United States v. Fetters
| Decision Date | 05 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:10-cr-00036,4:10-cr-00036 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ROBBIE DEAN FETTERS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant Robbie Dean Fetters' Motion for New Trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a) filed on April 11, 2011. [Dkt. No. 224.] The government filed a response on April 18, 2011. [Dkt. No. 225.]
A four-day jury trial began on May 28, 2011, with the government represented by Mary Luxa and the defendant represented by Alfredo Parrish. Counsel for defendant moved for a mistrial after the conclusion of the government's evidence on the basis that prejudicial testimony by three separate witnesses (Brian Jeffries, Jimmy Tibbon, and Matthew Jenkins) were grounds for a mistrial. The Court reserved ruling on the motion. On March 31, 2011, the jury convicted the defendant of seven of the eight counts submitted to the jury. On April 8, 2011, the Court denied defendant's motion for mistrial. [Mistrial Order, Dkt. No. 223.]
For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the defendant's Motion for New Trial.
The grand jury returned a superseding eight-count Indictment in this matter on May 27, 2010. [Dkt. No. 30.] The defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Counts One and Nine); conspiracy to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count Three); distribution of a mixture and substance containingmethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Counts Four and Five); possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(I) (Counts Six and Eight); and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of actual methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) (Count Seven).
At trial, three government witnesses brought to the jury's attention potentially prejudicial information regarding the defendant's criminal background.1 Brian Jeffries, a confidential informant, referred to a prior gun charge in his testimony.2 Officer Tibbon then testified about his pat-down search of the defendant at a jail and stated that he asked the defendant to remove his shirt because, Lastly, testimony from Officer Matthew Jenkins referred to situations where stolen cars oftentimes have license plates that do not match vehicle registration documents.3
In each instance, the Court sharply curtailed the testimony from these witnessestouching on the proscribed content. As an additional cautionary measure, the Court gave a limiting instruction in the final jury instructions.4
On March 31, 2011, the jury found the defendant guilty of Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Seven, and Eight, and acquitted the defendant of Count Six. During its deliberations, the jury asked the Court four questions, with three of the four questions related to the counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime. The Court had reserved ruling on the defendant's mistrial motion—on the basis of the testimony of Jeffries, Tibbon, and Jenkins— after the government rested, but denied the motion on April 8, 2011.
The Court addresses defendant's motion for new trial on essentially the same grounds as his mistrial motion. The defendant argues the testimony of the three witnesses was unfairly prejudicial because, "(1) it generalized Fetters' earlier bad acts into bad character, . . . and (2) it may have called for preventive convictions by the jury even though Fetters was innocent of some or all of the crimes charged." [Mistrial Motion, Dkt. No. 224 at 2.] He urges the Court to find that the cumulative effect of the testimony deprived the defendant of a fair trial. [Mistrial Motion Brief, Dkt. No. 224-1 at 4.] The defendant does not raise a sufficiency of the evidence argument. The Court considers the statements made by the three witnesses, and their cumulative effect, and finds that the interests of justice do not warrant a new trial.
A district court may grant a new trial if the interests of justice so requires. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). The Rule 33 remedy should be used sparingly and with caution. United States v. Dodd, 391 F.3d 930, 934 (8th Cir. 2004). The trial court may exercise its broad discretion in considering the motion, United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996), and has broader discretion in granting a new trial than it does in granting a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Boesen, 473 F. Supp. 2d 932, 941 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (citing United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th Cir. 2002)); see United States v. Starr, 533 F.3d 985, 999 (8th Cir. 2008). Unlike a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court need not examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Gascon-Guerrero, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102 (S.D. Iowa 2005). A court may weigh evidence and evaluate for itself the credibility of witnesses to determine if a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Starr, 533 F.3d at 999; United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 668 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rodriguez, 812 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1987).
Motions for new trials based on the weight of evidence are generally discouraged, and the authority to grant such a motion should be exercised "sparingly" and "with caution." United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980). The jury verdict is to be upheld, unless the court determines that a miscarriage of justice will occur. United States v. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d 721, 766 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (quoting Campos, 306 F.3d at 579). Nonetheless, a new trial may be granted under several scenarios. First, a new trial may be granted "if the evidence weighs heavily enough against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice occurred." Ortega v. United States, 270 F.3d 540, 547 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Lacey, 219 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2000)). Second, even if there is sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict, but a preponderate of evidence weighs "sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred, [the court] may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for determinationby another jury." United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 842, 847-48 (8th Cir. 2005) (alteration added); see also United States v. Lewis, 436 F.3d 939, 945 (8th Cir. 2006). The cumulative effect of alleged errors may warrant a new trial where "'the case as a whole presents an image of unfairness that has resulted in the deprivation of a defendant's constitutional rights, even though none of the claimed errors is itself sufficient to require reversal.'" United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1099 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Samples, 456 F.3d 875, 887 (8th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Anwar, 428 F.3d 1102, 1114 (8th Cir. 2005). In both of these circumstances, a district court may abuse its discretion when it "fails to consider a factor that should have been given significant weight, considers and gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commits a clear error of judgment in considering and weighing only proper factors." Campos, 306 F.3d at 580.
Defendant urges the Court to grant the motion for a new trial and find that the witness' testimony "unfairly highlighted propensity evidence." [Dkt. No. 224 at 2.] He asserts that the "cumulative effect of the improper statements" of the "critical witnesses" created an "unfair prejudice" problem under Fed. R. Evid. 403.5 Id. at 5. Although the defendant concedes the statements were not a result of prosecutorial misconduct, he urges the Court to evaluate the statements using the prosecutorial misconduct standard, when the improper remarks "prejudicially affect the defendant's substantive rights so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." [Dkt. No. 224-1 at 3-4.] He cites to United States v. Beeks, for theanalysis of whether there was a fair trial. 224 F.3d 741, 746 (8th Cir. 2000) ().
The government asserts that the statements were not prejudicial and did not result in an unfair trial. The government counters that the "more appropriate standard [for analyzing the statements] is that utilized in evaluating improper testimony." [Govt's Resistance, Dkt. No. 225 at 1.] The Court should, the government argues, look at the "context of the testimony and the prejudice created by it, as juxtaposed against the strengths of the evidence of the defendant's guilt." Id. at 1-2 (quoting United States v. Sherman, 440 F.3d 982, 987-88 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Here, the defendant concedes there was not prosecutorial misconduct because the witnesses volunteered the statements. Thus, in considering whether to grant a new trial on the basis of improper testimony, the Court looks at the "prejudicial effect of any improper testimony . . . by examining the context of the error and the strength of the evidence of the defendant's guilt." United States v. Hollins, 432 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "'It is generally within the discretion of the district court to decide whether the fairness of a trial has been compromised by prejudicial testimony . . . .'" United States v. Espinosa, 585 F.3d 418, 428 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Brandon, 521 F.3d 1019, 1026 (8th Cir. 2008)). Courts should consider improper comments in the context of the entire trial, United States v. Summer, 171 F.3d 636, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1999) (ci...
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