United States v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co.

Decision Date30 June 1915
Docket Number2536.
PartiesUNITED STATES v. GRAND RAPIDS & I. RY. CO.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

P. J Doherty, of Washington, D.C., and Myron H. Walker, U.S Atty., of Grand Rapids, Mich., for the United States.

J. H Campbell, of Grand Rapids, Mich., for defendant in error.

Before WARRINGTON, KNAPPEN, and DENISON, Circuit Judges.

WARRINGTON Circuit Judge.

The government commenced two actions of a civil nature against the railroad company to recover penalties amounting to $60,000, for alleged violations of the federal statute commonly known as the Hours of Service Act (34 Stat. 1415). A plea of the general issue was filed to each declaration. The actions appear to have been submitted as a single cause by consent of counsel and upon an agreed statement of facts. An instructed verdict was rendered in favor of defendant judgment was entered accordingly, and the government prosecutes error.

The services in question were rendered during the month of September, 1911, in two telegraph offices maintained by the defendant, one at Pellston and the other at Traverse City, Mich., for purposes, among others, of there receiving and delivering interstate train orders. Two telegraph operators were employed in each office. Defendant's main line extends from Mackinaw City, its northern terminus, through Pellston, some 18 miles southwardly, and to Ft. Wayne, Ind., with a branch line connecting with the main line at Walton Junction and extending a distance of 26 miles to Traverse City. Admittedly the service imposed upon each of the operators in every 24-hour period of the month in issue exceeded 9 hours. At Traverse City, one of the operators was on duty from 4:30 a.m. to 6 a.m., from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m., and from 12 m. to 5 p.m., a total of 10 1/2 hours; and the other operator served from 12 m. to 9:30 p.m., or 9 1/2 hours. It will be observed that the service of both operators was simultaneous from 12 m. to 5 p.m., or 5 hours, though neither was on duty from 6 a.m. to 7 a.m., nor from 11 a.m. to 12 m.; and the office was closed every night from 9:30 p.m. to 4:30 a.m., or 7 hours. At Pellston, during every 24-hour period, one of the operators worked from 6:30 a.m. to 12 m., and from 1 p.m. to 6 p.m., or 10 1/2 hours; and the other operator worked from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m., and from 6 p.m. to 11 p.m., in all 10 hours. Here both operators were on duty regularly from 11 a.m. to 12 m. and from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m., in all 4 hours; and the office was closed every night from 11 p.m. to 6:30 a.m., or 7 1/2 hours.

Counsel in effect agree that the case must turn upon the single question, whether the places of service were 'night and day' offices; but the arguments lead also to an inquiry into what are 'daytime' offices. The question involves an application of the phrase 'offices * * * continuously operated night and day,' [1] to the particular hours and the length of service stated. The words quoted have been judicially considered a number of times, and still their meaning, when applied to the facts above pointed out, is by no means settled. There are, however, at least two settled features of the statute, which are helpful here. One is that the enactment of the law was within the constitutional power of Congress (Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Int. Com. Comm., 221 U.S. 612, 31 Sup.Ct. 621, 55 L.Ed. 878), and the other is that the legislative purpose was to deal with all telegraph offices through which interstate train orders are transmitted (United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 37, 31 Sup.Ct. 362, 55 L.Ed. 361).

1. Much is said in argument touching the right of a railroad company in many instances so to dispose the hours of work as justly to require services on the part of each of its telegraph operators in excess of 9 hours in the course of each 24-hour period. The theory is that the character and extent of the work arising in some of the offices, especially in interstate train dispatching, admit alike of such excess in length of service and ample resting intervals for the operators. The effect of this insistence, as it seems to us, is to substitute the judgment of the railroad companies for that of Congress; and if such a practice can be indulged in at all, it is not easy to perceive where legislation is to end and observance of the legislative enactment is to begin. Mr. Justice Hughes said in the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Case, supra, at page 619 of 221 U.S., at page 625 of 31 S.Ct. (55 L.Ed. 878):

'The length of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency of the human agencies upon which protection to life and property necessarily depends. * * * In its power suitably to provide for the safety of employes and travelers, Congress was not limited to the enactment of laws relating to mechanical appliances; but it was also competent to consider, and to endeavor to reduce, the dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of duty on the part of * * * telegraphers, and other persons embraced within the class defined by the act. * * * If, then, it be assumed, as it must be, that in the furtherance of its purpose Congress can limit the hours of labor of employes engaged in interstate transportation, it follows that this power cannot be defeated either by prolonging the period of service through other requirements of the carriers or by the commingling of duties relating to interstate and intrastate operations.'

We may therefore safely assume that the statutory limits of service, which can be exacted of a telegraph operator within the 24-hour period, must be observed.

2. The portion of the act under which another feature is settled, as stated, is found in the first proviso to section 2:

'That no operator, * * * who by the use of the telegraph * * * reports, transmits, receives, or delivers orders pertaining to or affecting train movements shall be required or permitted to be or remain on duty for a longer period than nine hours in any twenty-four hour period in all towers, offices, places, and stations continuously operated night and day, nor for a longer period than thirteen hours in all towers, offices, places, and stations operated only during the daytime. * * *'

It appeared in the Atchison Railroad Case, supra, that the telegraph office in question was 'shut from 12 to 3 by day and by night, but open the rest of the time. ' The government claimed, among other things, that Congress intended by the proviso to legislate in respect of all towers, offices, etc., and in the course of the opinion Mr. Justice Holmes said, at page 43 of 220 U.S., at page 363 of 31 S.Ct. (55 L.Ed. 361):

'We think the government is right in saying that the proviso is meant to deal with all offices. * * *'

In construing the language of the proviso, then, we may regard the law as settled that the offices now in question were embraced within the terms of the act.

3. We thus come to a consideration of the question: Were the places of service at Traverse City and Pellston, during the time in issue, 'night and day' offices? All telegraph offices falling within the purview of the statute are resolved into two classes-- those 'continuously operated night and day,' and those 'operated only during the daytime.' Since the statute in its present form has been declared to be constitutionally valid (Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Case, supra), the validity of its scheme of classification is not, and it hardly would be, questioned here (United States v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. of Texas, (D.C.) 189 F. 954, 961, and citations, affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. United States, 199 F. 990, 117 C. C. A. 666). The principles underlying classification such as this do not.C.A. 666). require precise adjustment of all the rights and duties involved as respects either persons or things. Even the rule of equality admits of practical inequalities; for, after all, reasonable approximation to exactness furnishes the only standards...

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4 cases
  • United States v. Baltimore & OR Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • February 13, 1943
    ...within the contemplation of law continuously operated night and day." And Circuit Judge Warrington posed, in United States v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., 6 Cir., 224 F. 667, 672, this rhetorical question: "Can it be doubted, for example, that offices are `continuously operated night and day,'......
  • Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co. v. United States
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • March 5, 1918
  • United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
    • United States
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    ... ... of the enactment to ... [234 F. 436] ... be erroneous. See United States v. Grand Rapids & Indiana ... Ry. Co., 224 F. 667, 140 C.C.A. 177, and cases there ... cited; also Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co. v ... United ... ...
  • United States v. Boston & M.R.R., 1470.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • November 24, 1920
    ... ... agreed facts should be viewed as negligible intermissions ... (United States v. Grand Rapids & I.R. Co., 224 F ... 667, 140 C.C.A. 177) or as said in United States v ... Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 220 U.S. 37, 44, 31 Sup.Ct ... ...

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