United States v. Floyd
| Decision Date | 11 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-CR-126 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SHANE K. FLOYD, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Shane Floyd's ("Defendant Floyd" or "Floyd") Motion in Limine (Doc. 103), Defendant Floyd's Motion to Sever and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 111), and Defendant Carl Robinson's ("Defendant Robinson" or "Robinson") Motion to Join in Pretrial Motions of Co-Defendants , (Doc. 105-1).1 For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Floyd's Motion in Limine (Doc. 103) is DENIED, Defendant Floyd's Motion to Sever is DENIED (Doc. 111), and Defendant Robinson's to Join in Pretrial Motions of Co-Defendants is GRANTED but is MOOT (Doc. 105-1).
This case arises out of a seven count indictment brought by the United States on June 23, 2014, against Defendants Shane Floyd, Carl Robinson, Christopher Martin, and Kristal Screven (a.k.a. Kristal Allen) for their alleged participation as co-conspirators in a bribe and kickback scheme using funds from the State of Ohio that were being provided to Arise! Academy("Arise"), an Ohio charter school that operated in Dayton, Ohio. On April 13, 2015, the United States filed a Superseding Indictment, (Doc. 100), against the same four defendants. In the Superseding Indictment, Defendant Floyd has been charged with: one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One), one count of federal programs bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (Count Two), and one count of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (Count Four). Defendant Robinson has been charged with one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One) and one count of federal programs bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (Count Three). Defendant Martin has been charged with one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One), one count of federal programs bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (Count Two), and one count of making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (Count Five). Defendant Screven has been charged with one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One), one count of federal programs bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (Count Two), one count of making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (Count Five), and one count of witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (Count Seven).2
Trial in this case is set to begin on Monday, May 18, 2015. In his first Motion in Limine, Defendant Floyd moves this Court dismiss Count Four of the Superseding Indictment and preclude the Government from introducing evidence related to the charges in Count Four during the Government's case-in-chief, asserting that Floyd's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated during the course of the Government's investigation.3 (Motion, Doc. 103 at 2).
Second, Defendant Floyd moves this Court to sever Counts One, Two, and Four of the Superseding Indictment from Counts Three, Five, Six, and Seven for purposes of trial. Defendant Floyd argues that the counts have been improperly joined under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the alternative, Floyd argues that the trial should be severed because of "substantial prejudice" to Defendant under Rule 14 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (See Motion to Sever and Mem. in Support, Doc. 111 at 1, 4).
Defendant Robinson has also filed a pre-trial motion, moving this Court to permit Robinson to "join in the pre-trial motions filed or to be filed on behalf of his co-defendants in this action, to the extent such motions are applicable to him." (Motion, Doc. 105-1).
Motions in limine allow the Court to rule on the admissibility of evidence in advance of trial to expedite proceedings and give the parties advance notice of the evidence they may not rely upon at trial. Bennett v. Bd. of Educ. of Washington County Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., C2-08-CV-0663, 2011 WL 4753414, at * 1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2011) (citing Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir.1997)). To prevail on a motion in limine, the movant must show that evidence is clearly inadmissible. Id. If the movant fails to meet this high standard, a Court should defer evidentiary rulings so that the issues may be resolved in the context of a trial. See Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F.Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D.Ohio 2004). Whether or not to grant a motion in limine is within the discretion of a trial court. Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC, 2:07-CV-568, 2012 WL 5878873, *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2012) (citing Branham v. Thomas Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir.2012)). The Court may reconsider the admissibility of the evidence, however, and even change its ruling on a motion in limine, "as the proceedings give context to the pretrial objections." Bennett, 2011 WL 4753414at * 1 (citing Black v. Columbus Public Schools, No. 2:96-CV-326, 2007 WL 2713873, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2007)).
Floyd moves to suppress statements he made during a pre-indictment meeting to an Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") and a Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") agent, on the grounds of both the Fifth Amendment, which protects a defendant from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and the Sixth Amendment, which provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amends. V and VI.
In Defendant's Motion in Limine, he claims that, prior to any indictment in this case, he "was invited to respond to an investigation" by an FBI agent concerning his role as superintendent of Arise Academy charter school. (Doc. 103 at 1). "In the spirit of cooperation," Defendant asserts, Floyd traveled to Columbus, Ohio where he met with FBI Special Agent Rees, an unnamed woman, and AUSA Douglas Squires. (Id.). During the meeting, Defendant claims that he was not advised that he had the right to be represented by counsel, nor was he informed of his Miranda rights. (Id.). Defendant claims that, because he was "not used to the legal process" and was "somewhat nervous," he gave incorrectly reported the date on which he and codefendant Robinson formed a company called Millenium. (Id. at 1-2). Defendant claims that this "honest error" is being used as the basis for the claim of false statement against him (Count Four), and as proof of a criminal conspiracy between Floyd and Robinson. (Id.). Floyd requests dismissal of Count Four and suppression of any related evidence, claiming that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated.
The Government makes three arguments in response. First, the Government asserts that this Court could, and should, deny Defendant Floyd's Motion simply because his motion cites no legal authority, in contravention of the Local Rules of this District. (Doc. 106 at 3). Second, the Government insists that the meeting described in Floyd's motion was a non-custodial interrogation, and so the agents had no obligation to administer Miranda warnings. (Id.). Third, the Government argues that Floyd's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated until his initial appearance on July 8, 2014, three years after the meeting he complains of, which took place on June 1, 2011. (Id. at 3-4).
As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that Defendant Floyd's motion fails to comply with this District's Local Rules because it fails to cite the legal authorities upon which he relied in making the motion .4 See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2.5 Nevertheless, the Court will consider the merits of Floyd's motion so that the Defendant is not unfairly punished for this error, and because this Court is loath to exhort form and procedure over substance.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law enforcement officers to advise of certain rights, including the right to have counsel present, before interrogating an individual who has been "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom." Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). The Supreme Court has determined that a suspect subject to a "custodial interrogation" must be given notice of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, regardless of whether formal criminal proceedings have begun. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This Fifth Amendment privilege necessarily includes the right to have counsel present at an interrogation, as reflected in the standard warnings developed by the Court in Miranda. Id.
Miranda's procedural safeguards apply, however, only to suspects who are subject to "custodial interrogation." See, e.g., Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 511 (6th Cir. 2010). Any statements made in response to a custodial police interrogation must be suppressed unless a suspect first waives his Miranda rights "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." United States v. Al-Cholan, 610 F.3d 945, 954 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987)).
The Supreme Court has established that whether a suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes is an objective determination that requires two discrete inquiries: "first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1999) (...
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