United States v. Graham
| Decision Date | 07 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-CR-500 (NSR),14-CR-500 (NSR) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. KEVIN GRAHAM, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Defendant, Kevin Graham ("Defendant" or "Graham"), was charged in a three-count indictment with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, attempted sex trafficking and kidnapping.1 On December 8, 2015, Defendant pled guilty before the Honorable Magistrate Judge Lisa M. Smith ("Judge Smith")2 to count three of the indictment pursuant to a plea agreement ("the Agreement"). On January 27, 2016, the Court adopted Judge Smith's Report and Recommendation accepting Defendant's guilty plea. United States v. Graham, 14-CR-500 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2016). On February 4, 2016, this Court sentenced the Defendant to a term of one hundred and fifty-one (151) months imprisonment to be followed by a term of supervised release. (See Judgment, ECF No. 93.) Before the Court is Defendant's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his sentence on the basis that it is excessive, and to vacate his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and legal insufficiency. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED in its entirety.
A motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is an extraordinary remedy. See Moyhernandez v. United States, No. 02 Civ.8062 MBM, 2004 WL 3035479 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2004). 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provides that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
§ 2255(b) provides, in relevant part:
If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A plain reading of the statute contemplates providing a mechanism to detained individuals who seek judicial relief from a wrongfully imposed sentence. It is well settled that § 2255 provides a collateral remedy and not a remedy for an appeal such that it can used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. See, Dansbay v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998).
The Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) provides that before the court may accept a guilty plea, a defendant must be informed of his or her constitutional rights and must demonstrate that the plea is entered voluntarily. Courts have held that for a guilty plea to be deemed valid, itmust be entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)); see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). This standard exists because the failure to obtain a valid plea is deemed a violation of a defendant's due process rights. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. In addition, the court must determine whether the conduct which the Defendant admits to was committed by the accused and constitutes the offense charged in the Indictment, the charging instrument, or the offense for which the defendant has accepted responsibility for pursuant to a plea agreement. See id. at 467 ().
Plea agreements are generally favored because they tend to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and defendants tend to receive more favorable terms at sentencing. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012). It is a basic core principle that plea agreements are to be interpreted under the same standards of contract law, see United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 1996), bearing in mind, however, that they "are unique contracts in which special due process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards obtain." United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir.1996) (quotations and citation omitted), superseded on other grounds as stated in United States v. Cook, 722 F.3d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 2013); accord United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2002). Words and phrases in the agreement are to be given their plain meaning, see United States v. Dionisio, 415 F. Supp. 2d 191, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007), and terms are to be strictly construed. United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 335 (2d Cir. 1996). Any ambiguity in theagreement must be construed against the drafter, typically the Government, see United States v. Gotti, 457 F. Supp. 2d 411, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), because "the Government is usually the party that drafts the agreement, and [because] the Government ordinarily has certain awesome advantages in bargaining power." United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ready, 82 F.3d at 559). In deciding whether a plea agreement has been breached, a court must look to what the parties to the plea agreement reasonably understood its terms to be. United States v. Carbone, 739 F.2d 45, 46 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Paradiso v. United States, 689 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1116 (1983)).
"It is axiomatic that, in a criminal case, the government must prove each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), which defines Kidnaping, provides in relevant part that it shall be unlawfully to seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct, or carry away and hold for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, willfully transport the person in interstate, or the offender travels in interstate, or uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense. The statute contains three elements the government must prove: (1) the defendant unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away the victim; (2) that the victim was transported in interstate commerce while so seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, or abducted, or the Defendant traveled in interstate commerce or used an instrumentality of interstate commerce in committing or infurtherance of the seizing, confining, inveigling, decoying, kidnaping, or abducting; and (3) that the defendant held the victim for ransom, reward, or for any other reason. See Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 459 (1946); United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Corbett, No. 3:10-CR-28 CFD, 2011 WL 2144659, at *4 (D. Conn. May 31, 2011), aff'd, 750 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2014).
Typically, when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1361 (2d Cir. 1991). The court must consider not only direct evidence but the circumstantial evidence proffered. See United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993)). The evidence must be viewed in its totality, not in isolation, and the government is not required to negate every possible theory of innocence. See United States v. Rosenthal, 9 F.3d 1016, 1024 (2d Cir. 1993). When a conviction is obtained pursuant to a plea, the defendant's factual allocution and admission to the crime must support the elements of the crime charged. See United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2005) ().
It is well settled, that counsel owes her client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and when representing a criminal defendant, counsel's role is to assist defendant in his defense within the permissible rules of law. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668(1984). Such assistance includes the duty to advocate defendant's cause, to consult with the accused on all matters of importance and to appraise the defendant of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution "guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all 'critical' stages of the criminal proceedings," Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-228 (1967)), which includes the entry of a guilty plea, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 (1972), and sentencing. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). In regards to a negotiated plea, counsel has the utmost obligation to advise his client of "the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 370 (2010) (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51 (1995)). At sentencing, counsel's sage advice and...
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