating that he was leaving." J.A. 142. Davis then drove off without his license or proof of insurance, which were still in Richardson's possession.

The officers gave chase. Davis raced through a residential neighborhood, at times reaching speeds of up to 50 miles per hour—double the neighborhood's speed limit. The pursuit continued until Davis reached a dead-end cul-de-sac, drove in between two houses and into someone's backyard, got out of his vehicle carrying a backpack, ran on foot into a swamp, and got stuck in knee-high water. Richardson, also on foot and roughly seven to ten yards behind Davis, drew his service weapon and ordered Davis to come out of the swamp. Davis complied by returning to dry land, dropping the backpack, and lying down on his stomach.

Richardson patted Davis down and found a large amount of cash on Davis's person. Richardson then handcuffed Davis's hands behind his back and placed him under arrest for "several traffic violations, including felony flee to elude." J.A. 61–62.

Afterwards, Richardson unzipped the closed backpack and discovered "large amounts of cash and two plastic bags containing what appeared to be cocaine."³ J.A. 143. A search of Davis's vehicle revealed a digital scale, a bag containing bundles of cash, and other items. The officers also received a report that a witness had observed Davis toss a firearm out of his car window while fleeing. Acting on this information, the officers recovered a .45 caliber handgun from Davis's path of flight through the residential area.

On June 7, 2017, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Davis with possession with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base and an unspecified quantity of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count I); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count II); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (Count III).

Before trial, Davis filed a motion to suppress, contending that the evidence seized from his backpack and vehicle should be suppressed because the officers’ warrantless searches violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Davis's motion.

On September 11, 2018, a jury returned a guilty verdict on all three Counts. After dismissing Davis's felon-in-possession conviction,⁴ the district court sentenced Davis to 420 months imprisonment on the remaining counts: 360 months on Count I, followed by 60 months on Count II, to be served consecutively. Davis timely filed a notice of appeal.

II.

On appeal of the district court's denial of Davis's motion to suppress, we review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, and we construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Vaughan , 700 F.3d 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2012).

A.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. " ‘A warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions’ to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." United States v. Ferebee , 957 F.3d 406, 418 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Flippo v. West Virginia , 528 U.S. 11, 13, 120 S.Ct. 7, 145 L.Ed.2d 16 (1999) (per curiam)). "The government bears the burden of proof in justifying a warrantless search or seizure." United States v. McGee , 736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013).

One exception to the warrant requirement authorizes searches incident to a lawful arrest. United States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). The search-incident-to-arrest exception allows arresting officers to search both "the arrestee's person and the area ‘within his immediate control.’ " Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 232, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (quoting Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) ).

This exception has its origins in Weeks v. United States , a 1914 decision in which the Supreme Court acknowledged the government's "right"—which had "always" been "recognized under English and American law"—to "search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

More than a half-century later, the Court expounded on the principles underlying the exception in its 1969 decision in Chimel v. California . In that case, police officers engaged in a warrantless search of the defendant's entire home, including his attic and garage. 395 U.S. at 753–54, 89 S.Ct. 2034. The officers justified the search as a search incident to arrest. Id. at 754–55, 89 S.Ct. 2034.

In articulating the limits of the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was "reasonable" for arresting officers to search the person being arrested and the area within his reach (1) "in order to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape" and (2) "in order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction" of evidence. Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034. The Court concluded that there was therefore "ample justification ... for a search of [(1)] the arrestee's person and [(2)] the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. But because there was "no constitutional justification" for the warrantless search of the defendant's entire home , the Court held the search in Chimel to be unreasonable. Id. at 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034.

Four years later, the Supreme Court again considered the boundaries of the exception in United States v. Robinson . There, an officer patted down the defendant during his arrest. 414 U.S. at 220–23, 94 S.Ct. 467. The pat-down search revealed a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen capsules of heroin. Id. at 223, 94 S.Ct. 467. Although the arresting officer expressed no subjective concerns about his safety or the preservation of evidence, the Court held that the search of the defendant's person was permissible because "[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment," and "that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." Id. at 235–36, 94 S.Ct. 467. As to the cigarette package, the Court held that because the officer discovered the package "in the course of a lawful search," the officer was "entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he was entitled to seize them as ‘fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband’ probative of criminal conduct." Id. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 467 (quoting Warden v. Hayden , 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) ).

In 1981, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in New York v. Belton . An officer arrested the four occupants of a vehicle for possession of marijuana. 453 U.S. 454, 455–56, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). While searching the car, the officer unzipped a jacket pocket he found in the back seat and discovered cocaine. Id. at 456, 101 S.Ct. 2860. Recognizing that "courts have found no workable definition of ‘the area within the immediate control of...