United States v. Doggart
| Decision Date | 18 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-5813,17-5813 |
| Citation | 906 F.3d 506 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert R. DOGGART, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Jennifer Niles Coffin, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Perry H. Piper, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jennifer Niles Coffin, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Perry H. Piper, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Thomas E. Chandler, Anna M. Baldwin, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
Rare is the defendant who insists that we find him guilty. Rarer still is the defendant who gets his way.
Robert Doggart is on his way to accomplishing both. After federal agents arrested Doggart for plotting to attack an Islamic community at the foothills of the Catskill Mountains, he attempted to plead guilty to making a threat in interstate commerce, a crime carrying a sentence of no more than five years. But the district court found that he had not made a cognizable threat and rejected his plea under Criminal Rule 11. After that and after the government added some charges, a jury convicted Doggart of solicitation to damage religious property and solicitation to commit arson, leaving him with a sentence of almost 20 years. Because the district court wrongly rejected the plea agreement, we reverse its decision to reject the agreement, leave in place for now the later convictions, and remand for it to reconsider the agreement under the correct law.
Islamberg is a community of around 40 Muslim families near Hancock, New York. It is a self-organized and self-named community, though not a recognized municipality, that sits on 68 acres privately owned by two residents. Along with its private homes, Islamberg has a few shared buildings, including a mosque. In recent years, inaccurate reporting about Islamberg has found its way into the news, including a story suggesting the community supported terrorism.
Doggart is from Tennessee. After running unsuccessfully for Congress in 2014, he started investigating reports about terrorist training camps in Tennessee. One thing led to another, and before long he became obsessed with Islamberg and began to worry that the residents of Islamberg planned to attack New York City.
In February 2015, Doggart posted a message on Facebook calling for the destruction of "Target 3"—his code name for Islamberg—and sought help from other "gunners." R. 14 at 2–4. A confidential source for the FBI saw his message and responded to it. Doggart and the source spoke numerous times over the phone as Doggart tried to recruit him to join his attack on Islamberg. On March 6, Doggart told the source that Id. at 3. Doggart met with the source twice. During the meetings, Doggart stressed his desire to burn down Islamberg’s three main buildings and even kill the town’s residents if necessary. He also showed the informant a shotgun and M4 rifle, the weapons he planned to use for the job.
Doggart also tried to recruit a South Carolina man named William Tint to join him in the attack. Tint offered to help Doggart, noting that he knew a demolitions expert who could help them burn down Islamberg’s main buildings. Doggart replied enthusiastically.
Unwilling to let things proceed any further, the FBI arrested Doggart. The government charged him with one count of making a threat in interstate commerce, based on his March 6 phone call with the confidential source. The parties submitted a plea agreement under which Doggart would plead guilty to the threat charge and the government would not oppose a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court rejected the plea, reasoning that it did not contain a sufficient basis for convicting Doggart of making a threat.
The government filed a new indictment charging Doggart with solicitation to damage religious property. This time Doggart refused to plead guilty. The government filed a superseding indictment containing four charges: solicitation to damage religious property, solicitation to commit arson against the mosque, and two counts of making a threat in interstate commerce. After an eight-day trial, a jury convicted Doggart on all four charges. Doggart moved for acquittal on all of them. The district court granted his motion with respect to the two threat counts, concluding once again that Doggart had not made cognizable threats. The court sentenced him to 235 months on the remaining two solicitation convictions.
Doggart maintains that the district court had no business rejecting his guilty plea, a claim that receives abuse-of-discretion review. See United States v. Cota-Luna , 891 F.3d 639, 648 (6th Cir. 2018). A mistake of law—including a mistake about the meaning of a criminal statute—amounts to an abuse of discretion. Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996).
Criminal defendants have no right to require district courts to accept their guilty pleas. Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). But a district court must provide a sound reason for refusing a plea. Cota-Luna , 891 F.3d at 647. A misunderstanding of law does not count as a sound reason for rejecting a guilty plea and thus amounts to an abuse of discretion. See id. at 648–50 ; id. at 652 (Kethledge, J., concurring in the judgment); see also United States v. Rea-Beltran , 457 F.3d 695, 700–02 (7th Cir. 2006).
Under Criminal Rule 11(b)(3), a district court "must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea" before accepting it—that the defendant’s admitted conduct in other words amounts to an admitted crime, see McCarthy v. United States , 394 U.S. 459, 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). As the district court saw it, Doggart’s admitted conduct—telling the confidential source that he planned to destroy several buildings and kill residents of Islamberg—did not violate the threat statute because his statement did not amount to an objective threat. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
Was that correct? We don’t think so.
Section 875(c) punishes the transmission in interstate commerce of "any communication containing ... any threat to injure the person of another." To convict a person under this law, the government must prove that: (1) the defendant sent a message in interstate commerce; (2) a reasonable observer would view the message as a threat; and (3) the defendant intended the message as a threat. See Elonis v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2011, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015) ; United States v. Jeffries , 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012).
Element one is easy. Doggart knowingly sent a message in interstate commerce—his communication with the FBI source.
Element two is a closer call. But the factual statements in support of the plea satisfy that element too. A reasonable observer would have understood his message as an objectively serious expression of an intent to inflict loss or harm.
Pertinent definitions of threat all revolve around a single theme: an expression of an intent to inflict loss or harm. See Jeffries , 692 F.3d at 483–84 (Sutton, J., dubitante ); see also Elonis , 135 S.Ct. at 2008 ; id. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That’s what the Oxford English Dictionary says: "[T]o declare (usually unconditionally) one’s intention of inflicting injury upon" a person. 11 Oxford English Dictionary 353 (1933). So does Webster’s Second : "Law , specif., an expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm on another by illegal means." Webster’s New International Dictionary 2633 (2d ed. 1942). And so too does Black’s : "A communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another." Black’s Law Dictionary 1708 (10th ed. 2014).
Every circuit to weigh in on the matter has taken the same side on this point. See United States v. Stefanik , 674 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2012) (); United States v. Turner , 720 F.3d 411, 427 (2d Cir. 2013) (); United States v. Stock , 728 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2013) (); United States v. White , 810 F.3d 212, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (); United States v. Morales , 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (); United States v. Stewart , 411 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (); United States v. Jongewaard , 567 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2009) (); Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists , 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (); United States v. Heineman , 767 F.3d 970, 972 (10th Cir. 2014) (); United States v. Alaboud , 347 F.3d 1293, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2003) ().
Measured by this definition, Doggart’s statement qualified objectively as a threat. Doggart told the confidential informant that ...
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