United States v. Donnell

• Decision Date: 04 August 2020
• Docket Number: Case Number: 4:10-CR-65-SDJ-CAN
• Citation: 476 F.Supp.3d 514
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Lamon DONNELL (6)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

476 F.Supp.3d 514

UNITED STATES of America

v.Lamon DONNELL (6)

Case Number: 4:10-CR-65-SDJ-CAN

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.

Signed August 4, 2020

Ernest Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney's Office, Plano, TX, Maureen E. Smith, U. S. Attorney's Office, Sherman, TX, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

SEAN D. JORDAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Lamon Donnell's Motion for Compassionate Release in Light of COVID-19 Pandemic under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (Dkt. #639).¹ The Government has responded in opposition, (Dkt. #641), to which Donnell replied, (Dkt. #643). The Court, having considered the motion, the response, the record, and the applicable law, finds that the motion must be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction .

I. BACKGROUND

Donnell pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 3, 4-Methylenedioxmethamphetamine (MDMA), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was sentenced to a 240-month term of imprisonment and has been in custody since 2012. (Dkt. #504).

Donnell has requested that, because of risks to his health associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, he be released from the Bureau of Prisons's ("BOP") FCI Seagoville facility, where he is currently serving his sentence. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Donnell specifically requests that he be released or, alternatively, that the Court order that he complete the remainder of his sentence on home confinement.

Donnell submitted a request for compassionate release to his warden on April 21, 2020, stating that his health conditions place him at heightened risk of "succumbing to COVID-19" if he is infected. (Dkt. #639-1). Donnell cited his level of chronic care and attached medical records indicating his history of hypertension and its impact on his renal function. (Id. ) Donnell never received a response from the warden.

The Government opposes Donnell's motion, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic is not an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying a reduction in Donnell's sentence and that he cannot otherwise show that an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under the statute. (Dkt. #641).

Donnell subsequently notified the Court that he had COVID-19 and was taken to the hospital for complications. (Dkt. #642). He has since returned to the FCI Seagoville facility. He has alerted the Court that his health has been impacted and that he is still at risk of being infected again as it is his understanding that one can be infected twice by the virus.

II. DISCUSSION

A judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment "constitutes a final judgment and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances." Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 824, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b) ); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One such circumstance, invoked by Donnell, arises from 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which authorizes a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment when "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a reduction exist that are "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," and other procedural and substantive requirements are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Although Donnell has met section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement, he has not met the statute's requirement that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," warranting a reduction of his sentence. Donnell's motion, therefore, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

A. Donnell Has Met Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s Exhaustion Requirement.

Donnell's compassionate-release motion may be considered only if he first meets section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement. The statute provides that a court may not consider any modification to a defendant's sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) unless a motion for such a modification is properly made by the Director of the BOP or by a defendant who has fully exhausted his or her administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Director of the BOP may request a sentence reduction in court at any time. Id. A defendant may also make such a request but only after fully exhausting remedies within the BOP or after 30 days have passed since he or she sought administrative remedies. Id.²

Donnell submitted a request regarding his release, based on concerns relating to COVID-19, to his warden on April 21, 2020. (Dkt. #639-1). He then filed the current motion on June 22, 2020, well after thirty days had elapsed since his request for administrative remedies. Donnell has, therefore, met section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement.

B. Donnell Has Not Met Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s Requirements for Sentence Modification.

1. Donnell must meet section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s requirement that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," warranting a reduction of his sentence.

Under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a district court may grant a sentence reduction if it finds that (1) "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction," (2) "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," and (3) such a reduction is appropriate "after considering the factors set forth in [ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ] to the extent that they are applicable." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Congress did not define what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A), but rather delegated that authority to the Sentencing Commission. In 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), Congress granted the Commission broad authority to promulgate "general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the Commission would further the purposes set forth in [ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) ]." And, as particularly relevant here, in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), "Congress instructed the Commission to ‘describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction [under section 3582(c)(1)(A) ], including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.’ " United States v. Garcia , 655 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) ).

The Commission's policy statements, issued under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), are binding concerning what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "a common sense reading" of section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s phrase that a sentence reduction must be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," is that, "regardless of whether Congress wanted [the Commission's] policy statements to be binding in the sentencing context, it wished them to be binding in § 3582(c) proceedings." Id. "If a sentence reduction is inconsistent with a policy statement, it would violate § 3582(c)'s directive, so policy statements must be binding." Id. ; see also Dillon , 560 U.S. at 827, 130 S.Ct. 2683 (explaining that the Commission's pertinent policy statements are binding on courts where 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) —using the same language as section 3582(c)(1)(A) —permits a sentencing reduction based on a retroactive guidelines amendment only if "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission").

Thus, Donnell cannot obtain a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A) merely by asserting reasons that he, or for that matter this Court, might believe are sufficiently "extraordinary and compelling" to justify a sentence reduction. Instead, under the plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), as well as controlling precedent, Donnell's proffered reasons must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statement concerning what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A).

2. Donnell fails to satisfy section 3582(c)(1)(A) because his alleged "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reduction are not "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."

Donnell's compassionate-release motion turns on his assertion that the risks to his health associated with COVID-19, coupled with his existing hypertension, constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence. Donnell's assertion fails because it is untethered to the Sentencing Commission's binding applicable policy statement in section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Section 1B1.13 describes what will be considered "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and provides no basis for a reduction based on COVID-19.

Section 1B1.13 allows a sentence reduction for "extraordinary and compelling reasons" only if the reasons are "consistent with this policy statement." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A), (3).³ Application note 1 to the policy statement explains that "extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the circumstances set forth below," which include only: (a) a defendant suffering from a terminal illness or other medical condition "that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover"; (b) a defendant at least 65 years old who "is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process" and "has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less"; (c) a defendant who has minor children without a caregiver or with an incapacitated spouse or partner who needs the defendant to be the caregiver; or (...